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ABSTRACTS

Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics

By G. A. ALMOND and S. J. GENCO

In its eagerness to become scientific, political science has in recent decades tended to lose contact with its ontological base. It has tended to treat political events and phenomena as natural events lending themselves to the same explanatory logic as is found in physics and the other hard sciences. This tendency may be understood in part as a phase in the scientific revolution, as a diffusion, in two steps, of ontological and methodological assumptions from the strikingly successful hard sciences: first to psychology and economics, and then from these bellwether human sciences to sociology, anthropology, political science, and even history. In adopting the agenda of hard science, the social sciences, and political science in particular, were encouraged by the neopositivist school of the philosophy of science which legitimated this assumption of ontological and metamethodological homogeneity. More recently, some philosophers of science and some psychologists and economists have had second thoughts about the applicability to human subject matters of strategy used in hard science.

Stability and Change in European Electorates

By A. ZUCKERMAN and M. I. LICHBACH

Arguing counter to the accepted positions of political sociology, we contend that voters' decisions are best explained by the absence or presence of strong loyalties to political parties rather than by social or economic factors. Hence, in areas where most people have strong party attachments, marked change in the partisan division of the vote occurs only when an exceptionally large number of new voters enters the electoral arena; alterations in the social composition of a party's voters follow changes in the occupation or social categories of those who consistently vote for the party. In presenting this argument, we analyze time-series data for Britain, West Germany, and Sweden which negate the predicted development of "catch-all" electorates, and we test the relative power of party and class variables as predictors of voting behavior in Butler's and Stokes's panel study of British voters between 1963 and 1970.

Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis

By L. DITTMER

The concept of political culture embraces some of the most basic, perennially fascinating concerns in behavioral political science; because of certain ambiguities in its theoretical formulation, however, there has been a tendency for the term to grow fuzzy with continued use. Its connection with related concepts, such as political psychology, political structure, and political language, has remained unclear, with the result that political culture has been difficult to isolate as an independent variable. Thus it has come to occupy a position on the periphery of politics, and is usually presumed to reinforce the status quo.

This paper re-examines previous formulations of the concept and proposes a theoretical synthesis. The analytical framework is derived from *semiological theory*, a branch of science specifically designed for the analysis of meanings. The central variable is the *political symbol*. By analyzing the interactions of political symbols within a comprehensive semiological framework, the traditional concerns of political culture can be accommodated in a more precise and systematic way.

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The Global Economy and the Third World: Coalition or Cleavage?

By D. C. SMYTH

Positions taken by delegations in the U.N. General Assembly during debates of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions are analyzed to determine clustering on economic issues and their sources. Third-World states took positions consistently distinct from those of Eastern and Western countries, and economic attributes appear to explain this. Differences within the Third World were not consistent, however, and were more apparent in the Seventh Special Session. Divisions found between Third-World states on issues such as resource allocations and monetary reform included: states with slow versus fast economic growth rates; states dependent on Western versus Eastern aid; and regional differences. Neither OPEC nor a "fourth world" appeared distinct from the Third World as a whole. Coalitions, varying by issue, appeared to overlap to build the Third-World "bloc."

Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making during Crises

By R. MANDEL

This article evaluates one means—political gaming—for coping with the distorted processes and perceptions that are present in foreign policy making during crises. Political games are exercises in which teams representing national governments meet and discuss crisis situations presented in scenarios. American foreign policy makers have engaged in this activity since the late 1950's at the RAND Corporation, M.I.T., the Pentagon, and the C.I.A. Several hypotheses are developed on the changes in decision-making processes generated through political gaming, and on the nature of international perceptions during crises, as reflected through political gaming. These hypotheses are evaluated by means of data from the only unclassified professional-level games on international crises (those at RAND and M.I.T.), from a series of student games conducted at Yale, and from insights gained by the author's direction of two C.I.A. games. The results show that political gaming is indeed effective in improving decision making during crises, and they introduce some new aspects into accepted wisdom about international perceptions during crises.

Braudel's Mediterranean—*Un Défi Latin*

By J. A. ARMSTRONG

Fernand Braudel's immense history of international politics in the sixteenth century is significant for analytic social scientists from two standpoints—methodological and substantive. Although Braudel does not pretend to present a theory of history or international relations, he utilizes a broad range of geographic and economic theory to provide a novel conceptual framework. He devotes particular attention to defining boundaries in time and space. Braudel is highly innovative in his use of quantitative techniques, as in his analysis of communications potentials to delineate the spatial configurations of the sixteenth-century world. Just as Braudel's eclectic methodology suggests alternatives to approaches dominant in North American social science, his substantive emphasis on the pre-eminence of Latin civilization during the formative period of the modern Western world provides an impressive alternative perspective to the Whig interpretation of sixteenth-century history which has generally prevailed in English-speaking countries.

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

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NOTICE TO OUR READERS

Thirtieth Anniversary Issue

October 1978 will mark the 30th anniversary of the initial appearance of WORLD POLITICS. Through the years, the study of international relations and national development has evolved in a series of changing emphases on conceptual approaches, subject matter, and analytical techniques. The editors believe that the 30th anniversary of the journal provides an appropriate opportunity to encourage an evaluation of the themes and methods developed over the past generation, and in particular a discussion of those that seem most promising for the years ahead. They therefore would like to mark this occasion by devoting all or part of an issue to papers concerned with a critique of and the outlook for research trends in international relations and national development.

The editors have chosen to open the proposed anniversary issue to all prospective contributors rather than to commission papers for this purpose. They invite the submission of manuscripts that focus on broad retrospective and prospective views of the study of world politics. Papers received in response to this invitation will be given priority, but must conform to our regular rules and will be handled under normal editorial procedures. Manuscripts submitted for the anniversary issue should be so marked; they should be received before October 1, 1977, and should preferably be no longer than 10,000 words, including footnotes.

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CLOUDS, CLOCKS, AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS

By GABRIEL A. ALMOND and STEPHEN J. GENCO*

IN its eagerness to become scientific, political science has in recent decades tended to lose contact with its ontological base. It has tended to treat political events and phenomena as natural events lending themselves to the same explanatory logic as is found in physics and the other hard sciences. This tendency may be understood in part as a phase in the scientific revolution, as a diffusion, in two steps, of ontological and methodological assumptions from the strikingly successful hard sciences: first to psychology and economics, and then from these bellwether human sciences to sociology, anthropology, political science, and even history. In adopting the agenda of hard science, the social sciences, and political science in particular, were encouraged by the neopositivist school of the philosophy of science which legitimated this assumption of ontological and meta-methodological homogeneity. More recently, some philosophers of science and some psychologists and economists have had second thoughts about the applicability to human subject matters of strategy used in hard science. It may be useful to bring these arguments to the attention of political scientists.

POPPER'S METAPHORS

Karl Popper, who along with R. B. Braithwaite, Carl Hempel, and Ernest Nagel has argued the thesis of meta-methodological homogeneity, more recently has stressed the heterogeneity of reality, and its unamenability to a single model of scientific explanation. He uses the metaphor of clouds and clocks to represent the commonsense notions of determinacy and indeterminacy in physical systems. He asks us to imagine a continuum stretching from the most irregular, disorderly, and unpredictable "clouds" on the left to the most regular, orderly, and predictable "clocks" on the right. As the best example of a deterministic system near the clock-extreme, Popper cites the solar system. Toward this end of the continuum we would find such phenomena as pendulums, precision clocks, and motor cars. As an example of a system near the other, indeterminate, end of the continuum, he cites a cluster of gnats or small flies in which each insect moves randomly except that

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Edinburgh IPSA Congress, August 1976.

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it turns back toward the center when it strays too far from the swarm. Near this extreme we would find gas clouds, the weather, schools of fish, human societies and, perhaps a bit closer toward the center, individual human beings and animals.

The Newtonian revolution in physics popularized the notion—which was to persist for approximately 250 years—that this commonsense arrangement was in error. The success of Newton's theory in explaining and predicting a multitude of celestial and earthbound events by his laws of motion led most thinkers—although not Newton himself—to embrace the position that the universe and all its parts were by nature clocklike and in principle completely predictable. Phenomena that had the appearance of indeterminacy were viewed as being merely poorly understood; in time, they also were expected to be found regular and predictable. Thus, the reigning model of science after Newton affirmed that all nature was governed by deterministic laws or, to put it in Popper's metaphor, "*all clouds are clocks*—even the most cloudy of clouds."[1]

In the 1920's, the development of quantum theory challenged this clocklike model of nature and supported the view that indeterminacy and chance were fundamental to all natural processes. With this discovery, Popper's metaphor was inverted; now the dominant view held that "to some degree *all clocks are clouds*; or in other words, that *only clouds exist*, though clouds of very different degrees of cloudiness."[2] Many scientists and philosophers greeted this change of model with relief, since it seemed to free them from the nightmare of determinism that denied the efficacy of human choices and goals.

But Popper goes on to argue his central point, that "*indeterminism is not enough*" to account for the apparent autonomy of human ideas in the physical world. "If determinism is true, then the whole world is a perfectly running flawless clock, including all clouds, all organisms, all animals, all men. If, on the other hand, Pierce's or Heisenberg's or some other form of indeterminism is true, then sheer *chance* plays a major role in our physical world. But is chance really more satisfactory than determinism?"[3]

Popper answers in the negative. Although physicists and philosophers have tried to build models of human choice based upon the unpredictability of quantum jumps,[4] he rejects these as being too circumscribed.

[1] Karl R. Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man," in Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972), 210; emphasis in original.
[2] *Ibid.*, 213; emphasis in original.
[3] *Ibid.*, 226; emphasis in original.
[4] Arthur H. Compton, *The Freedom of Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1935).

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He acknowledges that "the quantum-jump model may be a model for . . . snap decisions. . . . But are snap decisions really so very interesting? Are they characteristic of human behavior—of *rational* human behavior?" He concludes: "I do not think so. . . . What we need for understanding rational human behavior—and indeed animal behavior—is something *intermediate* in character, between perfect chance and perfect determinism—something intermediate between perfect clouds and perfect clocks. . . . For obviously what we want is to understand how such non-physical things as *purposes*, *deliberations*, *plans*, *decisions*, *theories*, *intentions*, and *values*, can play a part in bringing about physical changes in the physical world"[5]

Popper's method of arriving at a solution to this problem seems, like the problem itself, to be relevant to politics and political science. His conjecture is that the problem is essentially one of *control*; i.e., the control of behavior and other aspects of the physical world by human ideas or mental abstractions. Thus, he states that "the solution must explain freedom; and it must also explain how freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between *something almost random or haphazard*, and *something like a restrictive or selective control*—such as an aim or standard—though certainly not a cast-iron control." Accordingly, he restricts the scope of acceptable solutions to those that "conform to *the idea of combining freedom and control*, and also to *the idea of 'plastic control,'* as I shall call it in contradistinction to a 'cast-iron' control."[6]

Popper reaches an evolutionary solution to this problem—one that stresses trial and error elimination, or variation and selective retention.[7] Only such a theory can accommodate plastic control, and thus human freedom. Once this is seen, the problem of the relationship between ideas and behavior becomes solvable: "For the control of ourselves and of our actions by our theories and purposes is *plastic* control. We are not *forced* to submit ourselves to the control of our theories, for we can discuss them critically, and we can reject them freely if we think that they fall short of our regulative standards. Not only do our theories control us, but we can control our theories (and even our standards): there is a kind of *feedback* here."[8]

Popper concludes: "We have seen that it is unsatisfactory to look upon the world as a closed physical system—whether a strictly deter-

[5] Popper (fn. 1), 228, 229; emphasis in original.
[6] *Ibid.*, 231-32; emphasis in original.
[7] See Donald T. Campbell, "Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-cultural Evolution," *General Systems Yearbook*, XIV (1969).
[8] Popper (fn. 1), 240-41; emphasis in original.

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ministic system or a system in which whatever is not strictly determined is simply due to chance; on such a view of the world human creativeness and human freedom can only be illusions. . . . I have therefore offered a different view of the world—one in which the physical world is an open system. This is compatible with the view of the evolution of life as a process of trial-and-error elimination; and it allows us to understand rationally, though far from fully, the emergence of biological novelty and the growth of human knowledge and human freedom."[9]

Thus Popper tells us that the models of explanation appropriate to the physical sciences will not enable us to come to grips with human and cultural phenomena, and that while we can increase our understanding of them, we cannot explain them fully because of their creative and emergent properties.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF POLITICS

Popper's essay presents us with three ways of conceptualizing social reality—as a clock, as a cloud, and as a system of plastic controls. Political reality, which it is the task of political science to explain, is clearly best captured by the third conceptualization. It consists of ideas—human decisions, goals, purposes—in constant and intense interaction with other ideas, human behavior, and the physical world. At the center of this complex system are *choices and decisions*—decisions to command, obey, vote, make demands. The political universe has organization; elites make decisions to command or not to command, what to command, how to implement commands. Citizens and subjects make decisions to comply, how to comply or not to comply; to make demands, how to make demands, or not to make demands. That is the heart of politics, the subject matter our discipline is committed to exploring and understanding.

The relations among these events are not simply reactive, as are the encounters of physical objects; they are not readily amenable to cause-and-effect "clocklike" models or metaphors. Basically, this is because the behavioral repertories of elites and citizens are not fixed repertories. The actors in politics have memories; they learn from experience. They have goals, aspirations, calculative strategies. Memory, learning, goal seeking, and problem solving intervene between "cause" and "effect," between independent and dependent variable.

Political decisions are not made and implemented in a vacuum; they are subject to a complex array of *constraints and opportunities*. These

[9] *Ibid.*, 254-55.

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constraints—the necessities of politics—range from the relatively hard variety represented by environmental or ecological limits to the quite soft variety illustrated by passing fashions and fads. Constraints define the "operational milieu" of political actors[10] and exhibit varying degrees of manipulability. Some, like geography or the level of technology, are difficult to alter even in the long run; in the short run, they are practically nonmanipulable. Others, like cultural values and public opinion, are relatively easy to manipulate in some circumstances, more intractable in others. But manipulation is very rarely impossible in principle. Even relatively hard environmental constraints—such as the relation between material resource needs and population—can sometimes be altered as a consequence of man's creative, adaptive capacities. The agricultural revolution some 10,000 years ago multiplied by many times the number of people capable of being sustained in a given space, and the industrial revolution of the last two centuries multiplied it by many times again.

These ontological properties of political affairs are plain for all to see; they are not matters on which reasonable persons can differ. Social scientists who—for whatever philosophical or methodological reasons—deny them and view human behavior as simply reactive and consequently susceptible to the same explanatory logic as "clocklike" natural phenomena are trying to fashion a science based on empirically falsified presuppositions. That becomes clear when their explanatory schemes are thought of in terms of their own behavior as scientists. Insofar as they acknowledge the importance of scientific memory, scientific creativity, calculative strategies, goal seeking, and problem solving in their own work, they must in some degree acknowledge these qualities in the human and social material they investigate and seek to explain.

The implication of these complexities of human and social reality is that the explanatory strategy of the hard sciences has only a limited application to the social sciences. Models, procedures, and methodologies created to explore a world in which clocklike and cloudlike characteristics predominate will capture only a part of the much richer world of social and political interaction. Thus, a simple search for regularities and lawful relationships among variables—a strategy that has led to tremendous successes in the physical sciences—will not explain social outcomes, but only some of the conditions affecting those outcomes.

Because the properties of political reality differ from those of physical

[10] Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965).

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reality, the properties of political *regularities* also differ from those of physical regularities. The regularities we discover are soft. They are soft because they are the outcomes of processes that exhibit plastic rather than cast-iron control. They are imbedded in history and involve recurrent "passings-through" of large numbers of human memories, learning processes, human goal-seeking impulses, and choices among alternatives. The regularities we discover appear to have a short half-life. They decay quickly because of the memory, creative searching, and learning that underlie them. Indeed, social science itself may contribute to this decay, since learning increasingly includes not only learning from experience, but from scientific research itself.

The softness and historical boundedness of political theories can be illustrated by a few examples. Political scientists are justifiably proud of their theory of voting behavior. It is the closest thing to a scientific theory that we have. It has generated a set of what appear to be "covering laws"—demographic and attitudinal correlates of the voting decision, inductively arrived at. The deductive Downsian model of the consequences for party systems of different distributions of voter attitudes looks like an even more basic law of politics. But even a casual review of the findings of voting research in the last thirty years shows how unstable these regularities are, and how far short of hard science our efforts to stabilize them must inevitably fall. Modern research on voting behavior made its greatest progress in studies of American elections in the 1950's and early 1960's, a period of rapid economic growth and low-intensity politics. Students of American voting behavior in that period maintained they could explain and predict American voting behavior on the basis of "party identification" and "candidate image"; issues seemed to play only a secondary role.[11] The result of this effort to produce a hard causal explanation was a psychological theory of voting behavior based on party identification and candidate image. But this theory was soon to be challenged by studies done in the early 1970's which include data from the 1930's and late 1960's. These earlier and later periods show American voters as making their choices on the basis of candidates' issue positions to a far greater extent than was true of the 1950's and early 1960's. Recent writers speak of the "decomposition" of the party system, of the individuation of voting behavior, and of the "ideologization" of American politics.[12] And one of the leading

[11] Angus Campbell and others, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson 1954); Campbell and others, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley 1960).

[12] Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976), 345ff; Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton 1970).

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collaborators of the Michigan group which produced the original party-identification theory now acknowledges that the demographic and attitudinal correlates of voting behavior are only loosely related, and that the only kind of theory we can aspire to is "some orderly specification of the conditions under which they vary."[13]

Political socialization theory is still engaged in a futile effort to impute relatively fixed values and weights to agents of socialization—family, school, workplace, media of communication, adult experiences, and the like.[14] Like voting research, socialization research in its thrust toward parsimonious scientific explanation has overlooked the larger historical context and the inherent instability of variables. Jennings and Niemi,[15] in one of the most sophisticated studies of political socialization ever undertaken, report that the impact of parents and teachers on the political attitudes of high school seniors was surprisingly weak. They failed to register the fact that the high school seniors they were sampling were the class of 1965, the first cohort of the post-World War II baby boom. It was a generation which to a considerable extent socialized itself, and it turned socialization theory upside down in the late 1960's by providing the cultural innovators of the youth rebellion. Like voting behavior theory, socialization theory is now slowly acknowledging the inherent instability of variables. The impact of the agents of socialization varies with changes in demographic and social structure, technology, and political events and issues. All that we can aspire to is a collection of propositions specifying the conditions under which these impacts tend to vary.

Perhaps the most vulnerable of these thrusts into hard science were the efforts of students of American politics in the early 1960's to discover the relationships between politics and public policy. The problem had been set by earlier work which argued that characteristics of the political system—party competition, voter participation, apportionment, and the like—had important consequences for public policy as measured by the level of public expenditures, and particularly by welfare expenditures. A series of statistical studies comparing the political, economic, and public policy characteristics of the American states in the 1950's and early 1960's proceeded to demonstrate that these political

[13] Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, IV (Boston: Addison-Wesley 1975), 126.

[14] For a recent review of the literature, see David O. Sears, "Political Socialization," in Greenstein and Polsby (fn. 13), 93ff.

[15] M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *The Political Character of Adolescence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).

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variables had little independent impact on the policy variables. When controlled for level of economic development, the effect of these political differences was washed away. This finding led to the remarkable conclusion that economic and other environmental variables explain public policy much better than political variables.[16]

There are two aspects of this research in public policy that are noteworthy for our purposes. The first is the extraordinary constriction of the time and space perspectives in this effort to test a global proposition concerning the relationship between economics, politics, and public policy. The fact that these were the American states in the 1950's—a period of political stability—rather than in the 1930's, did not register as limiting the kinds of inferences that could be drawn. Political scientists studying these problems brought no historical perspective to bear on their research—no memories of war, revolution, and depression, and of their well-known relationships to politics and public policy. Second, there was no recognition of the fact that environmental variables cannot directly produce public policy, that political choice must in the nature of the case intervene between them, and that historically this intervention has been very large indeed.

Social mobilization theory has sought to explain and predict trends toward politicization, democratization, and de-ideologization from trends toward urbanization, industrialization, communication, and education—only to discover that when these relationships are examined historically, human intractability and inventiveness, as well as sheer chance, complicates these patterns enormously.[17] The prophet of the end of ideology[18] has become the prophet of the postindustrial society[19] and, currently, the prophet of social disjunctions and cultural exhaustion.[20] Social scientists are finding that they do a better job of explaining when they follow the course of history, using sophisticated methodologies to isolate necessary sequences and constraints, but always aware of the role of chance and human inventiveness in producing the outcomes they are seeking to explain.

In their fascination with powerful regularities and uniformities that have the properties of causal necessity or high probability, social scien-

[16] See Thomas R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972), 243-48, for a review of this literature and a fuller formulation of these findings and inferences.

[17] For a review of this literature, see Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice and Change* (Boston: Little Brown 1973), 8ff.

[18] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Free Press 1960).

[19] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Free Press 1973).

[20] Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books 1976).

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tists have overlooked the fact that much of social and political change has to be explained neither by strong regularities nor by weak regularities, but by accidental conjunctions—by events that had a low probability of occurring. The concatenation of particular leaders with particular historical contexts is a matter of chance—of fortune—rather than necessity. Scholars can explain why Russia was ripe for revolution in 1917; and they can explain some aspects of Lenin's personality and operational code; but they cannot explain *why* the two conjoined to produce the Bolshevik Revolution, only *that* they conjoined by chance. The problem is similar to that of the biologist seeking to explain the emergence of a new species. He can describe an ecological niche in terms of constraints and opportunities; but for the niche to be occupied, the chance occurrence of an appropriate mutation or set of mutations is required.

Although in some respects the problem is similar to that of the biologist, it differs in fundamental ways. The interplay between the constraints of the ecological niche and the randomness of the process of mutation, to be sure, is a matter of trial and error. The search process is a random one, and largely genetic. In human affairs, the search process in addition has important conscious, planful aspects. It involves not only the chance concatenation of a revolutionary political niche with a Lenin, but with a scheming, contriving, willing, improvising Lenin, constantly probing, testing, and learning about the constraints and opportunities within the niche he is striving to occupy. Once he does occupy it, he transforms the niche and the population occupying it in ways that will constrain (but again not *determine*) future adaptive efforts. If we are to understand political reality, we have to come to grips not only with its determinate aspects but, most particularly, with its creative, adaptive, problem-solving aspects. For it is this last characteristic which is the essentially human property, and which is the unique mechanism and explanatory challenge of the social sciences.

THE CLOCK MODEL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The now dominant, "behavioral" tradition in political science tends to rest on three epistemological and methodological assumptions which it has taken from the hard sciences: (1) that the purpose of science is the discovery of regularities in, and ultimately laws of, social and political processes; (2) that scientific explanation means the deductive subsumption of individual events under "covering laws"; and (3) that the only scientifically relevant relationships between events in the world are those which correspond to a physicalistic conception of

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causal connection. These assumptions are highly interrelated, and each carries important substantive implications for the study of politics.

(1) The emphasis on generalizations in political science must first be understood in historical context. When David Easton argued in 1953 that "knowledge becomes critical and reliable when it increases in generality and internally consistent organization, when, in short, it is cast in the form of systematic generalized statements applicable to large numbers of particular cases,"[21] he was speaking against a tradition of ideographic, descriptive, noncumulative, and institutional case studies that had dominated much of the discipline (with a few notable exceptions) for several decades. A similar concern animated the behavioral polemics of Truman and others in the early 1950's.[22] The long-term result of this praiseworthy attempt to shift emphasis from description to explanation, however, has been the enshrining of the notion of generalization as the *sine qua non* of the scientific aspirations of the profession. This is perhaps most readily apparent in the recently burgeoning "scope and methods" literature. For example, Scarrow, in his *Comparative Political Analysis*, announces that "Generalizations are the hallmark of all scientific endeavor,"[23] while Conway and Feigert, in *Political Analysis: An Introduction*, declare that "the function of science is generally perceived as being the establishment of general laws or theories which explain the behavior with which the particular discipline is concerned."[24] Even a sophisticated study, such as Przeworski's and Teune's *Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, states somewhat dogmatically that: "The pivotal assumption of this analysis is that social science research, including comparative inquiry, should and can lead to general statements about social phenomena. This assumption implies that human and social behavior can be explained in terms of general laws established by observation. Introduced here as an expression of preference, this assumption will not be logically justified."[25]

The substantive impact of this emphasis on generalizations is to focus the attention of research on regularities, uniformities, and stable

[21] Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf 1953), 55.

[22] David B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," reprinted in Heinz Eulau, ed., *Behavioralism in Political Science* (New York: Atherton 1969).

[23] Howard A. Scarrow, *Comparative Political Analysis: An Introduction* (New York: Harper & Row 1969), 33.

[24] Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, *Political Analysis: An Introduction* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1972), 17.

[25] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley 1970), 4.

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patterns of association in political processes at the expense of unique or low-probability events or political outcomes. As Frohock expresses it in *The Nature of Political Inquiry*, "Science is concerned with establishing causal relations and general laws. To do this the social scientist must concentrate on systematic patterns of human conduct. Only as an event is a recurring instance of a general class can it be treated scientifically."[26]

We are not arguing here for the view that regularities do not occur in political processes or that valid generalizations cannot be made. As we noted above, political regularities—albeit soft—clearly exist and are crucial to political inquiry. Rather, our criticism is aimed at positions that see regularities and generalizations as the *only* proper objects of scientific political inquiry. This seems to us an unnecessary delimitation of the scope of the discipline's subject matter. If political reality is best viewed as a conjunction of choice and constraint, and as a source of both regularity and innovation, then political science should not be limited to a consideration of only part of this reality. A pure focus on generalizations as "the hallmark of all scientific endeavor" would seem to condemn it to just such a limitation.

(2) The concern with generalizations and regularities—and the concomitant willingness to limit the scope of political science to only those aspects of political reality that are generalizable—is closely associated with a particular conception of *explanation* in political inquiry. This position is also reflected in the "scope and methods" literature. Alan Isaak, in his *Scope and Method of Political Science*, declares that political scientists must accept the "scientific fact of life" that "every sound explanation and prediction contains at least one generalization; without generalizations there could be no explanations or predictions."[27] Similarly, Conway and Feigert argue that "Explanations in science require . . . laws or theories which are well established. . . . Explanation occurs when the facts to be explained can be deduced as a logical consequence of the laws or theory and . . . other known facts."[28]

The model of explanation alluded to here is the so-called "covering law" or deductive-nomological (D-N) model developed in the philosophy of science by R. B. Braithwaite,[29] Carl Hempel,[30] and others. The

[26] Fred M. Frohock, *The Nature of Political Inquiry* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey 1967), 141.
[27] Isaak, *The Scope and Method of Political Science* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey 1969), 80.
[28] Conway and Feigert (fn. 24), 27.
[29] Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1953).
[30] Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press 1965); see also Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1961).

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basic idea underlying this model is that something is explained when it has been shown to be a member of a more general class of things. "To explain something is to exhibit it as a special case of what is known in general."[31] This is achieved, according to the model, when the particular case is deduced from a more general law (or set of laws) that "covers" it and all other relevantly similar cases. That is why generalizations play such a fundamental role in deductive explanations.

The explanatory power of the D-N model derives from the fact that deduction from covering laws *logically necessitates* that which is deduced. The deduction "explains" by telling us that, on the basis of what we already know (the generalization), the case in question was to be expected: it *had* to occur the way it did.[32] This notion of "it was to be expected" stands at the center of the deductive conception of explanation, and accounts for the close association between explanation and prediction in the model.[33] For adherents of the D-N model, an explanation that would not be equally capable of supporting a prediction would not qualify as a true explanation.[34] It is not surprising, therefore, that closed deterministic systems—"clock models" in Popper's terminology—are most amenable to D-N explanation. As Hempel puts it: "The best examples of explanations conforming to the D-N model are based on physical theories of deterministic character. . . . [T]he laws specified by such a theory for the changes of state are deterministic in the sense that, given the state of that system at any one time, they determine its state at any other, earlier or later, time."[35]

It is clear that the D-N model loses its usefulness to the degree that there are *exceptions* to the law or laws warranting the explanation in question. If we cannot legitimately maintain that "all *A*'s are *B*'s" and must settle for a law asserting only that "some *A*'s are *B*'s," then the deductive link is dissolved and our explanation of the occurrence of *B* continues to be problematic. This state of affairs, however, is just what is implied by the notion of plastic control. Plasticity means that we can

[31] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler 1964), 339.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Paul Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton 1971), 164.
[34] See Hempel (fn. 30), 367, where this position is maintained while its obverse—that a valid prediction must also qualify as an explanation—is put aside. This modification of the so-called "symmetry thesis of explanation and prediction" has not always been appreciated by political scientists. See, e.g., Oran Young, "The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories in International Relations," in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 183.
[35] Hempel (fn. 30), 351; see also Nagel (fn. 30), 323.

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expect, in principle, that there will be exceptions to any generalizations we might form about the phenomena that are of interest to us. Thus, the more our subject matter exhibits plastic control, the less it will be amenable to simple D-N explanations.

(3) The notion of causality is closely associated with the idea of covering-law explanation by both political scientists and philosophers of science. R. B. Braithwaite, for example, describes causality strictly in terms of covering laws: "[T]he statement that some particular event is the effect of a set of circumstances involves the assertion of a general law; to ask for the cause of an event is always to ask for a general law which applies to the particular event."[36]

This formulation is echoed by political scientists. Thus, Robert Dahl argues that "If we wish to explain an event, *E*, in a strictly causal manner, we consider *E* as an effect and bring it under some generalization of the form: 'Every event *C* is accompanied later by an event *E*.' . . . The *C* is called the cause, *E* the effect."[37] Similarly, Isaak maintains that, "If saying that '*A* causes *B*' is tantamount to '*B* always follows *A*,' then they are both reducible to 'If *A*, then *B*.' In other words, we can express what is traditionally known as a causal relationship without using the term cause."[38]

All of these characterizations rest on the notion of causality as an *explanatory* concept. But how is this explanatory status acquired? As can be seen from even a cursory exposure to the literature on causation and conditions,[39] the concepts "cause" and "effect" are broad and ambiguous. One element of their meaning seems to stand out in any account, however: the principle of "same cause, same effect."[40] As Hempel puts it, "as is suggested by the principle 'same cause, same effect,' the assertion that [a given set of] circumstances jointly caused a given event implies that whenever and wherever circumstances of

[36] Braithwaite (fn. 29), 2; see also Hempel (fn. 30), 348-49.

[37] Dahl, "Cause and Effect in the Study of Politics," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *Cause and Effect* (New York: Free Press 1965), 87.

[38] Isaak (fn. 27), 95.

[39] See, e.g., Ernest Sosa, *Causation and Conditionals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975); Myles Brand, ed., *The Nature of Causation* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1976).

[40] There are many disputes concerning the philosophical status of causality that go well beyond this consensual element of its meaning—for example, the problem of whether the causal connection represents a constant conjunction, logical necessity, or "natural" necessity; and the problem of the temporal ordering and contiguity of causes and effects. For a discussion of these in terms relevant to political science research, see Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1971).

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the kind in question occur, an event of the kind to be explained takes place."[41] Or, in Abraham Kaplan's slightly more cautious formulation: "Causal connection is usually analyzed in terms of some relation of implication: the grammar of the 'if-then' conjunction is at least a starting point. If the cause occurs, then its effects occur."[42] It is this element of "same cause, same effect" that confers explanatory power on causal relations in the world. Without it, "causality" becomes simply another problematic and essentially unexplained relationship between two or more things, events, or processes.

This philosophical characterization of the relationship between cause and effect is closely related to Popper's notion of cast-iron control. The cause *produces* the effect, and the existence of the cause is the *explanation* of the effect. A world of pure cause and effect, as narrowly defined by this identification of causality with covering-law explanation, would be a world without exceptions, a world that could not be other than what it is. Such a world, we feel, is completely alien to the world of politics, in which the potential for surprise and innovation is inherent in many, if not most, situations.

In spite of the inflexibility and aridity of the explanatory concept of causality, however, many political scientists have attempted to couch their analyses of political phenomena in terms of the notions of cause and effect. The result is often an odd mixture of formalized definitions and unrelated empirical substance. As an example of such a mixture, we might take a brief look at one branch of political analysis that has made considerable use of causal formulations—the literature on the concept of power. Here the relationship of cause and effect is explicitly invoked as a metaphor for a necessary, dependent connection between events. For example, Herbert Simon has stated that "for the assertion '*C* has power over *R*,' we can substitute the assertion '*C*'s behavior causes *R*'s behavior.' If we can define the causal relation, we can define influence, power or authority, and *vice versa*."[43] Similarly, Andrew McFarland asserts that "definitions of power or influence based on such concepts as force, incentives or utilities, and minimum winning coalitions are . . . reducible to causal terms."[44] More recently, Jack Nagel has defined power as follows: "A power relation, actual or potential, is an actual or potential causal relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an out-

[41] Hempel (fn. 30), 348-49.
[42] Kaplan, "Noncausal Explanation," in Lerner (fn. 37), 146.
[43] Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley 1957), 5.
[44] McFarland, *Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1969), 29.

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come and the outcome itself."[45] And Robert Dahl, in the latest edition of his *Modern Political Analysis*, seems to maintain (although with some caveats) his long-standing view that causation is fundamental to understanding power and influence relations: "when we single out influence from all other aspects of human interaction in order to give it special attention, what interests us and what we focus attention on is that one or more of the persons in this interaction get what they want, or at least get closer to what they want, by causing other people to act in some particular way. We want to call attention to a *causal relationship* between what *A* wants and what *B* does."[46]

How is the word "cause" being used in these definitions? Clearly it is not being used as an explanatory concept, in the sense described by philosophers of science. For an explanation to be truly causal in that sense, as we have seen, the relationship in question would have to be (1) cast-iron, (2) generalizable, and (3) amenable to covering-law explanation. None of these properties would seem to apply to power relationships. There is no "necessity" inherent in the outcome of an attempt to assert power over another person, as there is in a causal connection between two physical objects. The target of the power attempt may, for any number of reasons, act differently than the power wielder would have him act. This is because a power relationship does not involve cast-iron control; instead, it is an interaction of two choosing and mutually constraining individuals, each with his own resources, goals, purposes, interests, and strategies. The intentions and resources of the first certainly constrain the choices and actions of the second, but they do not determine those choices and actions in any sort of cast-iron sense.

This "looseness of fit" between the behavior and intentions of actors involved in an attempt to exercise power means that their relationship is not readily generalizable; neither is it particularly amenable to strict covering-law explanation. As Hart and Honoré have put it: "The statement that one person did something because . . . another threatened him, carries no implication or covert assertion that if the circumstances were repeated, the same action would follow; nor does such a statement require for its defense, as ordinary causal statements do, a generalization. . . ."[47] These considerations lead us to conclude that the power

[45] Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1975), 29.

[46] Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1976), 30; emphasis in original.

[47] H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré, *Causation in the Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1959), 52.

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relationship is not causal, at least not in the explanatory sense of the term.[48]

This conclusion would seem, in one sense, to be shared by Dahl and many of the other political scientists who use causal language in their definition of power. If we examine their empirical analyses of power relations in real-world political situations rather than their definitions, we find careful and precise examinations of the complex interactions that contribute to outcomes, without reliance on simplistic notions of "same cause, same effect." In such substantive analyses—as opposed to definition making—plasticity is recognized and indeterminateness is often handled with sophistication and insight.

What we seem to observe in this particular area of political research, then, is a rhetorical or metaphorical—rather than explanatory—usage of causal language in formalizations and definitions. This accounts for the lack of a subsequent commitment to actual causal analysis in substantive research. The somewhat incongruous gap can perhaps best be explained as an attempt on the part of political scientists to create a "halo effect" around their theoretical formulations. Our longing for full scientific status has led us to create a kind of "cargo cult," fashioning cardboard imitations of the tools and products of the hard sciences in the hope that our incantations would make them real.

These three elements of the implicit logic that informs much of political science research today appear to imply a substantive model of the political world which closely resembles the deterministic "clock model" outlined by Popper. That is not to say that any political scientists actually *see* the political world this way; no doubt we would all agree that it often *appears* to be quite porous, irregular, and unpredictable. Rather, it is to say that the arsenal of meta-methodological principles and procedures we have borrowed from the physical sciences—or, more correctly, from a certain philosophical perspective on the physical sciences—has come to us with an array of substantive assumptions that all proclaim the principle "all clouds are clocks." If we search only for generalizations and regularities in political processes, if we couch our explanations only in terms of the covering-law model, and if we view political relationships as ultimately causal in nature, we are committing ourselves—whether we recognize it or not—to a disciplinary research program designed to strip away the cloudlike and purposive aspects of political reality in order to expose its "true" clocklike structure. If politics is *not* clocklike in its fundamental structure, then

[48] For further arguments along similar lines, see Terence Ball, "Power, Causation and Explanation," *Polity*, VIII (Winter 1975), 189-214.

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the whole program is inappropriate. We believe this to be the case: the current quandary in political science can to a large extent be explained by the fact that, by themselves, "clock-model" assumptions are inappropriate for dealing with the substance of political phenomena.

THE ADOPTION OF THE CLOCK MODEL AND ITS EFFECTS ON POLITICAL RESEARCH AND PEDAGOGY

The movement toward hard science in the study of politics is a phase in the scientific revolution of the last several decades. The great breakthroughs in physics and biology, and the extraordinary increases in research funding as science became a national asset, created a mood of sanguine expectations. It is not surprising that political scientists sought to share in this exciting and remunerative adventure.

Political science was invited to imitate the hard sciences by some of the more influential philosophers of science on the grounds that political reality lent itself to the same powerful methods that had proven so effective in physics and biology. That is one of the basic tenets of the logical positivist tradition in the philosophy of science,[49] and has been a starting point for many books and articles designed to show the social sciences and history how to achieve a "truly" scientific status.[50] In addition, there was immediate evidence of the success of the hard-science strategy within the social sciences themselves. Psychology and economics had been the first disciplines in the social sciences to move in this direction, demonstrating the possibilities of experimental methods, sophisticated quantitative methods, computer simulation, and mathematical modelling. The combination of philosophical legitimation and the demonstrated progress of psychology and economics was impossible to resist.

As a consequence of these legitimations and demonstration effects, the incentive structure of political science began to encourage an orientation modelled on the physical sciences. The pressures for conformity can be measured in terms of prestige, journal publications, fellowships, and grants. Major sources of research funding and graduate fellowships, such as the National Science Foundation, have been dominated by the hard sciences; the social science divisions have been junior

[49] See von Wright (fn. 40), chap. 1.

[50] See, e.g., Nagel (fn. 30); Hempel (fn. 30), chap. 9; May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1962); Richard S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966); Rudner, "Comment: On the Evolving Standard View in Philosophy of Science," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972).

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partners in these agencies, and the political science section has been the most junior of all. Projects that have the appearance of hard science have had the inside track for gaining substantial research support.

Perhaps the most important consequence of this imitation of hard science has been an emphasis on method as the primary criterion for judging the quality of research in political science. Today, the leading research traditions tend to be defined by their methodologies rather than their substantive foci. One result of this principle of organization—although certainly not a necessary consequence of it—has been that the value of this work seems to be measured primarily by its technical virtuosity, and only secondarily by the importance of the problems treated or illuminated.

In the last two decades there has been a tremendous drive toward quantification in political science. Riker celebrated this trend in a recent communication to the *American Political Science Review* when he commented that some two-thirds of the articles in recent issues of that journal were based on quantitative analysis employing sophisticated statistics.[51] Quantification has undoubtedly contributed to major advances in political science and other social sciences. But it has also led to a significant number of pseudo-scientific exercises that exhibit the form but not the substance of research in the physical sciences. Such studies become more prevalent when the use of quantification is treated as an end in itself rather than as a means toward understanding concrete political problems. Irrelevant quantification has recently been the subject of searching critiques in international relations,[52] comparative politics,[53] policy studies,[54] and elsewhere.

Quantitative analysis in political science has moved increasingly toward more sophisticated statistical methods. But the structure of the data in social science research often comes into conflict with the assumptions underlying confirmatory statistical theory. The problems involved in applying complex statistical methods to nonrandom, nonlinear, or nonadditive data should not be minimized.[55] Much of the

[51] William H. Riker, quoted in "Editorial Comment," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (June 1974), 733-34.

[52] Edward R. Tufte, "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," *World Politics*, XXI (July 1969).

[53] Andrew Mack, "Numbers Are Not Enough," *Comparative Politics*, VII (July 1975).

[54] Ralph E. Strauch, "A Critical Look at Quantitative Methodology," *Policy Science*, II (Winter 1976).

[55] See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, "The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966); Hubert M. Blalock, "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," in Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1970).

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inferential power of these methods is lost when the structure of the data does not conform to the rigid requirements of the theory. These difficulties have proven formidable enough to lead some statisticians, such as John Tukey, at Princeton, to devise alternative data-analytic techniques that, although not nearly as powerful as the most advanced statistical methods, are more compatible with the idiosyncratic characteristics of social and political data.[56] Here we seem to have fallen into a trap comparable to that of the early phases of Third-World development when "high technologies" were introduced into poor agricultural countries without regard for their disruptive consequences. We are discovering that an intermediate level of statistical technology, which takes into account the special characteristics of social data, is more appropriate to the social sciences than are the very sophisticated methods.

Running parallel to this emphasis on statistics in political science is an interest in mathematics and the construction of simple, logically rigorous models. This approach has been advocated in comparative politics by Holt and Richardson, who argue that "political scientists must turn to mathematics" if the discipline is to progress scientifically. They are careful to distinguish this path from the statistical one: "In making an appeal for more mathematics, we are not talking about statistics. . . . [S]tatistics provides a science with a basis for rigorous *induction*. Our critique suggests that the crying need in comparative politics is for more rigorous deduction and this is where mathematics, not statistics, is relevant."[57] This statement is echoed by A. James Gregor, Oran Young,[58] and many others.

The difficulty with mathematical models is that they usually measure up poorly to the complexities of the phenomena being modelled. For example, Oran Young, who strongly advocates the use of modelling methods in international relations, has candidly observed that "The inherent hazard of this procedure is that its products may display little relevance to the real world of international relations for the indefinite future."[59] Holt and Richardson, on the other hand, argue that a mathematically oriented political science must necessarily take a radically

[56] Tukey, *Exploratory Data Analysis* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1977); David C. Hoaglin, *A First Course in Data Analysis* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, forthcoming).

[57] Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Holt and John E. Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York: Free Press 1970), 70.

[58] Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (June 1968), 425-39; Young (fn. 34).

[59] *Ibid.*, 196.

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circumscribed view of political reality, cutting itself free from problem solving: "A science that is heavily committed to dealing with socially and morally relevant problems finds little use for this kind of paradigm or for the commitment to mathematics that it requires. For political science to advance, it must shed this professional commitment to solving social and moral problems."[60]

One aspect of the mathematical approach to politics deserves special mention: the use of rational-choice models to explain political behavior. These models are particularly interesting because they take the most intractable elements of political processes—the individual and collective choices of political actors—and try to treat them deterministically. Some analysts have argued that if political science is ever to be a true science, the notion of rationality must be its central concept. For example, Riker and Ordeshook draw an explicit analogy between rationality on the one hand and the notion of mechanism on the other:

> . . . it is clear that the assumption of rationality and the assumption of mechanism play comparable roles in the explanation of the social and physical world. The mechanical assumptions assert that there is something about things that assures us they will (usually) move regularly, and the rationality assumption asserts that there is something about people that makes them behave (usually) in a regular way. In each case, the function is to generalize about the regularity.[61]

The kind of regularities Riker and Ordeshook are concerned with here are of a special type—"postulated" as opposed to "observed" regularities. Granting that choices in empirical situations usually fail to exhibit the degree of regularity necessary for warranting deductive explanations and theories, Riker and Ordeshook choose to build a theory of politics on the foundations of how people *would* act *if* they were rational utility maximizers. This, of course, leads to a theory that fails to model political reality well. But the substantive loss is considered acceptable in light of the methodological gain: "The method of postulated regularity is positively more efficient, because it permits the easy generation of hypotheses and offers a single and parsimonious explanation of behavior."[62]

[60] Holt and Richardson (fn. 57), 70-71.

[61] William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1973), 11. A sympathetic yet sober evaluation of the utility of rational choice models for explaining and predicting coalition behavior is offered by Abram De Swann, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1973).

[62] Riker and Ordeshook (fn. 61), 11-12. By "explanation," we can only assume that Riker and Ordeshook mean "definition," since the postulation of rationality *defines* a (hypothetical) type of behavior, but does not *explain* it in any way.

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The popularity of rational-choice models in political science would be puzzling to anyone who was not familiar with the current hierarchy of methodological and substantive priorities in the field. But with this hierarchy in mind, some particularly perplexing exercises become understandable. For example, in the recently published *Handbook of Political Science*, J. Donald Moon contributes a piece on "The Logic of Political Inquiry."[63] This article begins very promisingly by articulating the D-N model of explanation as well as an important alternative to it, the interpretive model, which explains behavior in terms of motives, intentions, rules and norms, etc. Noting serious defects in both models, Moon turns to the task of synthesizing the two in order to create a more comprehensive framework for political explanation. But the "synthesis" turns out not to be a synthesis at all; instead it consists of a *substitution* of a rational actor "model of man" for the interpretive model of explanation. This eliminates the "looseness" and lack of regularity of empirical choice that is captured by the interpretive model and substitutes for it "presuppositions [that] specify the decisional premises of the actors which, together with descriptions of their situations, provide the rationale for the actions which bring about the overall pattern of social behavior . . . that . . . theorists desire to explain."[64]

Like the regularities of interest to Riker and Ordeshook, these "presuppositions" are postulated (specified) *a priori*. They replace the contingent aspects of empirical choice and action with causal and lawlike assumptions. Thus, choices are reduced to an algorithm specifying a necessary outcome from a necessary utility calculation. The net result of this substantive reduction is a definition of choice in terms of cause-and-effect relationships; which is to say, a definition of choice that denies the existence of choice! Certainly this conclusion would appear strange if we were not familiar with the current priority of method over substance in political science. As it is, we can see that Moon is struggling with the task of fitting his recalcitrant subject matter to the strict exigencies of a methodological notion of necessity that bears little resemblance to the realities of political choice.

The stress on reductionist explanation, quantification, and formalization has also led to an overloading of graduate curricula. If a political scientist must be a statistician, psychologist, and sociologist, then some of the traditional curriculum has to be set aside in order to make room

[63] Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives," in Greenstein and Polsby (fn. 13), I.

[64] *Ibid.*, 194.

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for these newer disciplines and techniques. Anyone who has taught in a major graduate department of political science in the last twenty years will recall this inexorable process of narrowing and technicizing of the curriculum; the foreign-language requirements have been reduced, the field examination requirements have dropped from five to four to three, perhaps even to two. By the mid-1960's, it had become possible for someone to become a Ph.D. in political science with little if any knowledge of political theory, political history, foreign political systems, international relations, and even much about American politics and government. As Hayward Alker has recently remarked: "Training graduate students intensively in multivariate quantitative methods such as factor analysis makes less time available for developing a sophisticated awareness of what has classically been thought and said about political life. . . . Thus modern training is particularly inappropriate for understanding modern politics in which many questions about systems restructuring are continually raised."[65]

Accompanying this narrowing and technicization of the graduate curriculum has been a demoralization of the older intellectual traditions in the social sciences and in political science. Political theory and philosophy, public law and public administration, and descriptive institutional analysis have all become defensive, peripheral, and secondary subject matters. As a result, a large part of the political science tradition is no longer being transmitted effectively to younger generations.

What we suggest here is that "science" is not a set of methods extracted from mathematical physics, as the neopositivist philosophers might have us believe; it is ultimately a commitment to explore and attempt to understand a given segment of empirical reality. The means employed in pursuing this goal should be secondary: in "good" science, methods are fit to the subject matter rather than subject matter being truncated or distorted in order to fit it to a preordained notion of "scientific method." This is the lesson that social scientists should have learned from the physical sciences. Instead, they have ignored it and, in the process, have undermined what Abraham Kaplan has called the "autonomy of inquiry."[66] If social science is to redeem itself, "Social scientists need to construct their own notions of 'good science,' their own methodological approach appropriate to their particular subject matter. . . . This view implies giving up the notion that there is some

[65] Alker, "Polimetrics: Its Descriptive Foundations," in Greenstein and Polsby (fn. 13), VII, 157.
[66] Kaplan (fn. 31), 3.

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close analogy in the social sciences to basic research in the physical sciences."[67]

SECOND THOUGHTS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

Much of the knowledge our discipline has acquired of "scientific method" has been filtered through the two "pace-setting" disciplines in social science—psychology and economics. If we look closely at the present state of these disciplines which have pioneered in the use of statistical methods, mathematical models, and experimentation, we find evidence of some doubt and disillusionment.

Psychology, much like political science, has over the last couple of decades entertained a nearly constant "great debate" concerning the conceptual and methodological principles underlying the discipline. How should man, as the subject matter of psychology, be conceptualized? What kind of knowledge should psychology hope to acquire, and how can this knowledge best be pursued? Lately, some participants in this debate have become more and more critical of the established orthodoxy and have begun to question previously sacrosanct assumptions. These critics are not the inevitable dissenting minority in any discipline, but include some of the recognized leaders in the profession—leaders who, in fact, have been instrumental in creating the very conceptions they now question.

The problem of the "image of man" in psychology has been taken up many times. A particularly trenchant and lucid discussion was offered by Isidor Chein in his 1962 presidential address to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Chein argued that "among psychologists . . . the prevailing image of Man is that of an impotent reactor, with its responses completely determined by two distinct and separate, albeit interacting, sets of factors: (1) the forces impinging on it and (2) its constitution (including in the latter term . . . momentary psychological states)."[68] He held that this image is obviously false, that psychologists can cling to it only "by violating our cardinal obligation as scientists—to maintain faith in our subject matter, to support scrupulously that which we observe, and to observe fully without willful bias."[69]

What this image denies, and what observation clearly attests to, is

[67] Marc J. Roberts, "On the Nature and Condition of Social Science," *Daedalus*, Vol. 103 (Summer 1974), 61, 62.

[68] Chein, "The Image of Man," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVIII (October 1962), 3.

[69] *Ibid.* Similar arguments are made in Rom Harré and P. F. Secord, *The Explanation of Social Behavior* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield 1972).

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that man is "an *active, responsible agent,* not simply a *helpless, powerless* reagent." Chein continues: "I am saying that we should not permit ourselves to be seduced, as so many of us have been, by those pretentious high order conceptualizations of Psychology that would deny Man the quality that is inalienably his, the quality of freedom—and, in the denial, make Man, as a psychological agent, inaccessible."[70]

This argument bears a strong resemblance to Popper's. The determinist assumption of "cast-iron control" over choice and action is rejected for a conception that allows for the autonomy of human action in creating, as well as in responding to, the world. Interestingly enough, Chein claims to be a determinist—in the sense of viewing every event as having necessary and sufficient conditions—but argues that motives and purposes share in the determination of human actions, thus bringing them under direct human control. Like Popper, therefore, Chein is concerned with the question of how "mental events" such as purposes, deliberations, plans, etc., can play a part in bringing about change in the physical world.

In his presidential address before the American Psychological Association in 1975, Donald Campbell called on psychologists to show a bit of epistemic humility, and to recognize that "all scientific knowledge is indirect, presumptive, obliquely and incompletely corroborated at best." He went on to argue that reductionism in psychology must be seen as a first step in a long-term research strategy, not as an end in itself:

> Considering the complexities of our field and our models from the history of the successful sciences, a strategy of deliberate initial oversimplification has to be recommended to psychology. But this guarantees that in the early stages of development the theoretical orthodoxy will be misleadingly reductionistic, will portray humans as more simple machines than they actually are. If psychologists at such a stage were to lose the perspective that this view was a product of their long-term strategy, were instead to exaggerate the degree of perfection of their current theories, and were to propagate these immature theories as final truth, the net result could be destructive of popular values. . . . Here again, a science requiring the strategy of deliberate initial oversimplification may recruit scholars overeager to adopt a demeaning, mechanistic, reductionistic view of human nature.[71]

Today, at least some psychologists have managed to move beyond the mechanistic image of man, and are pursuing research based upon a more realistic and useful conception. Among the newer approaches in

[70] Chein (fn. 68), 2; emphasis in original; 18.

[71] Campbell, "On the Conflict Between Biological and Social Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition," *American Psychologist*, xxx (December 1975), 1120, 1121.

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social psychology, for example, is "attribution theory," which examines the assumptions and working hypotheses that constitute the "naive psychology" of ordinary people as they interpret their own behaviors and the actions of others. Lee Ross, one of the leaders in this field, has summed up the significance of this approach:

> The current ascendancy of attribution theory in social psychology culminates a long struggle to upgrade that discipline's conception of man. No longer the stimulus-response (S-R) automaton of radical behaviorism, promoted beyond the rank of information processor and cognitive consistency seeker, psychological man has at last been awarded a status equal to that of the scientist who investigates him. For man, in the perspective of attribution theory, is an intuitive psychologist who seeks to explain behavior and to draw inferences about actors and their environments.[72]

What of psychology's second problem, the kind of knowledge it can expect to attain about man? That issue has recently been given careful consideration by the educational psychologist Lee Cronbach. Reflecting on his experience in experimental social psychology over the last two decades, Cronbach asks the question, "Should social science aspire to reduce behavior to laws?" He observes that "Social scientists generally, and psychologists in particular, have modelled their work on physical science, aspiring to amass empirical generalizations, to restructure them into more general laws, and to weld scattered laws into coherent theory. That lofty aspiration is far from realization."[73]

The essential difficulty with this methodology, Cronbach argues, is that social science laws, unlike physical laws, seem to be highly mutable. As he puts it, "Generalizations decay." Further, "At one time a conclusion describes the existing situation well, at a later time it accounts for rather little variance, and ultimately it is valid only as history. The half-life of an empirical proposition may be great or small. The more open a system, the shorter the half-life of relations within it are likely to be." He compares the task of building theories in this way with a mechanical assembly problem: "It is as if we needed a gross of dry cells to power an engine and could make one a month. The energy would leak out of the first cells before we had half the battery completed. So it is with the potency of our generalizations."[74]

[72] Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process," in L. Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, X (New York: Academic Press 1977), 174.

[73] Cronbach, "Beyond the Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology," *American Psychologist*, xxx (February 1975), 116, 125.

[74] *Ibid.*, 122-23.

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At the end of this article, which recounts two decades of aspiration toward a nomological psychology, Cronbach writes:

> Social scientists are rightly proud of the discipline we draw from the natural science side of our ancestry. Scientific discipline is what we uniquely add to the time-honored ways of studying man. Too narrow an identification with science, however, has fixed our eyes upon an inappropriate goal. The goal of our work, I have argued here, is not to amass generalizations atop which a theoretical tower can some day be erected. . . . The special task of the social scientist in each generation is to pin down the contemporary facts. Beyond that, he shares with the humanistic scholar and the artist in the effort to gain insight into contemporary relationships, and to realign the culture's view of man with present realities.[75]

Economics, like psychology and social psychology, has also been having its troubles in recent years. The critical themes have been surprisingly consistent; the field is seen as isolated and inbred, with its formal models bearing very little resemblance to the empirical world with which economists are supposed to be concerned. These criticisms have for quite some time been the stock-in-trade of such established gadflies of the profession as Gunnar Myrdal and John Kenneth Galbraith. Myrdal, for example, has argued that economists have failed to produce relevant knowledge because of an inappropriate commitment to the methods of the simpler natural sciences:

> In recent decades . . . there has been a strenuous, even strained, effort among my economic colleagues to emulate what they conceive of as the methods of the natural sciences by constructing utterly simplified models, often given mathematical dressing. . . .
>
> It should be clear, however, that this adoption of a form, which the natural scientists, in more simple, pointed questions, can use for analysis and presentation, does not really make the social sciences more scientific, if that form is not adequate to social reality and therefore, not adequate for the analysis of it.[76]

Similarly, Galbraith used the occasion of his 1972 presidential address to the American Economic Association to chide the profession for its failure to come to grips with practical economic problems: "Neoclassical or neo-Keynesian economics, though providing unlimited opportunities for demanding refinement, has a decisive flaw. It offers no useful handle for grasping the economic problems that now beset the modern society. . . . No arrangement for the perpetuation of thought

[75] *Ibid.*, 126.

[76] Gunnar Myrdal, *Against the Stream: Critical Essays on Economics* (New York: Vintage 1972), 143.

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is secure if that thought does not make contact with the problems that it is presumed to solve."[77]

These doubts and concerns have lately become a bit more widespread. Marc Roberts, a younger economist, asserts that "a significant proportion of recent theoretical work in economics has been of little scientific value. Many papers explore questions posed not by the world itself, but by someone else's model."[78] These views seem to be shared by some of the most respected leaders of the economic establishment. Oskar Morgenstern, in an important paper published in 1972, argues that economics is in a crisis because it lacks the concepts, methods, and philosophy it needs to deal adequately with social and political reality. Following a discussion of current equilibrium theory, Morgenstern observes:

> The contrast with reality is striking; the time has come for economic theory to turn around to "face the music."
>
> There is, of course, always the possibility and the temptation of proving all sorts of theorems which have no empirical relevance whatsoever . . . Yet the ultimate criterion is whether what the theorem asserts is what is found in reality. One cannot help but be reminded of Hans Christian Andersen's story of the Emperor's clothes.[79]

Wassily Leontief, who won the Nobel Memorial Prize for the invention of input-output analysis, has struck an even more pessimistic note. In his presidential address to the AEA, given two years before Galbraith's, Leontief argued that "The uneasiness [in economics] is caused not by the irrelevance of the practical problems to which present-day economists address their efforts, but rather by the palpable *inadequacy* of the scientific means with which they try to solve them. . . . Uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulation tends often to conceal the ephemeral substantive content of the argument behind the formidable front of algebraic signs." He concluded that "In no other field of empirical inquiry has so massive and sophisticated a statistical machinery been used with such indifferent results."[80]

The problems in economics, as in psychology, would seem to be primarily substantive. Morgenstern, sounding much like Popper, points

[77] John K. Galbraith, "Power and the Useful Economist," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 63 (March 1973), 2.

[78] Roberts (fn. 67), 60.

[79] Morgenstern, "Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory," *Journal of Economic Literature*, x (December 1972), 1164-65.

[80] Leontief, "Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 61 (March 1971), 1, 2, 3; emphasis in original.

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to the failure of economics to deal seriously with the nonphysical aspects of economic processes:

> . . . the overwhelming emphasis on the physical aspects of the economic process . . . seems one-sided when we realize that it is plans, decisions, preferences, states of information, expectations, etc., etc., that determine the movement and significance of the physical components of the whole economic phenomenon. We are far from having more than broad notions of how to describe and measure their share in a concrete situation. Do we even have a good methodology we could apply?[81]

It used to be, and apparently still is in much of economic theory if not practice, that these decisions and expectations could be discounted because they tended to cancel one another out in the classical market situation. Today, however, many economists attribute a large part of the discipline's empirical dilemma to a failure to appreciate how extensively political decisions now override the mechanisms of the market. Galbraith observes that "in place of the market system, we must now assume that for approximately half of all economic output there is a power or planning system."[82] The effect of this injection of planning into the economic process has been to upset the predictive capabilities of economic theory. Robert Heilbroner, in commenting on the inability of economics to predict the course of a national economy, remarks that "it may be that this is less possible than it was, because the economy itself now is so much more a creature of decision making, and so much less the outcome of sheer interplay of impersonal forces, that prediction becomes inherently more difficult."[83]

This major problem in economics would seem to have important implications for political science. For what the economists are saying is that to the extent their subject matter is becoming more *political*, it is becoming less susceptible to scientific and formalistic methodologies. The impact of decisions, of the possibility of shifting the economy in new directions, undermines the regularity of the impersonal forces that previously allowed for successful predictive and modelling exercises. This conclusion does not augur well for those who envision an eventually formalized political science. Indeed, the tendency seems to be in the opposite direction; economics may be becoming more like political science!

A second and related problem economists have had to deal with deserves mention: the problem of decaying generalizations. Like psy-

[81] Morgenstern (fn. 79), 1187-88.
[82] Galbraith (fn. 77), 4.
[83] Quoted in Wade Greene, "Economists in Recession," *New York Times Magazine* May 12, 1974, p. 64.

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chology, economics has been unsuccessful in its attempt to build lasting empirical models of its subject matter. As Leontief puts it:

> In contrast to most physical sciences, we study a system that is not only exceedingly complex but also in a state of constant flux. I have in mind not the obvious change in the variables . . . that our equations are supposed to explain, but the basic structural relationships described by the form and the parameters of these equations. In order to know what the shapes of these structural relationships actually are at any given time, we have to keep them under continuous surveillance.[84]

These second thoughts in economics and psychology illustrate the degree to which the two bellwether disciplines are now reassessing their earlier explanatory strategies and meta-methodological commitments. Clearly, their attempts to deal with the complexities of social reality in terms of a model of scientific method borrowed from the physical sciences has run into more difficulties than they had expected. The ambivalence of this effort to bring the human enterprise under the categories and logic of the hard sciences has been captured by the economist and social philosopher Albert Hirschman, who points out in a recent book—in a section entitled "A Passion for the Possible"—that "Most social scientists conceive it as their exclusive task to discover and stress regularities, stable relationships, and uniform sequences . . ." rather than recognizing "the multiplicity and creative disorder of the human adventure." He maintains that the social scientists would be surprised and even "distraught if their search for general laws were crowned with total success," and concludes, "Quite possibly . . . all the successive theories and models in the social sciences, and the immense efforts that go into them, are motivated by the noble, if unconscious, desire to demonstrate the irreducibility of the social world to general laws! In no other way would it have been possible to affirm so conclusively the social world as the realm of freedom and creativity."[85]

The philosophy of science itself is experiencing a process of re-evaluation and reorientation similar to that taking place in psychology and economics. The article by Popper which we have used as a metaphorical guide for our own thinking is but one example of a more general trend in the field exemplified by his work[86] and that of Polanyi,[87] Hanson,[88]

[84] Leontief (fn. 80), 3.

[85] Albert O. Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1971), 27.

[86] Popper (fn. 1); *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Basic Books 1963); *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books 1959).

[87] Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1958).

[88] Norwood R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1958); *Observation and Explanation: A Guide to Philosophy of Science* (New York: Harper and Row 1971).

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Kuhn,[89] Quine,[90] Lakatos,[91] Toulmin,[92] and many others. Today, the pre-eminent position held by logical positivism in the philosophy of science seems to be weakening. Philosophers of science no longer see their role as one of legislating the "rules" of science; they are more likely to pursue descriptive and explanatory modes of research. Science is viewed as an activity or a process, not simply as a logical product. Accordingly, an appreciation is beginning to develop for the degree to which science—humankind's loftiest intellectual achievement—is grounded and dependent upon basic common sense and informal as well as formalized substantive knowledge.[93] Philosophers are learning more about how science grows and how it prospers. The newer literature in the philosophy of science is rich in insights and implications for the enterprise of social science.

IMPLICATIONS

If the whole of social reality has distinctive properties rendering it unamenable to simple deductive-nomological forms of explanation, this is especially the case for the study of politics which, of all the social sciences, focuses most directly on collective goal-seeking and adaptive processes. A political science solely concerned with the search for regularities which constrain choice would miss the distinctive aspect of political reality, which is the effort to escape from constraints, to discover value-optimizing solutions to problems in the context of constraints.

The anthropologist John W. Bennett recommends an approach to anthropological theory and research which is oriented around the concept of adaptation:

> Instead of abstractions from behavior, like culture or the reductive formulas of psychology or genetics, [adaptation] focuses on human actors who try to realize objectives, satisfy needs, and find peace while coping with present conditions. In their coping, humans create the social future in the sense of generating new problems or perpetuating old ones and may even modify the biological construction of the population in the process. . . . By analyzing the factors that guide the choice of strategies,

[89] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962).

[90] W. V. O. Quine, *Ontological Relativity* (New York: Columbia University Press 1969).

[91] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970).

[92] Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, I (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972); *Foresight and Understanding* (New York: Harper and Row 1961).

[93] See Campbell (fn. 71).

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> we gain knowledge of the possibility and direction of change and the relation of human behavior to the milieus.[94]

We would argue that what Bennett has to say about anthropology applies with even greater force to political science: "the important phenomena for an adaptational anthropology are dynamic human purposes, needs and wants. . . ." The emphasis ought to shift "toward strategic coping, that is, the attempt to realize individual and social objectives through the mobilization of social and material resources. This category of human behavior has become dominant in the contemporary world with its interdependence and growing constraints on free action."[95]

Duncan MacRae argues a similar thesis regarding the development of the social sciences in the last several decades.

> They [the social sciences] have evolved from an earlier form of social analysis, less specialized and recondite, by imitating the natural sciences . . . many social scientists have become convinced that the most effective path to useful application lies through objective research and theory construction, free from the complications of ideological and philosophical dispute. They have thus developed distinct technical terminologies and methods of research, specialized journals and programs of graduate instruction. Through these devices they have separated the discourse of specialists from that of the general public, and the communications of the individual specialists from one another. The course of the social sciences during the past several decades has thus been guided by the model of natural science—however distinct they may seem from it to natural scientists themselves.[96]

MacRae's solution to this problem of the withdrawal of the social sciences from social problem solving is to introduce into the university a "discipline of policy analysis" which will combine social theories and analysis with disciplined ethical discourse. He believes that the present situation of cognitive and valuative fragmentation in the disciplines of social science can only be overcome by an institutional solution—the introduction of research and teaching departments of policy analysis and applied social science.[97]

We have somewhat less faith in organizational solutions, and are convinced that the discipline of political science—which has tended to abandon the task MacRae now wishes to assign to a special discipline—

[94] Bennett, "Anticipation, Adaptation, and the Concept of Culture in Anthropology," *Science*, Vol. 192 (May 28, 1976), 847.
[95] *Ibid.*, 850, 851.
[96] MacRae, *The Social Function of Social Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1976), 3.
[97] *Ibid.*, 277ff.

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is still capable of reasserting a central role in the study and evaluation of public policy. The powerful attraction of the example of the natural sciences has begun to fade as our efforts have fallen short of our aspirations. Despite the prominence of the trend among our methodologists, in our leading journals, and in some of our leading centers of graduate instruction, the overwhelming majority of the profession in the United States and abroad either actively resists the model, experiences a sense of obsolescence because of its prominence, or is indifferent to it. Most of the published work in political science, settles for goals less ambitious than nomothetic explanation. This work includes descriptive or historical accounts or case studies making limited use of theoretical frameworks and generalizations, and contributes to the aims of understanding, interpreting, and exploring political reality and policy alternatives which MacRae identifies as crucial to policy analysis.

One might make the case that the search for greater rigor in our understanding of politics might have made more progress if its claims and expectations had been less extreme, less exaggerated, less difficult to square with a recalcitrant reality. A more cautious approach to scientific progress, recognizing the peculiarities of human and social reality, might have resulted in a more general acceptance of appropriate quantification, of the heuristic value of formal-mathematical formulation, experimental methods, and the like.

It is of interest that a quarter of a century ago, in the aftermath of World War II, when the movement toward science in the social disciplines was just beginning, this relationship between the search for regularities and man's efforts to discover value-optimizing solutions to his predicaments was more clearly understood. One has only to compare an early "scope and methods" book with the more recent ones cited above. Some twenty-five years ago, many of the pioneers of the behavioral movement in the social sciences contributed to a volume entitled *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*. In the leading chapter, Harold Lasswell stated his priorities: "If our policy needs are to be served, what topics of research are most worthy of pursuit? . . . What are the most promising methods of gathering facts and interpreting their significance for policy? How can facts and interpretations be made effective in the decision-making process itself?" The same essay celebrated the introduction of scientific methods into the social sciences—statistics, mathematical modelling, and related approaches. But this scientific hardening of method was set in the context of problem solving, value clarification, and the enhancement of the human condition. Lasswell looked upon method as

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making possible acts of "creative imagination" which might move mankind in constructive directions away from the tyrannies and catastrophes of the 1930's and 1940's.[98]

The connection between the search for regularities and political creativity—clearly seen by that generation freshly returned from Washington and the military theaters of World War II—was gradually lost in the decades that followed. The "methods" message of Lasswell's sermon was heard and acted upon with the mixed results we have reviewed, but the "policy science" message largely fell on deaf ears for reasons we have suggested above.

What is under attack here is the pecking order, and the particular set of priorities and resource allocations, which have come to dominate the profession in the last decades. These priorities and allocative policies, and this pecking order, are legitimated not by successes in the explanation of political reality, but by the example and the demonstration effect of the hard sciences. A pecking order in which mathematization and sophisticated statistical analysis are viewed as the only sources of "real" or "powerful" theory, while theories produced from the interplay of imagination and induction are treated as "heuristic" or "weak" theory, cannot be justified by the explanatory performance of the former. Theories are inherently weak in the human sciences—both those that look "strong" because they look like the theories of physics, economics, or psychology, and those that look "weak" because they derive hypotheses from the examination of individual cases or historical experience.

Another aspect of the pecking order which is under criticism here is the distinction between pure and applied political science. Even in the hard sciences, the comparative intellectual payoffs of so-called pure and applied research are not at all clear-cut. Important discoveries often emerge out of applied research. In the social sciences, including political science, this difference loses its meaning since the special characteristic of social reality is man's adaptive behavior. The part of the discipline which calls itself pure political science, searching for powerful and enduring regularities, has missed the essential point of its subject matter. At best it illuminates the context of political decisions; but it leaves unexplored the adaptive searching process, the policy options, and their consequences. Surely the study of public policy—viewed as efforts to adapt to, cope with, modify, and overcome constraints—is as basic and pure an undertaking as is the search for constraining regularities.

[98] Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1951), 3, 12.

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Indeed, we might argue that the essence of political science—insofar as it is to be defined by the essence of the politics it studies—is the analysis of choice in the context of constraints. That would place the search for regularities, the search for solutions to problems, and the evaluation of these solutions on the same level. They would all be parts of a common effort to confront man's political fate with rigor, with the necessary objectivity, and with an inescapable sense of identification with the subject matter which the political scientist studies.

Our policies of research support and professional training need to be freed from imitating the hard sciences. Policy studies, institutional studies, and philosophically sophisticated evaluative studies are claimants on research support with as much legitimacy as is currently accorded mathematical, statistical, and psychological and sociological reductionist studies. Knowledge of political substance in its institutional, historical, and philosophical aspects has to be re-established on an equal footing with sophisticated methodologies and reductionist knowledge in our programs of graduate training. A whole library of meta-methodological handbooks and primers imposing the model of hard science on political reality has to be re-evaluated in a new light. These volumes do not represent the "true path" to scientific progress; rather, they are a historical deviation, a flirtation with mistaken metaphors that temporarily captured the imagination of social scientists. Their historical importance is thus great, but their relevance to practical research problems in the social sciences is limited. To progress scientifically, the social disciplines require their own philosophy of science based on explanatory strategies, possibilities, and obligations appropriate to human and social reality.

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STABILITY AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN ELECTORATES

By ALAN ZUCKERMAN and MARK IRVING LICHBACH*

INTRODUCTION

THE assumptions of political sociology guide most analyses of European electorates.[1] They provide the rationale for interrelating social, economic, and political variables while contending that the latter are causally dependent upon the first two. Exemplifying these views, numerous studies predicted that changes in the voting behavior of individuals would follow the social and economic transformation of postwar Europe. In turn, these changes would effect major alterations in the size and social composition of the parties' electorates.

The outcomes of postwar elections have run counter to these predictions. Rose and Urwin, in a study of elections held between 1945 and 1970, present much evidence of stability in the partisan division of the vote.[2] Even where electoral outcomes in the early 1970's have differed radically from past patterns, no direct links to social and economic change are evident.[3] Throughout this essay, we present additional problems for the accepted theories. In the first part, we elaborate and then test the argument for the emergence of parties with "catch-all" electorates. Using survey data that cover most of the postwar period in several European countries, we find evidence that negates this argument. In the second part, we examine the determinants of individual voting decisions. We derive hypotheses from competing schools of electoral analysis and test them against data taken from Butler's and Stokes's panel study of British voters between 1963 and 1970.

* We are indebted to Vincent Covello for providing us with initial access to much of the data and to Haywood Sanders for much crucial technical assistance. Leon Epstein, Arnold Howitt, Morris Janowitz, William T. Murphy, Jr., Bo Särlvick, Giovanni Sartori, William Schneider, Sidney Tarrow, and Sidney Verba contributed comments and encouragement on various drafts. We are especially grateful to Kenneth Janda for his incisive and detailed criticisms.

[1] A general critique of this literature may be found in Giovanni Sartori, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press 1969), 65-100.

[2] Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945," *Political Studies*, XVIII (September 1970), 287-319. See also Adam Przeworski, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 (March 1975), 49-67.

[3] The British elections of 1974 are especially important, but note also the Swedish elections of 1973 and the Italian regional election of 1975 and the Italian national election of 1976.

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Since our research presents findings contrary to the expectations of political sociology, we conclude the essay by elaborating an alternative argument. We contend that the voters' decisions are best explained by the absence or presence of loyalties to political parties rather than social or economic factors. In areas where most people have strong party attachments, marked change in the partisan division of the vote occurs only when an exceptionally large number of new voters enter the electoral arena; alterations in the social composition of a party's voters follow changes in the occupations or social categories of those who consistently vote for the party.

Our primary goal has been to test hypotheses derived from more general theories of electorates. Thus, we are less concerned with providing complete explanations for the problems than with assessing the effects of the findings on the competing theories. The focus upon the testing of hypotheses resolves potential conceptual ambiguities. The criteria incumbent to the theories have been used to choose the analytic dimensions, the cleavages, and the relevant definitions. In the following pages, we devote particular attention to Kirchheimer's work on the "catch-all" party because of its theoretical importance.[4] Kirchheimer's hypotheses deal with the aggregate characteristics of electorates and are derived from the accepted theories of voting behavior.

A Test for the Development of "Catch-All" Electorates

Since the end of World War II, according to Kirchheimer, the "catch-all peoples party" has come to typify the large competitive parties in Western Europe.[5] The German Christian Democratic Union, for instance, emerged as a catch-all, while others descended from "class-mass" and "denominational-mass" parties. In our analysis, we examine for only one of several defining characteristics—the catch-all electorate. Following Kirchheimer's usage, one or both of the following serve

[4] Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), 177-200.

[5] A number of tests of Kirchheimer's argument have focused on political party competition in Italy. See Sidney Tarrow, "Economic Development and the Transformation of the Italian Party System," *Comparative Politics*, I (January 1969), 161-83; Vincent E. McHale and John E. McLaughlin, "Economic Development and the Transformation of the Italian Party System: A Reconsideration," *Comparative Politics*, VII (October 1974), 37-60; and Raphael Zariski and Susan Welch, "The Correlates of Intraparty Depolarizing Tendencies in Italy," *Comparative Politics*, VII (April 1975), 407-34. See also McHale and Sandra Shaber, "From Aggressive to Defensive Gaullism: The Electoral Dynamics of a 'Catch-All Party,'" *Comparative Politics*, VIII (January 1976), 291-306.

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as the relevant operational criteria: (1) The social composition of a party's voters approximates—if it does not mirror—that of the general population. (2) There has been a dramatic decline in the level of a party electorate's shared social characteristics.[6]

Which parties will develop catch-all electorates? Kirchheimer derived his answer from the strategic decisions open to party leaders and from the contours of the social structure: parties with political incentives, where social divisions are weakening. The crucial political variables are the relative size and standing of a party: the smaller the party and the lower the competitive utility of attracting new voters, the smaller the likelihood that the party will alter its structure and voting base. Thus, the parties with no chance of accumulating large numbers of voters, and those already controlling a predominant portion of the electorate, are not expected to become catch-all. The Swedish Agrarian Center Party is an example of the first type; the Swedish Social Democratic Party exemplifies the second.[7] The imperatives of the cleavage structure will prevent other parties from becoming catch-alls.[8] Of the remainder, the British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats are most likely to develop catch-all electorates.

The argument deals with three categories of parties:

1. *Parties that are expected to change from very high social homogeneity to catch-all status.* By testing the predictions with regard to the British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, we sought to falsify the argument where it is most likely to succeed. If it does not hold, we may draw negative conclusions about the underlying theory.
2. *Parties that are expected to be stable at very high levels of social homogeneity.* The examination of the parties in this category checks out Kirchheimer's explanation for the development of the catch-all electorate. Thus, if one of these parties changes, we must go beyond Kirchheimer's argument in order to find the sources of change.
3. *Parties that are expected to be stable at catch-all levels.* The examination of these parties enables us to gauge levels of social homogeneity for all the parties. Kirchheimer presumes that these parties began the postwar period with electorates considerably less homogeneous than the others.

[6] Kirchheimer's most explicit formulation blends the two: "De-emphasis of the *classe gardée*, specific social-class or denominational clientele, in favor of recruiting voters among the population at large." This conceptualization is listed along with the other characteristics of the "catch-all" party. Kirchheimer (fn. 4), 190.

[7] *Ibid.*, 187.

[8] Kirchheimer's example is the Italian *Democrazia Cristiana*; *ibid.*, 187-88.

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In our test of the predictions, we have followed the guidelines of Lipset and Rokkan and have examined all relevant political cleavages.[9] We have also looked at the social characteristics of the electorates and at the voting decisions of the social divisions. In order to provide standardized descriptions, we have used Rose's and Urwin's "index of social cohesion" and Janda's "reflection" score. Each provides systematic and complementary measures of the selected phenomena.[10]

Before examining the tables, we must address some methodological issues pertaining to the combination of different surveys into one time series. There are two major problems: The surveys frequently use incommensurable categories, and there are discrepancies between survey responses and actual patterns. Where it was possible, we obtained the surveys themselves and standardized the classifications.[11] Where that was not possible, we have so indicated in the tables, and have reported the survey results along with the actual election returns and the accepted measures of the social categories. The problem of inaccurate results is especially important because it indicates a change in the tables' cells where none is really present. Since it is self-defeating to be more precise than the data allow and the tests of the hypotheses require, we have not interpreted the data beyond the description of general patterns.

[9] See Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments,* (New York: Free Press 1967), 1-64. For an analysis distinguishing between political division and political cleavage as well as establishing types of political cleavages, see Zuckerman, "Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science*, v (April 1975), 231-48.

[10] Rose's and Urwin's index of social cohesion is developed in their article, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes," *Comparative Political Studies*, II (April 1969), 8-12. In our analysis we use the term "homogeneity," which does not imply the small-group intimacy of cohesion. Rose's and Urwin's index standardizes the share of a party's vote supplied by a cleavage, by comparing that to the cleavage's share of the population. They establish a score of 17 as indicating social cohesion. Janda's measure is more complex and sophisticated. The reflection score indicates the extent to which a party's electorate resembles the electorate's characteristics. It usually varies between 0 and 1, the latter being perfectly similar. Janda develops this and other measures in *Comparative Political Parties: A Cross-National Handbook* (Evanston, Ill.: International Comparative Parties Project 1974). For an analysis relating the parties' social composition to other phenomena, see Robbin Gillies and Kenneth Janda, "Social Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Party Systems: A Cross-National Analysis," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1975. "Reflection" was formerly labelled "representation."

[11] We have followed the procedures used in Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952–1968," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (March 1972), 11-20, and David Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1974), 255. The originator of the method is Frederick Mosteller, "Association and Estimation in Contingency Tables," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 63 (March 1968), 1-28.

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The problems are especially severe in the West German surveys, in which the data must be viewed with caution; it is best to rely on the standardized scores. Still, we would rather display the results of all available West German elections than omit some of the surveys. As a check, we have compared our results with those of other studies and we have found similar distributions.

The sources of the parties' votes as displayed in Table 1[12] do not conform to Kirchheimer's predictions. The Labour Party was less socially homogeneous at the start of the period than at any point thereafter. For approximately fifteen years after the war, it was characterized by a slight rise in the working class as a proportion of its electorate; the decline evident in 1970 returned the party to the levels of the early 1950's. Throughout the period, generally the same portion of Labour's vote came from the working class. The data also show that, at the outset of the period, the Labour Party was less socially homogeneous than the Conservative Party. Surveys taken during non-election years also reveal stability in the parties' levels of social homogeneity.[13]

Data on the actual voting behavior of the social classes show them to have been just as stable.[14] In 1945, 57 percent of "skilled manual workers" voted Labour, as did 55 percent in 1970. Between those elections, the low point (52 percent), was reached in 1951, and the high point (58 percent), in 1966. Only in 1974, an election marked by many changes, did the proportion of "skilled manual workers" that voted for Labour dip below half, to 47 percent. Among the "unskilled manual workers" and "pensioners" there was slightly more change, but there were no clear trends. In 1945 and 1970, 57 percent voted Labour. The low point was 55 percent, in 1955, and the high point was 68 percent, in 1959. At the start of the period, 32 percent of the working class

[12] The published sources used in Table 1 are Robert Alford, *Party and Society* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1963); Butler and Stokes (fn. 11); Jean Blondel, *Voters, Parties and Leaders* (Baltimore: Penguin 1967); and Peter G. J. Pulzer, *Political Representation and Elections: Parties and Voting in Great Britain* (New York: Praeger 1967). Morris Janowitz and David Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States," in Giuseppe DiPalma, ed., *Mass Politics in Industrial Societies* (Chicago: Markham 1972), 212, and Richard Rose, "Britain: Simple Abstractions and Complex Realities," in Rose, *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press 1974), 501, use the same categorization of the classes.

[13] Zuckerman and Lichbach, "L'Elettorato Dei Partiti Europei," *Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica*, III, No. 1 (1976), 116.

[14] In addition to the sources cited in footnote 12, we used survey materials from the British election studies for 1964 and 1966, by David Butler and Anthony King; for 1970, by David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky; and for 1974, by David Butler and Denis Kavanaugh (New York: St. Martin's Press). The categories used in the discussion of the classes' voting patterns are set out below Table 1.

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TABLE 1

GREAT BRITAIN 1945–1974
SOCIAL SOURCES OF PARTIES' ELECTORATES
(PERCENTAGES)[a]

Parties	*1945*	*1950*	*1951*	*1955*[c]	*1959*[c]	*1964*	*1966*	*1970*	*1974*
LABOUR									
% of vote from Working Class[b]	82	85	87	85	89	82	81	78	83
Rose and Urwin index	16	17	19	18	22	21	19	17	20
Janda reflection score	.66	.62	.59	.58	.51	.56	.59	.64	.60
CONSERVATIVE									
% of vote from Middle Class[b]	52	50	50	50	53	57	60	57	55
Rose and Urwin index	18	18	18	17	20	18	22	18	18
Janda's reflection score	.59	.58	.57	.60	.52	.59	.54	.65	.56
Cleavage's share of electorate									
Working class	66	68	68	67	67	61	62	61	63
Middle class	34	32	32	33	33	39	38	39	37
Party's share of two-party vote[d]									
LABOUR	55	51	50	48	46	50	53	48	50
CONSERVATIVE	45	49	50	52	54	50	47	52	50

[a] The 1945–59 data were recomputed from Alford (fn. 12). Percentages may not add up to 100 because of recomputation and rounding. The 1964–70 data were gathered from the Butler and Stokes panel study of Great Britain and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. (Here and throughout this article, neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium are responsible for our analyses or interpretations.) For 1974, we used the information in Butler and Kavanaugh (fn. 14).

[b] See Alford (fn. 12), for the development of the working-class/middle-class dichotomy for the 1945–59 data. For the 1964–70 and 1974 data, the categories were combined as follows:

Middle class:	A	–Higher managerial or professional
	B	–Lower managerial or administrative
	C1a	–Skilled or supervisory nonmanual
	C1b	–Lower nonmanual
Working class:	C2	–Skilled manual
	D	–Unskilled manual
	E	–Residual, on pension or other state benefits.

This categorization follows the suggestions of Rose (fn. 12), and Pulzer (fn. 12).

[c] Because the 1955 and 1959 surveys oversampled the middle class, we have adjusted the marginals to make them comply with generally accepted descriptions of the relative sizes of the working and middle class. See, for example, Blondel (fn. 12), 57.

[d] The reported election results are all within 1 or 2 percentage points of the actual returns.

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voted for the Tories. This number rose to 40 percent in the mid-1950's. In 1970, working-class Tories were 35 percent of the "skilled manual workers" and 32 percent of the others.

Among the "nonmanual," 24 percent voted Labour in 1945—a figure not reached again until 1964, when 25 percent voted Labour. This proportion was surpassed both in 1966 and 1970, but in 1974, it declined again to 18 percent. In 1945, 61 percent of the "nonmanual" voted Tory, a percentage equalled or surpassed in every election until 1966, when 59 percent supported the Conservatives. An even larger share of the vote of the "managers, professionals, and administrators" went to the Conservatives: 76 percent in 1945, as much as 90 percent in 1951, and 79 percent in 1970.

The results deny the predictions inasmuch as (1) the Labour Party did not begin the period at especially high levels of social homogeneity; (2) it has not been characterized by clear declines in the share of its vote coming from the working class; (3) support for Labour by the working class has not dropped; and (4) there is no evidence of sustained growth in the share of the middle-class vote that goes to Labour.

Table 2 reports the results of West German election surveys taken since 1953. As we found in the British case, the patterns do not conform to Kirchheimer's predictions. The SPD was no more socially homogeneous in the early 1950's than in the 1972 election. The Christian Democrats, while drawing a relatively large share of their votes from Catholics, have consistently derived much support from all cleavages. The middle class (and especially its Protestants) has always provided a relatively large portion of the SPD electorate. Our findings show that one-fifth of the SPD's voters in 1953 came from the Protestant middle class (very close to its share of the population); one-third came from the middle class as a whole. These ratios deny Kirchheimer's view of a class-mass SPD, presumably drawing all or nearly all of its votes from the working class. They also sustain earlier analyses which maintain that as much as 40 percent of the Social Democratic vote came from the middle class before 1933.[15]

While the share of the SPD's vote coming from the working class—particularly the "traditional left" component—has remained at high levels, the party has increased its appeal among the other cleavages.[16]

[15] Derek Urwin, "Germany: Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics," in Rose (fn. 12), 131.

[16] For analyses that use similar cleavages, see Klaus Liepelt, "The Infra-Structure of Party Support in Germany and Austria," in Mattei Dogan and Richard Rose, eds., *European Politics: A Reader* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 193, as well as Janowitz and Segal (fn. 12), 216, and Urwin (fn. 15), 160. The discussion of the social categories' voting patterns follows the definitions set out below Table 2.

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TABLE 2

WEST GERMANY 1953–1972
SOCIAL SOURCES OF PARTIES' ELECTORATES
(PERCENTAGES)[a]

Parties	*1953*	*1957*	*1961*	*1965*	*1969*	*1972*
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT						
% of vote from:[b]						
Traditional Left	43	63	47	73	62	64
Mixed Attachment	27	5	24	7	9	3
Middle Class	20	29	21	19	25	31
Roman Catholic	11	3	7	2	4	2
Rose and Urwin index on Trad. Left	19	27	19	17	18	17
Janda's reflection score	.74	.61	.75	.62	.74	.68
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT						
% of vote from:						
Traditional Left	12	20	16	30	29	28
Mixed Attachment	28	16	27	22	20	14
Middle Class	25	40	26	28	33	42
Roman Catholic	35	23	31	20	19	17
Rose and Urwin index on Middle Class	−2	1	−1	1	2	3
Janda's reflection score	.84	.73	.82	.74	.74	.51
Cleavage's share of electorate:[b]						
Traditional Left	24	36	28	46	44	47
Mixed Attachment	26	11	24	15	14	7
Middle Class	27	39	27	27	31	39
Roman Catholic	24	14	20	12	11	7
Reported share / Actual share of total vote						
SPD	30/29	39/32	36/33	41/39	47/43	55/46
CDU/CSU	45/45	55/50	50/45	53/48	48/46	35/45

[a] The 1957 data were taken from Almond's and Verba's Five-Nation Study; the 1965, 1969, and 1972 data were taken from the respective German Election Studies. All were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data for 1953 and 1961 were recomputed from Franz Urban Pappi (see fn. 17). Percentages may not add up to 100 because of recomputation and rounding.

[b] Following the literature, we have developed four political cleavages. They were devised as follows: A working-class/middle-class dichotomy was formed, along with a category of Roman Catholics who attended Church at least once a week. The "traditional left" are working class who are not practicing Catholics; "mixed attachment" are working class who are practicing Catholics; "middle class" are middle class who are not practicing Catholics; and "Roman Catholics" are middle class who are practicing Catholics. The 1953 and 1961 data defined Catholic by religion of birth. Hence, there are discrepancies between the relative size of the cleavages. Because the published data for those elections do not distinguish farm owners and farm workers, we have omitted that category from our analysis.

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This gain is clearly reflected in the growth of the Social Democrats' share of the national vote. With regard to the voting of the social categories, Franz Urban Pappi has demonstrated a general increase in support for the SPD in all cleavages.[17] Our own analysis shows that the proportion of the traditional left voting for the SPD was 63 percent in 1957, 64 percent in 1965, 66 percent in 1969 and 74 percent in 1972. Among those in the "middle class," the SPD has shown major recent gains: 29 percent in 1957, 28 percent in 1965, 38 percent in 1969 and 45 percent in 1972. The SPD's advances among the Catholic segments (the "mixed attachment" and "Roman Catholic" categories), however, have been somewhat less consistent and marked. Indeed, the party has scored best where it began already relatively strong, in the Protestant working class and the Protestant salaried middle class. The latter has been the fastest-growing segment of the society, and crucial to the SPD's electoral growth. In addition, the severe discrepancies between actual and reported election results in 1972 exaggerate the SPD's spread among the social cleavages.

We have not been able to obtain survey information for all postwar Swedish elections. It appears that all parties have experienced declines in social homogeneity, but none has reached catch-all levels; only the Center Party has had the sharp obvious growth in social heterogeneity which is characteristic of the catch-all electorate.[18] In addition, using a slightly different categorization of the classes, a recent study has found similar patterns of social homogeneity among Social Democratic voters.[19] As in West Germany and Britain, the large Socialist Party in Sweden has always attracted much support from outside the working class. Särlvick's evidence that in the 1930's one-fourth the party's voters were from the middle class supports this contention.[20] The slight de-

[17] Franz Urban Pappi, "Parteiensystem and Sozialstruktur in der Bundesrepublik," *Politische Vierteljahrschrift* (1972), 191-213.

[18] For analyses and the derivation of the relevant Swedish cleavages, see Bo Särlvick, "Sweden: The Social Bases of the Parties in Developmental Perspective," in Rose (fn. 12), 371-434; Särlvick, "Party Politics and Electoral Opinion Formation: A Study of Issues in Swedish Politics 1956–60," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, II (1967), 167-202; Särlvick, "Voting Behavior in Shifting Election Winds: An Overview of the Swedish Elections 1964–1968," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, V (1970), 241-86; and Nils Stjernquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock," in Robert Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions In Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 116-46.

[19] Using official Swedish Government statistics, Gosta Esping-Anderssen, "The Social Democratic Party and the Welfare State: A Comparative Analysis of the Sources and Consequences of Party Decomposition in Advanced Capitalism," unpub. (Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin), cites the following indices of social cohesion for the Swedish Social Democrats: 1956:24.5, 1960:21, 1964:18, 1968:16, 1970:16, and 1973:17.4.

[20] Särlvick in Rose, (fn. 12), 395.

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TABLE 3

SWEDEN 1956–1968
SOCIAL SOURCES OF PARTIES' ELECTORATES
(PERCENTAGES)[a]

Parties	*1956*	*1960*	*1964*	*1968*
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT				
% of vote from:				
Working Class[b]	75	75	69	66
Middle Class		23	30	32
Farmers		2	1	1
Rose and Urwin index on Working Class	26	26	20	18
Janda's reflection score		.56	.60	.62
CENTER (AGRARIAN)				
% of vote from:				
Working Class		20	30	33
Middle Class		22	22	37
Farmers	77	57	48	29
Rose and Urwin index on Farmers	61	44	37	21
Janda's reflection score		—.09	—.06	.23
PEOPLES				
% of vote from:				
Working Class		27	24	24
Middle Class		68	68	67
Farmers		4	8	5
Rose and Urwin index on Middle Class		31	25	25
Janda's reflection score		.50	.60	.63
CONSERVATIVE				
% of vote from:				
Working Class		10	14	14
Middle Class		75	73	68
Farmers		15	13	15
Rose and Urwin index on Middle Class		38	30	26
Janda's reflection score		.42	.60	.45
Cleavage's share of electorate				
Working Class	49	49	49	48
Middle Class	35	37	43	42
Farmers	16	13	11	8
Reported share of total vote / Actual share				
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT		52/48	51/47	55/50
CENTER		15/14	15/13	17/16
PEOPLES		17/18	17/17	14/15
CONSERVATIVE		14/17	11/13	11/14
COMMUNIST		2/5	3/5	1/4

[a] The data for 1956, 1960, and 1968 were recomputed from Särlvick (fn. 18); the 1964 data from Stjernquist (fn. 18). Percentages may not add up to 100 because of recomputation and rounding.

[b] The cleavages used in the table were combined from the following categories in the various surveys:

Working class:	Workers engaged in manufacturing, construction, and mining
	Farm and lumbering workers
	Other workers
Middle class:	Larger employers, higher-salaried employees
	Smaller employers
	Lower salaried employees, shop ass stants, foremen
	Professionals
Farmers:	Farmers

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clines in the homogeneity of the Social Democratic electorate were not caused by a drop in support among the working class but by votes from new social sources. Thus, we find that in 1966, 73 percent of the workers chose the Socialists or the Communists, as did 75 percent in 1960, 73 percent in 1964, and 75 percent in 1968.[21] Only the Center Party began at the levels of homogeneity characteristic of the class-mass party.[22]

Figure 1 charts the results of Rose's and Urwin's "index of social cohesion," illustrating the findings of the tables: stability in the social homogeneity of the British electorates and slight changes in the social characteristics of the Swedish and West German voters. The figure also contrasts the social homogeneity of the socialist parties with the catch-all CDU/CSU, and the stability of all the parties with the growth in the heterogeneity of the Swedish Center Party.

The evidence we have presented negates Kirchheimer's predictions: Change of the required magnitude has occurred where it was not predicted—in the Swedish Center Party. It has not occurred where it was predicted—in the SPD and the British Labour Party. The German Social Democrats' patterns are strikingly similar to those of the Swedish Social Democrats; these parties had been predicted to have different patterns. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the large socialist parties began the period at especially high levels of social homogeneity, a key presumption of Kirchheimer's. It even seems that, at the start of the period, the British Conservative Party was socially more homogeneous than was Labour.

Our analysis also demonstrates the utility of examining electoral patterns over long periods of time. From this perspective, the declines in the social homogeneity of the British Labour Party between 1963 and 1970 detail not a shift from a class-mass to a catch-all electorate,[23] but a return to earlier and still high levels of shared characteristics among its voters. The late 1950's and early 1960's were the apex of Labour's social homogeneity and the consolidation of the various political cleavages. Where we have information on the initial postwar elections, as in Britain, we can see that the subsequent ten to fifteen years were a time of increasing rather than decreasing social homogeneity in the parties' electorates. It would seem that much of Kirchheimer's

[21] *Ibid.*, 398.

[22] In Zuckerman and Lichbach (fn. 13), 121, we present a similar analysis of Norway based on the 1965 election. The results add to the picture of the large Socialist Party's votes coming from its traditional social source, the working class.

[23] See, for example, Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 201; John W. Books and JoAnn B. Reynolds, "A Note on Class Voting in Great Britain and the United States," *Comparative Political Studies*, VIII (October 1975), 360-76.

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

FIGURE 1. THE SOCIAL COHESION OF SELECTED PARTIES

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argument is based on generalizations from existing patterns. The presumption is that the social composition of the electorates at the end of the 1950's had heretofore been considered as the "normal" patterns.

Kirchheimer's argument exhibits still another weakness. The idea that the characteristics of electorates derive from the votes of individuals allows for the presumption that change in the social characteristics of a party's supporters always results from alterations in the voting behavior of individuals. An interpretation of the Swedish Center Party's declining social homogeneity illustrates some problems of this inference. Formerly viewed as a farmers' party—and called the Agrarian Party—the Center Party has been able to increase its share of the national vote by attracting support from new social sources and by increasing its share of the farmers' votes. In 1956, 48 percent of the farmers voted for it, as did 56 percent in 1957, 69 percent in 1960, 64 percent in 1964, and 61 percent in 1968.[24] There is reason to believe that a substantial source of the decline in social homogeneity has been due to changes in the occupations of those who have voted consistently for the party. For example, Särlvick shows that those in the working class who are the children of farmers are considerably less likely than other workers to vote for the Social Democrats. He uses this and other factors to argue that party attachments are widespread and powerful determinants of voting decisions in Sweden.[25] Thus, we find individuals maintaining their party loyalties but changing occupations. Hence, shifts in the parties' aggregate characteristics present the illusion of changes in the votes of individuals. In the next section, we will deal directly with the determinants of individual voting decisions.

The Determinants of Electoral Behavior: A Test of Competing Hypotheses

The source for this part of our analysis is Butler's and Stokes's study of British voting behavior between 1963 and 1970. By surveying the same persons at successive elections, these authors have provided the data necessary to analyze the votes of individuals. Their study confirms earlier findings to the effect that most people consistently voted for the same party:[26] more than two-thirds of those in the panel re-

[24] Särlvick, in Rose (fn. 12), 393.

[25] *Ibid.*, 396-97.

[26] Mark Abrams, "Social Trends and Electoral Behavior," in Richard Rose, ed., *Studies in British Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1966), 129-44; R. J. Benerick, A. H. Birch, J. G. Blumer, and Alison Ewbank, "The Floating Voter and the Liberal View of Representation," *Political Studies*, XVII (June 1969), 177-95.

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ported casting ballots for the same party in the three elections (and four surveys) during the seven-year period. Although Butler and Stokes note a growth in the incidence of conversions from one party to another, and in variations in turnout, they show that the most important component of change was "physical replacement"—the entry of new voters with electoral preferences different from those who died.[27] Change *of* the electorate, not *in* the electorate, is the key to the observed alterations. Rather than deal with the issue of whether change by one-third of the voters is "significant" (a question that is meaningless without theoretical guidelines), we have related these patterns to more general theories of voting behavior.

The literature of political sociology presumes that a person's location in the social and economic structure determines the selection of political friends and foes, goals and tactics. In this view, political behavior is conditioned by the interests and needs associated with one's occupation, ethnic group, religion, and/or social status. Put simply, stability in one's social and economic positions results in stable voting behavior; change in voting behavior results from alterations in one's occupation, social attachment, or status. From this perspective, Kirchheimer argued that economic growth in postwar Europe would lead to a reduction in interclass economic conflict, a weakening of status barriers, and a diminution of the number of individuals voting on strict *classe gardée* interests. Reacting to these changes in the lives of voters, party leaders would devise new appeals. The result is the catch-all party.

This emphasis on the action of party leaders differentiates Kirchheimer's argument from those of others who share the presumption that social factors determine votes. For example, Lopreato assumes that parties have no influence on voting decisions. He argues that those who are upwardly mobile will vote for the party of their original class when they perceive status discrimination to be present.[28] This position is best summarized by Shively, who doubts the presence of attachments to political parties in Weimar Germany and in European polities in general.[29]

In this view, a person's primary loyalties are to his social group. A psychological attachment to a political party arises only when it is seen as tied to one's cleavage or economic interests, and even then it

[27] Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 257-70.

[28] Joseph Lopreato, "Social Mobility and Political Outlooks in Italy," in Dogan and Rose (fn. 16), 202-12.

[29] W. Phillips Shively, "Voting Stability and the Nature of Party Attachments in the Weimar Republic," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (December 1972), 1222.

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serves only to indicate those more substantial bonds. *The arguments that social group identity is the determinant of voting behavior, and that it is more "fundamental" and stable than attachment to a political party, characterize this theoretical position.*

Rose's and Urwin's analyses emphasize the interactions of party and social group, and draw on the theories of Lipset and Rokkan. In their view, parties maintain political cleavages even after the social issues have disappeared. No differential effects for social group and party are specified, and it is frequently presumed that social attachments are the most important. Thus, Rose and Urwin distinguish between cases of simple and complex social structures, and hypothesize that although both may result in stable voting patterns, the latter does so only when well-established political parties are present.[30]

The view that the activities of political parties are central to electoral behavior directly opposes this argument: not only do parties maintain already existing political cleavages, but they bring cleavages into existence. *The argument that political organizations and party loyalties determine electoral behavior characterizes this theoretical position.* Attachments to a party will frequently develop apart from ties to class or other social divisions. Social group loyalty need not be more stable than party loyalty, and the latter will usually determine voting decisions.[31]

Using party attachment to explain electoral behavior in European polities runs counter to accepted practice. As we noted earlier, there are scholars who deny the presence of extensive and persistent ties to political parties in those countries. Studies which presume that survey respondents do not distinguish between party attachments and voting behavior reflect that view.[32] In support of this argument, Butler and Stokes show that, in the mid-1960's, British voters were more likely than their American counterparts to change their party ties so as to match their voting decisions.[33] The authors show that party attachments in Britain do not structure voters' opinions. Most Britons do not have stable or coherent sets of policy positions.[34] For these reasons, and

[30] Rose and Urwin (fn. 2), 308-9.

[31] The general position is forcefully and precisely stated by Sartori (fn. 1), 84-90. See also Richard Hamilton, *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1967), 291-92. Zuckerman (fn. 9), elaborates the contention that political cleavages need not be tied to social divisions.

[32] Examples of this view are Arend Lijphart, "The Netherlands: Continuity and Change in Voting Behavior," in Rose (fn. 12), 242, and Rose, in Rose (fn. 12), 496-97.

[33] Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 44.

[34] *Ibid.*, 319, 323.

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because of the theoretical "closeness" between party loyalty and vote, analysts have been reluctant to use attachment to a party to explain electoral decisions.

There are, however, strong justifications for its use. For all their stated doubts, Butler and Stokes provide massive evidence of the widespread attachment to parties in Britain. In the panel study and in the cross-sectional surveys, party loyalty is the most widely held attachment. For example, in 1970, while 25 percent of the respondents said that they conceptualized politics on a left-right dimension, 96 percent reported having a party attachment. Indeed, Butler and Stokes concede, "Allegiance to party is one of the central facts of the British elector's political awareness."[35] There are additional sources of evidence: Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky find at the end of the 1960's precisely those discrepancies between party loyalty and voting behavior that are typically used to establish the presence of party identification in the American electorate.[36] Alt, Särlvick, and Crewe find it present in Britain as a determinant of policy coherence and electoral choice in 1974.[37] Manfred Berger locates the same patterns among West German voters in recent elections and thereby determines the presence of party identification in the Bonn Republic.[38] As we noted earlier, Särlvick indicates the presence of party identification in the Swedish electorate. Furthermore, party loyalty in Britain (as in the United States) structures the vote in local elections as well.[39] In addition, acceptance of the presence of party loyalty among British voters erases two major anomalies—the working-class Tories and the uniform-vote swing—produced by the established interpretation.

Finally, the argument that respondents do not distinguish party loyalty from voting behavior is telling, but it raises methodological rather than theoretical problems. The question is whether the survey is an adequate instrument. It is not that there is no difference between a psychological attachment to a party and an act of voting for that party, but that the use of a survey in order to tap the distinction is problematic. It may be argued that in reporting party allegiance and vote, the respondent merges the two. In order to avoid this pitfall, we have

[35] *Ibid.*, 329.

[36] Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky (fn. 14), 346.

[37] James Alt, Bo Särlvick, and Ivor Crewe, "Partisanship and Policy Choice: Issue Preference in the British Electorate, February, 1974." *British Journal of Political Science*, VI (July 1976), 273-90.

[38] Manfred Berger, "Parteiidentifikation in der Bundesrepublik," *Politische Vierteljahrschrift* (1972), 215-25.

[39] Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 41.

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related party loyalty as stated in 1963 to voting decisions as reported during the ensuing seven years. This procedure resolves the methodological problem; we are no longer dealing with a single survey covering a minute slice of time, but a seven-year period in which the respondent was forced to distinguish between party loyalty and voting behavior. In sum, we have presented empirical, theoretical, and methodological factors that justify the examination of hypotheses in which party allegiance is considered a determinant of electoral behavior.[40]

The theories outlined provide hypotheses and empirical generalizations dealing with electoral behavior and the persistence of class and party loyalties. The use of the British data conditions the analysis and the conclusions to be drawn from it. Because of the general absence of other relevant cleavages, the explanatory power of party allegiance has been contrasted only with social class. However, we have devised hypotheses that focus on both occupation and class loyalty. Party and class allegiance have been defined by responses to the appropriate questions in the 1963 survey. The question on party attachment was: "Do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, or what? How strongly do you generally feel?"[41] Those who volunteered class identities were considered to have strong class identification; those who provided a class membership only after a probe question were labelled weak class loyalists; the remainder were defined as having no class identity.

I. Determinants of Electoral Behavior

A. class allegiance

A1. The stronger the middle-class allegiance, the more likely to vote stable Conservative.

A2. The stronger the working-class allegiance, the more likely to vote stable Labour.

A3. The weaker the social-class allegiance, the more likely to be a vote switcher.

B. occupation

B1. Stable non-manuals will be stable Conservative voters.

B2. Stable manuals will be stable Labour voters.

B3. Occupation changers will be vote switchers.

[40] Studies of American voting behavior remain the major source in which attachment to a political party ("party identification") is given major independent explanatory power. Two volumes by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes are the classics of this literature: *The American Voter* and *Election and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley 1959 and 1966, respectively).

[41] To aid comparability and terminological precision, we have rendered the categories of party allegiance ("very strong," "fairly strong" and "not very strong"), as strong, moderate and weak.

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C. PARTY ALLEGIANCE

C1. The stronger the Conservative Party allegiance, the more likely to vote stable Conservative.

C2. The stronger the Labour Party allegiance, the more likely to vote stable Labour.

C3. The weaker the party allegiance, the more likely to be a vote switcher.

II. PERSISTENCE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LOYALTIES

A. CLASS TO PREDOMINATE

A1. A greater proportion of the society will have class attachments than party attachments.

A2. Class loyalties will change less frequently than party loyalties.

C. PARTY TO PREDOMINATE

C1. A greater proportion of the society will have party allegiances than class allegiances.

C2. Party loyalties will change less frequently than class loyalties.

In accordance with generally accepted arguments, there is reason to expect that social class is a particularly widespread and stable basis of self-identification and a most important determinant of British voting behavior. Rose and Urwin maintain that in a society like Britain's, with a simple social structure, social attachments will be direct and long-lasting, and will precede attachments to political parties.[42] The choice of British data favors the hypotheses in which social class is the explanatory variable.

Table 4 reports the results of the cross-tabulation between class identification in 1963 and voting behavior between 1963 and 1970. In general, the association with stable voting patterns follows the predictions (Hypotheses I. A1 and I. A2), except that weak middle-class identification bears a slightly stronger relationship to stable Conservative voting than does strong middle-class identification. Two other points should be made. As expected, the phenomena of the working-class Tory and the middle-class Labourite appear in the tables. Strong class loyalty did not bar some people from voting for the political party of the "other" class. In addition, we found that those with weak or no class loyalties were not particularly given to vote switching.

In Table 5, we present the association between occupation and voting behavior for the duration of the panel. Here, too, the proposed explanation of electoral stability is sustained (Hypotheses I. B1 and I. B2). In addition, although most of those who changed categories of

[42] Rose and Urwin (fn. 2), 308.

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TABLE 4

GREAT BRITAIN 1963–1970
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR OF SOCIAL CLASSES
(PERCENTAGES)[a]

Voting Stability[b]	*Class Allegiance*				
	Middle Class		*None*	*Working Class*	
(*N*)	*Strong* (*90*)	*Weak* (*41*)	(*23*)	*Weak* (*123*)	*Strong* (*330*)
Conservative—four times	72	75	66	36	20
Conservative—three times	6	5	0	6	6
Mixed Conservative-Labour	1	6	0	7	11
Labour—three times	16	5	5	7	17
Labour—four times	5	8	29	44	47

[a] The data were gathered by the Butler and Stokes panel study of Great Britain, 1963–1970, and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

[b] The dependent variable was the number of times the respondent answered the four panel questions (1963, 1964, 1966, 1970) that he/she voted (or would vote) Conservative or Labour.

TABLE 5

GREAT BRITAIN 1963–1970
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR OF OCCUPATIONAL STRATA
(PERCENTAGES)[a]

Voting Stability[b]	*Occupational Strata*[c]		
(*N*)	*Nonmanual* (*117*)	*Switchers* (*134*)	*Manual* (*306*)
Conservative—four times	79	46	14
Conservative—three times	3	8	5
Mixed Conservative-Labour	1	11	9
Labour—three times	6	9	19
Labour—four times	12	26	54

[a] The data were gathered by the Butler and Stokes panel study of Great Britain, 1963–1970, and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

[b] The dependent variable was the number of times the respondent answered the four panel questions (1963, 1964, 1966, 1970) that he/she voted (or would vote) Conservative or Labour.

[c] Nonmanual workers were those who fell in categories A, B, C1a, and C1b for the duration of the panel; manual workers were those in C2, D, and E for the duration of the panel. Switchers were those who were not consistent in their occupational classification during the panel.

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occupation did not change their votes, they were more likely to do so than those who stayed in the same occupation.

Table 6 conveys the very strong association between party attachment in 1963 and voting behavior during the following seven years. Again the proposed hypotheses are supported (Hypotheses I. C1, I. C2, and I. C3). As expected, there are no exceptions to the argument that the stronger the party loyalty, the more likely the vote will consistently be for the party; the weaker the party loyalty, the more likely it is that there will be at least one change.

In sum, none of the hypotheses are clearly negated. Even for those with problems, Hypotheses I. A3 and I. B3, the difficulties are not with the direction of association but with the predicted strength of the relationship.

When we examined the survey data in order to test the second set of hypotheses, the relative weaknesses of class-related propositions began to emerge. Only in the 1969 survey did more than 7 percent of the respondents *not* offer a party loyalty; in all other years, more than 93 percent did so. In no survey did more than 66 percent say that they thought of themselves as being in either the middle or working class. (Even fewer suggested that they *thought* in class terms.) During the period of the panel, 87 percent retained the same party allegiance, while 68 percent kept the same class identification. These data negate Hypotheses II. A1 and II. A2.

TABLE 6

GREAT BRITAIN 1963–1970
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR OF PARTY LOYALISTS
(PERCENTAGES)[a]

Voting Stability[b]	*Party Allegiance*						
	Conservative			*None*	*Labour*		
	Strong	*Moderate*	*Weak*		*Weak*	*Moderate*	*Strong*
(*N*)	(*90*)	(*103*)	(*47*)	(*22*)	(*52*)	(*151*)	(*134*)
Conservative—four times	97	85	70	30	4	0	0
Conservative—three times	1	4	10	26	9	6	3
Mixed Conservative-Labour	2	5	11	0	18	11	9
Labour—three times	0	5	8	14	25	21	15
Labour—four times	0	0	0	30	47	61	73

[a] The data were gathered by the Butler and Stokes panel study of Great Britain, 1963–1970, and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

[b] The dependent variable was the number of times the respondent answered the four panel questions (1963, 1964, 1966, 1970) that he/she voted (or would vote) Conservative or Labour.

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The weak association between class loyalty and voting behavior is underscored by the ambiguous results found in studies that relate intergenerational mobility and voting behavior. There is some evidence of "class-risers" voting Tory more frequently than Labour[43] and contrasting evidence of their voting Labour more frequently than Tory.[44] Some analyses of "class-skidders" show that they vote Conservative more frequently than they do Labour,[45] while others indicate a greater incidence of this group voting Labour.[46] Butler and Stokes demonstrate very little difference in voting behavior between class-risers and class-skidders. They are almost equally likely to vote for either party.[47]

Additional examination of the data sustains the contention that class attachment is a weak determinant of voting decisions. The results of the panel survey show that voters with strong *party* loyalties in 1963 were much less likely to switch their votes during the seven years than voters with strong *class* loyalties in 1963. Between 1963 and 1970, 40 percent of those with strong class ties, as compared to 17 percent of those with strong party loyalties, reported changing their votes. Of those who did change at least once during the seven years, 78 percent reported strong class ties in 1963, while 21 percent had strong party attachments at that time.

As a final test of the hypotheses, we used a multiple regression equation to compare the relative impact of each of the explanatory variables on voting behavior. In order to avoid the possibility that all the overlapping areas of predictive ability were assigned to party allegiance, we inserted party allegiance into the analysis after the other two, in a stepwise mode. The effect is to stack the theoretical deck against party allegiance.

The results, as shown in Table 7, demonstrate that class loyalty and occupation did not predict voting behavior as well as party attachment did. The latter adds an enormous amount of explained variance even *after* the other two variables have entered the equation. As a consequence, party allegiance by itself, with "shared power" removed, accounts for almost half the variance of the dependent variable. Finally, the correlation between party and class allegiance is .42; between party and occupation, it is .43. These scores do not indicate multicollinearity.

[43] Paul Abramson, "Intergenerational Mobility and Partisan Choice," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (December 1972), 1292; Kenneth H. Thompson, "A Cross-National Analysis of Intergenerational Social Mobility and Political Orientations," *Comparative Political Studies*, IV (April 1971), 8.

[44] Paul Abramson and John W. Books, "Social Mobility and Political Attitudes," *Comparative Politics*, III (April 1971), 421.

[45] Thompson (fn. 43).

[46] Abramson (fn. 43).

[47] Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 101.

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On the chance that the variables may not be interval measures, we turned each into a series of component "units," or dummy variables; we suppressed one unit (for occupation, "switchers"; for class and party attachment, "none"), and then regressed the dependent variable on the remaining units. The results underscore the merits of our analysis: the total amount of variance "explained" increased only slightly, to .80. The units of party loyalty were the best predictors of voting behavior. Only "Weak Labour" was not as strong as some of the class-related variables. There is even evidence that party allegiance is an interval measure. The parameter estimates provide the following "distances

TABLE 7

GREAT BRITAIN 1963–1970
INFLUENCE OF CLASS ALLEGIANCE, OCCUPATION, AND PARTY ALLEGIANCE ON VOTING BEHAVIOR
(MULTIPLE REGRESSION EQUATION)[a]

Independent Variable[b]	*Parameter Estimates*		*Standard Error*	*R^2 Contribution to Equation*
	Unstandardized	*Standardized*		
Class Allegiance	.03	.02	.03[c]	.18
Occupation	.40	.19	.05[d]	.14
Party Allegiance	.64	.76	.02[d]	.44
(Intercept)	.63			
(Total R^2)	.76			

[a] The data were gathered by the Butler and Stokes panel study of Great Britain, 1963–70, and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.
[b] The dependent variable was the number of times the respondent answered the four panel questions (1963, 1964, 1966, 1970) that he/she voted (or would vote) Conservative or Labour.
[c] Significant at $p > .10$.
[d] Significant at $p < .01$.

between" each of the components: "Strong Conservative" to "Moderate Conservative," .37; "Moderate Conservative" to "Weak Conservative," .45; "Weak Conservative" to "Weak Labour," .91; "Weak Labour" to "Moderate Labour," .47; "Moderate Labour" to "Strong Labour," .29.

In what sense are these findings surprising? Should we not expect party allegiance to predict voting behavior especially well—even better than social class? There are a number of rejoinders to be made. We have been relating party attachment in 1963 to reported electoral behavior during the ensuing seven years, thereby avoiding some of the problems that arise when there is only a small lapse of time between survey and election. Those who claimed strong loyalty to a party re-

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tained that attachment and consistently voted for the party, most of them even if they changed occupations or class identities. Attachment to a political party, not to class or occupation, determined the votes of most respondents. Because these conclusions are drawn from an analysis of British electoral behavior, there is strong reason to expect them to apply to societies with more complex social structures. Our findings therefore cast doubt on the widely accepted views of political sociology.

Sources of Stability and Change

We have maintained that for the 25 years that followed World War II the size, social composition, and votes of the electorates of most European political parties remained stable. Rose's and Urwin's analysis details the consistent results of most national elections. We have utilized surveys to demonstrate that the social composition of the parties' electorates in Britain, West Germany, and Sweden and the voting patterns of the cleavages changed but little during this period. In addition, most British voters did not alter their partisan support between 1963 and 1970. We have also indicated a few examples of marked change, particularly the size and social homogeneity of the Swedish Center and the size of the SPD in Germany. With the start of the 1970's, the partisan division of the vote in several countries diverged for the first time from prevailing patterns. The analytical task is to explain both the stability and the change with a set of interrelated hypotheses.

First, two consequences of this electoral stability should be mentioned. (1) New political parties had difficulties in forming and in carving out secure niches for themselves. It would seem, to use Sartori's apt analogy, that the electoral markets were distributed and the consumers were not changing their buying habits. (2) Where electoral stability assured the dominance of one party over the parliament and cabinet, other political groups sought to control governing policies and positions. In the Scandinavian countries, interest groups of all political persuasions have entered into formal participation in policy making.[48] In Italy, contests for the control of cabinet positions have been the province of the factions of the dominant Christian Democratic Party.[49]

In sum, there were generally fixed distributions of voters. Each of

[48] In addition to the literature cited above, see Stein Rokkan, "Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism," in Dahl (fn. 18), 70-115; Martin O. Heisler with the assistance of Robert K. Kvavik, "Patterns of European Politics," 27-89, and Kvavik, "Interest Groups in a 'Cooptive' Political System: The Case of Norway," 93-116, both in Martin O. Heisler, ed., *Politics in Europe* (New York: David McKay 1974).

[49] Zuckerman, *Political Clienteles in Power: Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy* (Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics 1975), 01-055.

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the large competitive parties, as well as some of the smaller ones, received the support of mostly constant shares and segments of the electorate. Each party was centered around one of the "humps" on a graph of the voting population—a graph in which the shape of the curves seemed to be fixed.

In electoral analysis, it is tempting to assume that past trends will continue. This assumption results from the absence of satisfactory theories of stability and change. It also produces *ad hoc* explanations of the results of particular elections. Hence, we must not only explain the most recent (and other) incidences of change, but we must do so within an argument that accounts for the stability of the earlier period. We will argue that in the early 1970's there was a decline in the pervasiveness and strength of one factor that explains much of the previous electoral stability—strong attachment to political parties. Extending our analysis of British voting behavior, we maintain that the electorate in 1974 contained an extraordinarily large number of voters who did not have strong attachments to either Labour or the Conservatives.

In our analysis of British voting behavior, we have isolated the following elements necessary for a general explanation of electoral stability.

1. Changes in voting patterns do not follow changes in occupation or class identity.
2. Almost all voters have party attachments which remain fixed throughout their voting careers.
3. The older the attachment to a party, the stronger it is.[50]
4. The stronger the attachment to a party, the more likely a person is to vote for that party.

Where these elements apply, as in postwar Britain, (1) the parties' shares of the electorate remain generally static; (2) the social composition of the parties' electorates are also relatively stable. Change in the social homogeneity of a party's voters most frequently results from alterations in the occupation and social categories of persistent supporters of the party. Put another way, party loyalists may change their jobs, but they do not change their votes. As in the instance of the Swedish Center Party, perceived change in social composition is a result of the theoretical point of view rather than the actual behavior of voters.

It follows that change in the *size* of each party's electorate results

[50] See Butler and Stokes (fn. 11); also Philip Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," in DiPalma (fn. 12), 64-96.

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from the votes of those with weak or no party loyalties. In polities where most people do not have strong attachments to parties, shifts in the size of the parties will be frequent. Thus, weak party loyalties, particularly among the non-socialist voters, would account for the "flash parties" of the French Fourth Republic. The same argument would account for the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany. It drew votes from the non-Marxist and non-Catholic sectors, while it also received the votes of many who had not voted before. Turnout after 1928 rose dramatically, as did votes for the Nazis.

Where party loyalties are widespread and strong, major electoral shifts will be infrequent. They will occur only when an extraordinarily large number of new voters, those with the weakest party attachments, take part in an election. The greater the absolute number of new voters, the greater the number of voters presumably amenable to voting in ways that differ from past patterns. Numbers alone, however, do not suffice to account for the importance of potential new voters in an election; they may choose not to vote. Party leaders must therefore convince them to vote differently from experienced voters. Some support for this argument comes from the analysis of the Swedish Center Party's growth from 15 percent of the vote in 1968 to 25 percent in 1973. Olof Petersson reports that for the first time young voters cast ballots differently from other age groups, and they did so in disproportionate amounts for the Center Party.[51] Major support for this argument comes from the analysis of the British elections of 1974.

On several key dimensions the results of the British election of February 1974 were significantly different from those of 1970 (and earlier ones).[52] In 1970, the Conservatives received 45.7 percent of the national vote, Labour 43.4 percent, and the Liberals 8.8 percent; four years later, the Conservatives received 38 percent, Labour 39.2 percent, and the Liberals 19.8 percent. Between the two elections, the share of the vote controlled by the two large parties declined from 90 to 78 percent. Our argument, in order to account for these changes, would require two events to have occurred: An unusually large number of new voters would have had to take part in the election, and the Liberals (and the smaller Nationalist parties) would have had to be much more active than in the past. That is what we find.

[51] Olof Petersson, "The 1973 General Election in Sweden," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, IX (1974), 226.

[52] The sources of this analysis were *The Economist* of February 23, 1974, and especially March 16, 1974, as well as Butler and Kavanaugh (fn. 14), and Hugh Berrington and Trevor Bedeman, "The February Election," *Parliamentary Affairs*, XXVII (1973-74), 317-22.

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In 1970, British electoral laws were altered to allow 18-year-olds to vote. The new entrants, together with those of the postwar "baby-boom" generation who had already turned 21, swelled the electoral lists by an additional four million potential voters. (Between 1955 and 1966, the electoral list had grown by 100,000.) However, most of the new electors did *not* vote in 1970. Thus, the half-million new voters who came of age in time for the 1974 election and the more than three million individuals who had been eligible in 1970 but voted for the first time in 1974 constituted the largest number and proportion of new voters in Britain in decades.

In addition, the Liberal Party and the Scottish and Welsh parties fielded many more candidates than in previous years. The mean of candidate per constituency was greater than three.[53] The Liberals ran 517 candidates, up from 332 in 1970, and from a mean of 270 in earlier years; the Scottish National Party ran candidates in all but one of Scotland's 31 constituencies. Most importantly, the Liberals did best where the turnout was highest. In particular, in the 31 constituencies where more than 85 percent of those eligible took part, the Liberals won seven contests.

Our argument is buttressed by the finding that similar phenomena were present at the time of the last major shift in the relative size of the British parties—the decline of the Liberals and the rise of Labour. Comparing the results of the relevant elections, we find that in 1910, the Liberals gathered 45 percent of the national vote, Labour 9 percent, and the Conservatives 46 percent; in 1918, the Liberals gathered 25 percent of the national vote, Labour 28 percent, and the Conservatives 47 percent. In 1910, because of restrictions in the franchise, only 59 percent of the adult males could vote, while all adult males were permitted to vote in the 1918 elections. Most, if not all, of the newly enfranchised came from the working class. In addition, the split in the Liberal Party in 1916 precluded it from blocking Labour's gains among the new working-class voters.[54]

In both 1974 and 1918, we find an influx of extraordinarily large numbers of new, and therefore generally mobilizable, voters plus reenforced efforts by the gaining parties. This is not to argue that electoral realignment has occurred in Britain, but that its potential is—or was—present. Current leadership problems make it unlikely that the Liberals will be able to develop and sustain party ties among the new voters.

[53] *The Economist*, December 6, 1975, p. 24.
[54] Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 179.

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More probably these voters will either develop loyalties to Labour or the Conservatives, and there will be a return to electoral stability; or low levels of party attachment will persist, followed by declines in turnout, as in 1970, and continued flux in the outcome of national elections.[55]

There is additional support for our hypotheses. Butler and Stokes detail other generational contrasts in Britain. Those who first voted in 1945 were raised during the depression, when the economic appeals of Labour or the Conservatives were most attractive. Hence the apex of class voting ten to fifteen years later, when this age group predominated in the electorate.[56] Our most significant support comes from the explanation of electoral change in the United States by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik. They specify the entry of an extraordinarily large number of new voters in the early 1970's as the source of the decline in party attachments within the electorate, the reduced voter turnout, and changes in the partisan division of the vote. Furthermore, they account for the changes in the 1932 election in large part by the mobilization of those who had come of age but had not voted in preceding elections.[57] Considering the subject from a different analytic perspective and dealing with another country, these authors reached conclusions very similar to ours.

In sum, where most voters have strong party attachments: (1) Massive change in the social composition of a party's electorate is infrequent. When it occurs, it generally results from changes in the social affiliation of stable party voters. (2) Change in the size of a party's electorate is usually caused by the votes of those with weak or no party ties. (3) Only when such a change comes from the entry of an extraordinary number of new voters, will it lead to long-term alterations in the size of a party.

We cannot deal here with the origins of party attachments, but our analysis leads us to consider parties as the developers of such ties. The greater the strength of organization, the more likely the party is to attract and hold supporters. Sartori provides an important addition to this highly mechanistic contention. He stresses the manipulation of a "party image:" "[P]arties communicate to mass electorates via party

[55] Alt, Särlvick, and Crewe (fn. 37), cite evidence to support the second position.
[56] Butler and Stokes (fn. 11), 200-5.
[57] Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976), esp. pp. 346-52.

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images. . . . An image is—in my understanding—a vague *policy package* condensed in, and rendered by, one word or slogan."[58] Organization and the ability to tap appealing but vague policy packages, rather than issues or social factors, best explain the electoral successes of parties.

Conclusion

We have argued against some of the major tenets of political sociology. In our view, attachments to political parties, not to social positions, determine voting decisions. Parties do not play passive roles in this process. They not only maintain the loyalty of their supporters, but when there are large numbers of voters with weak or no party attachments in an electorate, increased activities by the parties will effect drastic changes in the partisan division of the vote.

We do not argue that social ties are not most important in the lives of people, or that political loyalties are. There is much evidence that most citizens devote relatively little attention to national political events and issues. Butler's and Stokes's finding that most Britons do not have coherent or stable political opinions is certainly in line with this view. Since the act of voting does not loom large in the eyes of most citizens, it is not surprising that party attachment serves as the major conditioner of the voting decision, but of little else. It provides a rationale for the choice and thereby simplifies the vote calculus. Electoral decisions rarely result from precise calculations of people's social and economic positions, their long- and short-term requirements, or the relative effects of the candidates and parties on those interests. Few can—or care to—make those calculations.

Two paradoxical conclusions follow. (1) Strong social attachments are not necessarily translated into party attachments and voting decisions. (2) Strong social loyalties are still central to most people's activities.

Political cleavages derive from social divisions if party leaders structure their followings around those lines. If they do not, individuals, though tied by the strongest of social bonds, will vote for different parties. The fate of ethnicity as a determinant of voting decisions best illustrates this contention. Observers of Israeli society have frequently noted the presence of a sharp *Ashkenazi-Sephardi* split within the Jewish population. Israeli parties are not built upon this division, but reflect the lines of conflict of the pre-Independence period; they reproduce the party systems of Western Europe. Even though the ethnic

[58] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, I (London: Cambridge University Press 1976), 329; emphasis in original.

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division overlaps with the distribution of occupation and status, it has not been politicized. The large number of *Sephardim* who arrived after 1948 faced an already established party system and were taught to adapt their voting behavior accordingly.[59] This argument applies to the erratic development of ethnic parties in other democratic polities. Rose, for instance, reports the extensive and intensive presence of ethnic identity in Britain, especially among the non-English. Yet this crucial basis of social ties rarely emerges as a determinant of the vote.[60]

In our view, our conclusions do not argue that perceptions of social bonds do not determine much of what one does. Very few of a person's concerns and actions are political. Voting decisions take up very little psychic and physical time and energy. Rather, most of one's existence involves actions that do take into account the concerns and demands of one's family and friends, work-mates, ethnic group, and coreligionists.

[59] Alan Arian, *The Choosing People* (Cleveland: Press of Case-Western Reserve University 1973), chap. 8; Shimshon Zelniker and Michael Kahan, "Religion and Nascent Cleavages: The Case of Israel's National Religious Party," *Comparative Politics*, IX (October 1976), 21-48. See also Sartori (fn. 58), 155.

[60] Rose (fn. 12), 514.

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POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL SYMBOLISM: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis

By LOWELL DITTMER*

"POLITICAL Culture" functions as a conceptual umbrella for a wide and apparently heterogeneous range of political issue areas: National character, the impact of collective historical experience on national identity, and the emotional or normative dimensions of the relationship between the state and its citizenry (such as apathy, or a sense of political efficacy), seem to be among the more prominent concerns of the contributors to this literature. Who would deny that such concerns are among the most perpetually fascinating aspects of politics? The quantity and quality of empirical work in this field is impressive and includes at least one acknowledged behavioral classic.[1] Unfortunately, lacking an adequate theoretical grounding, some excellent empirical studies are apt to talk past one another rather than to contribute to the cumulation of generalizable knowledge. Political culture has in fact shown some inclination to become a catch-all term, used to deal with questions of meaning and interpretation of peripheral interest to the discipline, and elusive of objective treatment. The purpose of this paper is to open to discussion the tenability of the existing theoretical underpinnings of political culture, and then to propose a more satisfactory synthesis.

A Review of the Literature

The three seminal conceptual schemes that deal with subjectively meaningful aspects of politics are political culture, political symbolism, and communication theory. Although all three models are generally concerned with what Marxists term the cultural superstructure of society, each has its own particular strengths and weaknesses. We shall find, for example, that the theoretical discussions of political culture state the general concerns of this literature, but fail to define the empirical variable to be analyzed, with the result that the focus tends to

* I wish to thank Tang Tsou and Bogdan Denitch for their most helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, which was first presented at the 1976 APSA Convention in Chicago.

[1] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963).

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drift between micro-analysis and macro-analysis. The literature on political symbolism selects the most fruitful variable for analysis and has many brilliant *aperçus* to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between political appearance and reality, but the analysis proceeds unsystematically, unbalanced by an appreciation of the positive functions of symbolism. The theory of political communication contributes a highly systematic, quantifiable methodology to the field, but thereby begs the question of qualitative meaning. Each of these three approaches contributes important insights to the clarification of the others.

POLITICAL CULTURE

The study of political culture has since its beginnings been in the vanguard of the behavioral revolution in political science. Whereas traditional political science allegedly confined its attention to the formal institutional structure of the state, behavioralist political science would open its doors to consideration of all elements that make up a nation, and to their relationship with the state. The ideological implications of this scientific revolution were broadly democratic, and the methodological implications were innovative: a host of new models and theories were introduced, often drawn by analogy from the hard sciences, and interdisciplinary liaisons were initiated among the various social sciences. Political culture was at the cutting edge of this disciplinary movement, concentrating on the mass of common men who had been neglected in traditional political science, and borrowing both conceptual frameworks and methodological techniques from cultural anthropology, depth psychology, and public opinion research.

Since Gabriel Almond first advanced a definition of political culture, it has been elaborated upon in his own writings and those of Pye and Verba, and has gained virtually unanimous acceptance in the field. Almond defined political culture as "orientation toward politics."[2] Later, this orientation was specified to include "cognitive orientation, affective orientation, evaluational orientation"; or, more simply, "cognitions, feelings and evaluations."[3] Citizens are oriented toward a set of political objects, which are variously defined as: (1) the system in general, inputs, outputs, or the self as an object;[4] (2) governmental and

[2] Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409.

[3] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965), 512-61.

[4] Almond and Verba (fn. 1), 14-15.

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other structures in the political system (political identifications, political trust, rules of the game), or one's own political activity (political competence or efficacy);[5] (3) "the Government, the Regime, and the Political Community."[6] The content of these orientations has been empirically investigated chiefly as it has become manifest in patterns of participation. The most frequently encountered patterns of participation form yet another triad of "participant, subject, and parochial."[7]

One of the criteria for clear definition is that the concept be distinguished from related concepts; one of the persistent difficulties in the definition of political culture concerns the analytical boundaries between that concept and political psychology on the one hand and political structure on the other. In dealing with the relationship between political culture and political psychology, the simplest and most widely adopted solution has been to equate the former with an aggregate of individual psychological orientations toward politics. In *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba modified Almond's earlier definition of political culture to read "*psychological* orientation toward social objects" (emphasis added); they defined the political culture of a nation as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation."[8] Lucian Pye, in his introductory essay to *Political Culture and Political Development*, was even more explicit: "[I]t is the problem of aggregation—which involves the adding up of the discoveries of individual psychology in such a manner as to make community-wide behavior understandable in the light of individual actions . . . for which the concept of political culture holds such great promise."[9] A recent synthesis echoes these notions: "Political culture can be defined in two ways. If we concentrate on the individual, it is psychological, entailing all the important ways in which a person is subjectively oriented toward the essential elements in the political system. The second, 'system level' approach refers to the collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system."[10]

It seems fair to conclude that the dominant school of thought on this issue is one of psychological reductionism. Psychological reductionism facilitated the introduction of sophisticated sample survey tech-

[5] Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger 1975), 6-7.

[6] Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American States," *Journal of Politics*, XXX (February 1968), 187-210.

[7] Almond and Verba (fn. 1), 21.

[8] *Ibid.*, 14-15. This point is made in Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," *British Journal of Political Science*, 1 (July 1971), 291-305.

[9] Pye and Verba (fn. 3), 9.

[10] Rosenbaum (fn. 5), 4.

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niques for the empirical measurement of attitudes. These techniques were useful in showing, *inter alia*, that cultural patterns are not uniformly distributed throughout society: all members of society do not have equal leverage in determining dominant cultural patterns, nor do all groups subscribe to these patterns equally. But methodological convenience alone should not be permitted to define one's theoretical formulations. If the social scientist investigates cultures lacking in Western individualistic traditions (such as much of the Third World) or legal toleration for survey research (such as Communist nations and a growing number of nationalist authoritarian systems), even the methodological advantage evaporates. If political culture can be reduced to the distribution of attitudes among a given population, wherein lies the need for a distinct conceptual framework and line of inquiry? Perhaps understanding a political culture is rather like learning a language: before a frequency distribution of vocabulary usage can make much sense, a basic grasp of the underlying grammatical structure is necessary. In his most recent contribution to the discussion, Pye agrees, using a different metaphor: "The situation is analogous to our ability to say 'something' about what a building will be like from knowledge about what its building elements are like, but to truly 'picture' the building we need also to know the blueprints and the total design."[11] Although it is certainly useful—where feasible—to measure the relative assimilation of culture by questioning a sample of individuals, political culture should be conceptualized as an emergent variable, whose properties transcend the sum of its members' belief- and value-systems.

It is partly because of the patent shortcomings of psychological reductionism that the dominant competing tradition in the literature of political culture flirts with global, macro-analytic descriptions of political structure. However, the precise relationship between political culture and political structure has remained as uncertain as it was when Pye defined it in 1968: "If the concept of political culture is to be effectively utilized, it needs to be supplemented with structural analysis, but the difficulty is that political structures can be seen on the one hand as products reflecting the political culture, while on the other hand they are also 'givens' which shape the political culture."[12] The distinction

[11] Lucian Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 53 (September 1972), 285-96. Cf. Edward W. Lehman, "On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical Reassessment," *Social Forces*, Vol. 50 (March 1972), 361-70.

[12] Pye, "Political Culture," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968), 218-25.

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between political culture and political structure is perhaps inherently ambiguous, given the definition of the former as "cognitions, feelings, and evaluations" *about* the latter. There is thus a tendency among some writers to slide from one to the other, as Lipset does:

> Hence, a working class which has made gains in the economic order will be relatively satisfied, while a middle and upper class which feels threatened in its position of status will react aggressively. It may be contended that in Weimar Germany the majority of the workers were relatively moderate politically because they had secured access to the economic and political orders, while traditional conservative groupings and the middle classes were disposed to accept militant politics in a crisis because their value orientations of elitism and ascription led them to perceive such gains on the part of the workers as a threat to their overall status position and to their sense of "the way things ought to be."[13]

In this excerpt—from a book in which he attributes greater autonomy to the realm of values than in any of his earlier works—Lipset tends to lapse into "vulgar" Marxism, reducing ideological preferences to social structural variables. If such a reduction were adequate at the level of meaning, we should have no need for the concept of culture—a "sociology of knowledge" would suffice.

Given its tendency to merge imperceptibly into definitions of political psychology or political structure, political culture becomes difficult to use as either a dependent or an independent variable in a causal explanation. It is consigned to the role of a residual or intervening variable, whose influence may reinforce an outcome already predictable on the basis of stronger evidence; but it is in no way capable of functioning independently. In most cases the concept is used to explain systemic stability, as if the absence of change required explanation; this use began with Almond and has continued through Easton and most other systems theorists. In a recent study, Donald J. Devine has sought to show how political culture contributes not only to the persistence of systems, but to the stability of regimes.[14] The only source of dynamics of political culture that is considered in any of these representative works is political socialization, which facilitates only intergenerational change.[15] One might conclude from the available empirical studies

[13] Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1967), 269.

[14] Devine, *The Political Culture of the United States: The Influence of Member Values on Regime Maintenance* (Boston: Little, Brown 1972). Cf. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley 1965).

[15] Anthony Wallace, an anthropologist, has proposed a different framework for understanding cultural change, featuring the key concepts of "goal culture" and "transfer

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that political culture is profoundly conservative in its policy implications; in fact, this conclusion seems implicit from the outset in the term's ambiguous conceptualization. To the extent that political culture contains elements of political psychology or political structure in its definition, its use to explain change in either of these variables is of course tautological.

POLITICAL SYMBOLISM

In the foregoing discussion of political culture, I have suggested that the chief difficulty is one of fuzzy conceptualization; the variable we are trying to isolate for analysis loses its autonomy to more clearly defined variables on either side. What is it about political culture that is inherently "cultural," resisting reduction either to political structure or to political psychology? I would submit that it is political *symbolism.* Symbols exist independently of human beings and may therefore transmit meanings from person to person despite vast distances of space and time. Although symbols are ultimately dependent for their meaning on fallible human interpretation, human communities do set forth comprehensible and relatively consistent rules of usage to facilitate speed and fidelity of communication. Thus, although the interpretation of symbolism would require some understanding of both social structure and psychology, the symbols themselves may legitimately be assumed to have some degree of autonomy from both; that is what Hegel meant by "objective spirit."[16] Lloyd Warner points to some of the important consequences of this limited autonomy:

> When words are written no longer dependent on the immediate organic environment where sounds and silences stimulate meaning in live organisms, powerful new factors enter. Words can go elsewhere, beyond the interpersonal context. Delayed communication between individuals or generations widely separated in space and time, frees words from their immediate controls and they become immortal and autonomous, independent of the social structure and the values and beliefs that produced

culture"; but aside from the work of Chalmers Johnson and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., this promising conceptualization does not yet seem to have attracted, among political scientists, the attention it deserves. Cf. Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1970), 1-33; and Frederic Fleron and Lou Jean Fleron, "Administrative Theory as Repressive Political Theory: The Communist Experience," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism,* VI (November 1972), 4-42. *Technology and Communist Culture,* a major conference volume edited by Fleron and embodying his analytical framework, will be published shortly by Praeger.

[16] Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "On the Definition of the Symbol," in Joseph R. Royce, ed., *Psychology and the Symbol* (New York: Random House 1965), 26-72; Alfred North Whitehead, *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: Macmillan 1927), 86.

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> them. As such it acts both as a conservative force, strengthening the hold of the past on the changing present, and as a liberalizing one, freeing the present generation from dependence upon oral transmission of the immediate older generation's interpretations of the sacred tradition.[17]

If symbol systems have a coherent internal logic of their own, and a certain historical latitude exists within which this logic can play itself out, the autonomy of symbols is always limited by the imperative that they remain relevant to certain basic human needs. Thus, new attempts at definition are constantly being made, new implications being seen and faced, as the continual intrusion of pragmatic issues into the functions served by symbols creates recurring gaps, modifications, and inconsistencies.[18] But these vagaries should be no more formidable an impediment to the systematic study of political culture than is the idiosyncratic fluctuation of the stock market to econometrics.

It is far easier to propose political symbolism as the most promising unit of analysis for studies of political culture than it is to define the term. Symbolism is one of the essential identifying characteristics of mankind, and its study is of ancient provenance: symbols have been studied from so many different perspectives and for so many different purposes that the term has become even "softer" and more ambiguous than the notion of political culture. It is difficult to define the term either synthetically (that is, by distinguishing it from related concepts) or analytically (that is, by specifying its characteristics).[19] In synthetic definitions, symbols tend to merge with "language" on the one hand and with the substantive "reality" that language represents on the other. Attempts to define the term analytically have produced such a tangled congeries of distinctions that it is difficult to sort them all out: there are public symbols and private symbols; religious symbols, artistic symbols, logical symbols, linguistic symbols, dream symbols; they are used to express or communicate or represent logical relationships, intangible cosmic forces, and repressed drives and feelings.

Underlying all of these definitions is the nominalist insight that appearance may differ from reality, that the relationship between the sign and its referent is conventional rather than natural, and that signs may consequently be detached from their referents. This insight has accompanied the study of political symbolism from the beginning, per-

[17] W. Lloyd Warner, *The Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1959), 216.

[18] Raymond Firth, *Symbols: Public and Private* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1973), 426-28.

[19] Cf. Richard Robinson, *Definitions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1950).

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mitting it to "de-mystify" the systematic purveyance of illusion and to unmask hypocrisy. Walter Bagehot, although clearly foreshadowed by Machiavelli, was perhaps the first to allude explicitly to this distinction, pointing out that an effective political order has not only an "efficient part" (which formulates programs, administers, and governs), but also a "theatrical" part (which symbolizes certain common traditions and ideals, strengthening the bonds that unite men).[20] But the first to make political symbolism the object of concerted scientific analysis was Harold D. Lasswell, who has had a lasting impact on the field. He combined the psychoanalytic discoveries of the functions of dream symbolism and neurotic symptoms to express repressed emotional complexes with the elitist perspective on politics of Mosca and Pareto. In the thoroughly disillusioning picture of politics at which he arrived, symbols were "manipulated" by elites in order to appeal to the unconscious wishes of the masses. (According to what he called the "triple-appeal principle," elites could pitch their appeal to the id, the ego, or the superego, but in most of Lasswell's own early work the emphasis was on the id.)[21] Their purpose was the legitimation of their own maximization of "income, safety and deference."[22] In a sense anticipating Wittgenstein, Lasswell bleakly suggested that political problems could never really be solved, but only *dis*solved through some form of preventive therapy, for he held politics to be essentially a field for the projection of irrational impulses.[23] With Nathan Leites, Daniel Lerner, and other collaborators, Lasswell brought his studies of political symbolism to fruition in the comparative analysis of propaganda during World War II, expanding his rather loose (and always primarily verbal) definition of symbols to initiate the content analysis of political language on a grand scale.[24]

Lacking Lasswell's methodological virtuosity but compensating somewhat by a delightfully sarcastic style, Thurman Arnold continued the Lasswellian tradition in his study, *The Symbols of Government*.[25] Whereas Lasswell focused on the self-serving manipulation of symbols by individual elites, Arnold pointed out that political institutions were

[20] Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, as quoted in Whitney Smith, Jr., "Prolegomena to the Study of Political Symbolism," Ph.D. diss. (Boston University 1968).

[21] Lasswell, "The Triple-Appeal Principle: A Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Political and Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology* XXXVII (January 1932), 528-38.

[22] Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* (New York: World 1958).

[23] Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1930), chap. 10, "The Politics of Prevention."

[24] Lasswell, Leites, and others, *Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1949).

[25] Arnold, *The Symbols of Government* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1962).

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organized around symbolic self-justifications, and were "apt to go to pieces out of sheer lack of self-confidence if their philosophical assumptions are attacked, just as a devout individual may suffer if he loses faith in his religion." In other words, Arnold began to blur Lasswell's sharp contrast between elite rationality in pursuit of self-interest and mass irrationality by suggesting that symbols serve integrative and legitimating functions of positive value to the entire organization.

Although willing to concede that symbols serve positive functions for the association, Arnold saw little chance that they could transcend this bounded context and serve similar functions for the political community as a whole. Perhaps influenced by group theory, Arnold perceived the private association as a rational entity, but the political system as an irrational congeries of mutually inconsistent ideals. Rational reform in this context became self-defeating—liable to find itself "twisted and warped" by contradictory ideals: "A people will never accept an institution that does not symbolize for them the simultaneously inconsistent notions to which they are at various times emotionally responsive." With the words "emotionally responsive," Arnold betrayed his lingering allegiance to the notion of an irrational mass, moved neither by self-interest nor by public interest, but by "the chance of association or temperament that makes them emotionally responsive to one set of symbols or another." Thus, despite his departure from Lasswell's elitism for a more organic conception of the function of symbols at the subsystem level, Arnold wound up embracing Lasswell's irrationality at the system level: "Almost all human conduct is symbolic. . . . The symbols are everywhere inconsistent. Society is generally more interested in standing on the sidelines and watching itself go by in a whole series of different uniforms than it is in practical objectives."[26]

Undoubtedly the best contemporary analysis of political symbolism has been provided by Murray Edelman, who continues in his writings to explain discrepancies between the actual practice of politics and the way it should rationally function by referring to the susceptibility of the masses and the self-interest of the elites in political symbolism. Although he introduces some interesting new ideas from symbolic interactionism (such as the notion of dramaturgy), Edelman presents no central theory or network of hypotheses, following rather in the tradition of the iconoclastic essays by Lasswell and Arnold. His most influential work shows how political symbolism contributes to mass

[26] *Ibid.*, 219, 17.

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quiescence by responding to the unconscious needs of political supplicants with appropriate symbolic reassurances while omitting any tangible changes in patterns of resource allocation.[27] He seems to agree with Lasswell and Arnold that political problems are inherently insoluble, pointing out that demands for reform fill all sorts of cognitive and emotional needs for would-be reformers; even if reforms are achieved, these needs will be reinforced by the publicity rather than satisfied by the reform; paradoxically, demands will increase.[28] Adopting Sapir's distinction between condensation symbols (which function to express unconscious wishes and feelings) and symbols of reference (which refer to empirical objects), Edelman contends that condensation symbols predominate in campaign oratory and mass protest, whereas referential symbols prevail in direct negotiations between interest groups and administrators. Thus we see reincarnated the Lasswellian distinction between acute susceptibility to irrational appeals (condensation symbols) among the mass electorate, and the rational, self-interested use of language (referential symbols) among elites.[29]

Perhaps the main conceptual difficulty in Edelman's analytical schema is the lack of any clear distinction between symbolism and substantive political action: not only is campaign rhetoric considered "symbolism," but marking a ballot is a "symbolic ritual," and attribution of success or failure to public officials is a "myth" (for they are but pawns in the hands of vast social forces); even the passage of reform legislation is primarily a "symbolic" act designed to reassure people by inflating the rhetorical portions of the bill without really reforming anything. What, then, is the empirical status of symbolism? Edelman defines myth as "a widely held belief based upon social cues rather than upon observation of the world,"[30] as if "social cues" were somehow otherworldly or did not require observation. The underlying assumption is that political symbolism is "empty"—an assumption that coincides with Edelman's focus on resource allocation as the central reality of politics. But, as Froman points out, the impermeable distinction drawn by

[27] Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (5th ed.; Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1972).

[28] Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (New York: Academic Press 1971), 12-31.

[29] Considerable evidence suggests, however, that condensation symbols may play as large a role in negotiations among small elite groups as in manipulating mass audiences; witness the long dispute over the shape of the table in the Paris peace talks between Washington and Hanoi, for example. Published transcripts of the Watergate tapes reveal an obsession with condensation symbols among elites that defied all attempts to manipulate them rationally.

[30] Murray Edelman, *The State as a Provider of Symbolic Outputs* (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers, University of Wisconsin, August 1973), 16.

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Edelman between symbolic and material benefits is not really tenable.[31] Politics must serve many other important functions as well, such as mobilizing and integrating the political community. Symbolism is vital here, and indeed, redistribution would be pointless without it: witness the political vulnerability of certain transfer payments (such as welfare) relative to others (such as defense), primarily because the former lack cogent legitimating symbolism. Politicians can and have used condensation symbols to mobilize and integrate groups under circumstances in which there were few material resources to be allocated—for instance, regeneration of the Chinese Communist Party in the desiccated wilderness of Yenan, or the migration of American intellectuals to the South to participate in the civil rights movement.[32] To view symbols as an empty substitute for material gains seems somehow to misunderstand the motives of those who pursue them. This is related to an additional point: like Lasswell, Edelman uses a one-way causal analysis to depict a circulation of symbols in which the elites pull the wires and the masses dance. The rise of student power and antiwar and other protest movements in the West in the 1960's suggests that this is an oversimplification, however, and that symbols may be co-opted by the masses for their own purposes. Finally, Edelman devotes surprisingly little attention to the actual content of the symbols, and to how this content changes under different circumstances; his focus is on the actors, and on the way they use symbols to pursue their interests. The result is a tendency toward the psychological reduction of symbolism rather than toward according it pride of place in the analytical framework.

To summarize: the conceptual advantages of political symbolism seem in many ways tailor-made to compensate for the weaknesses of current conceptions of political culture. Most importantly, political symbolism provides an empirical variable to be analyzed (i.e., symbols) which is closely related to both political psychology and political structure, but has a degree of autonomy from either. Because political symbols may vary independently, the internal dynamics of political culture become accessible to analysis, freed from the prevailing assumptions that political culture functions primarily to reinforce the status quo and to minimize intrasystem conflict. On the other hand, the analysis of political symbolism has suffered from ambiguous definition, both

[31] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham 1968), 41-52.

[32] Mayer N. Zald, "Politics and Symbols: A Review Article," *Sociological Quarterly, VII* (Winter 1966), 85-91.

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because of the failure to distinguish symbols from language or political structure, and the failure to sort out the various distinctions among different types of symbols. The elitist methodological perspective of the early students of symbolism has biased the literature toward a one-way causal analysis of symbol flow, disregarding feedback channels and the co-optation of symbols by the masses. This perspective has also led to an overestimation of the rationality of elites and the irrationality of the masses in the pursuit of their respective interests. The distributive focus that has accompanied this perspective ("Who gets what, when, how?") discounts the mobilizational and integrative functions of symbolism and cynically regards symbols as bogus tokens of substantial resources. Finally, in the preoccupation with the way symbols are used, surprisingly little attention has been paid to an analysis of the symbols themselves—their contents, systemic interrelationships, and transformation over time under different political conditions. Many of the conceptual shortcomings of political symbolism may be traced to the lack of any systematic conception of the symbolic process. For this we turn now to the theory of political communication.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Just as political symbolism seems admirably suited to compensate for some of the conceptual inadequacies of political culture, recent developments in communication theory may resolve some of the difficulties raised in our discussion of political symbolism. Communication theory is derived from cybernetics, and perhaps its most vigorous and influential proponent in political science is Karl Deutsch. Deutsch has used communication theory primarily to analyze the process of integration, at both the national and the international (i.e., regional) levels.[33] His basic premises are derived from the neofunctionalist notions of Mitrany and others, but his analytical framework is far more refined in its theoretical elaboration, and is expressly designed to be empirically verifiable. The basic notion is that integration within a given network will proceed in direct relation to the frequency of communications within that network.

Communication theory has at least three advantages over the two approaches we have examined. First, Deutsch and other systems theo-

[33] Deutsch and others, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968); Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: Free Press 1965); Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1966).

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rists have dealt with the integrative, mobilizational, and legitimating functions of communication that have been most neglected by students of political symbolism, thereby relieving their own work of the mordant and sometimes excessive cynicism apparent in the writings of the latter. Second, thanks to its more precise definition of key variables, communication theory lends itself more readily to quantifiability than do either political culture or political symbolism. Quantitative analysis reveals new and significant dimensions of the cultural superstructure: for instance, it facilitates comparisons among variables within the communication network and registers the dynamics of the system over time. Third, with its emphasis on channels and flow of communications, communication theory should obviate the propensity for a one-way causal analysis of flow that disregards feedback or mass-initiated messages.

In order to perceive more clearly the logical implications and methodological weaknesses of communication theory, it may be useful to look at the premises of information theory, from which it is derived. According to information theory, any communication system consists of: (1) at least one *code* to regulate the use of symbols (that is, an indication of the modalities of their codification, decodification, and interpretation); and (2) a set of conditions that permit such operations (that is, the presence of at least one transmitter, one receiver, one channel, and a context). The prime variable in the system is *information*, which in information theory has nothing to do with the content of what is said, but with the number of alternatives available. "Information" is not what *is* said, but what *can* be said—the number of possible choices in the selection of a message. Through binary disjunction it is possible to break every message into an endless number of possible binary choices. The basic unit of information is the bit, or binary digit, which consists of one choice between two equally probable possibilities. "Information" is thus a statistical characteristic of the source of the message, describing the range of choices available in its construction. The less information there is, the easier the communication. A "code" is designed to ease communication by imposing a probability system upon the random probabilities of the sending system, and thereby limiting the amount of information contained. (For example, in the English language a code stipulates that the letters "str" must be followed by a vowel, not by a consonant.) The code transforms an infinite reality into finite units that are relevant to communication among interested parties: it changes information into meaningful messages. Among human beings, several codes may function simultaneously: at the basic level a

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denotative code may translate events into a series of signals, and one or more connotative codes may then translate those signals into subjectively meaningful interpretations. (For instance, "The Martians have landed" = "We must flee/negotiate/attack!") Political culture would from this perspective be considered as a system of connotations codified to interpret a denotative system of messages.[34]

Perhaps the most serious problem with communication theory in its current political science formulations is the lack of an adequate concept of a code. In the absence of any such criterion to sort data into relevant categories of meaning, information is broken into quantifiable atomic units (messages), its speed and direction are measured, and the code appears *inferentially* as an epiphenomenon of the emerging pattern of message flow. Yet, how can meaning be inferred from a flow pattern the constituent units of which have no intrinsic meaning? *Ex nihilo nihil fit!* In seeking to determine whether political integration is positively associated with the frequency of intrasystem communication, it may be relevant to ascertain whether the messages are friendly or hostile, for example; but Deutsch is unable to do so without a code. This code must obviously *precede* rather than result from his analysis; hence, communication theory offers little assistance. Communication theory assumes that the meaning of symbols is exhausted in their patterned interrelationships, and is unable to explain the power of symbols that appear with the same meaning in different cultures.[35] Whereas students of political symbolism may be too cynical in their sharp juxtaposition of symbols and substantive policies, communication theorists evade the issue by declining any interpretation that goes beyond quantifiable linguistic appearances.

The System of Political Culture

We must now try to rise to the challenge implied in our criticisms of previous approaches and propose a constructive alternative. If it is to be a satisfactory synthesis, this alternative should incorporate the advantages of the three analytical schemas discussed above while avoiding their salient weaknesses. The system I propose will address the basic concerns articulated in the literature of political culture while endeavoring to define the empirical unit of analysis more precisely. This unit of analysis will be adopted from the literature of political

[34] Umberto Eco, *Einfuehrung in die Semiotic,* trans. by Juergen Trabant (Munich: Wilhelm Fink 1972), 35, 52-53, and throughout; Ferrucio Rossi-Landi, *Linguistics and Economics* (The Hague: Mouton 1975), 10.

[35] Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (New York: Pantheon Books 1970).

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symbolism—divorced, however, from the accompanying assumptions that symbolism is empty. As in communication theory, symbolism will be analyzed within a comprehensive theoretical framework, but one that will include its linguistic as well as its communicative dimensions.

I suggest that political culture may best be understood as a *semiological system*. Semiology (or semiotics) is the science concerned with the systematic analysis of meanings. The model I shall outline was inspired by the work of a number of logicians, cultural anthropologists, and structural linguists ranging from Charles Morris to Roland Barthes. Modesty is certainly appropriate at this state in its formulation, and criticisms or suggestions for improvement are more than welcome. In the first subsection, I shall delineate the analytical boundaries dividing the system of political culture from its environment. In the second subsection, I shall specify the basic components of the system and show how they relate to one another.

POLITICAL CULTURE REDEFINED

A semiological approach to the analysis of political culture returns the field to a primary focus on symbols. Political culture is a system of political symbols, and this system nests within a more inclusive system that we might term "political communication." It may facilitate our attempt to define the system of political culture to outline first the system of political communication as a whole and then to indicate the boundary that distinguishes political culture from the rest of political communication.

The political communication system consists, first of all, of the components of communication theory that have already been discussed: codes, transmitters, channels, and so forth. In addition to these communicative variables, it consists of certain linguistic categories designed to deal with those questions of meaning that have heretofore been neglected in communication theory: *signs*, which are usually words (but may be signals, symbols, symptoms, artifacts, clues, etc.) referring to something else; *referents* (sometimes called designata), which are the "something else" referred to; and *significations* (or designations), which are definitions of the signs and their referents that apply to the generic signs' type or class. Any semiological system comprises this combination of communicative and linguistic variables and their interrelationships, which may be used to define the political system simply by restricting the field of reference. But it would not define political culture specifically—at least not political culture narrowly and precisely conceived (i.e., as we conceive it). How may political culture be dis-

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tinguished from the political communication system in which it nests?

In previous attempts to define political culture we noted a tendency to conflate the term with the political cultures it subjectively describes, with the political psychology that perceives those structures, or with the political language that distortedly registers and conveys the structures so perceived. We may already claim to have differentiated political culture from political structure or political psychology by focusing on political symbols, which mediate between the two and function with some degree of autonomy. Now the question concerns the difference between political symbols and political language. Our first gambit might be to assert that political symbols include *more* than language: symbols may include emblems, icons (e.g., flags, totems, coins), graphic artifacts (statues, paintings), or concrete entities (Jerusalem, the Kremlin). But in the final analysis, verbal symbols are more comprehensive than nonverbal symbols. It cannot be demonstrated that nonverbal symbols are invariably derivative from verbal symbols, but they may in every case be reduced to them. Systems of nonverbal symbols can signify, and on a large scale, but never autonomously: other signs enjoy the status of systems only insofar as they pass through the relay of language, which extracts their meanings (in the form of a nomenclature) and names their referents.[36]

The argument here is that political symbolism is *less* than political language, just as political culture is less than politics. Political symbolism is embedded in political communication, but analytically distinct from it. Political symbolism has two specific properties distinguishing it from other political language: its metalinguistic property, and its connotative property.

The distinctive *metalinguistic* property of symbols is that they function simultaneously as apparent "object language" and actual "metalanguage"; that is, they seem to denote a specific empirical event, but actually they refer to a series of signs which in turn refer to a category of events.[37] For example, Franklin Roosevelt's slogan, "priming the pump," refers *prima facie* to a simple farm chore, but it also functions as a concept referring to a wide range of social and economic policies. The selection of a word from everyday language endows the symbol with an appearance of familiarity, enabling members of the mass public to relate on a more intimate level to a remote, complex, and seemingly irrelevant event. A symbol may thus integrate an indefinite series of

[36] Roland Barthes, *Elements of Semiology*, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill & Wang 1967), 10.

[37] *Ibid.*, 58 ff.

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signs into a meaningful synthesis while retaining the illusion of concrete reality peculiar to words in everyday language. The fact that symbols are removed from empirical experience by one or more levels of abstraction makes it possible for them to condense a great deal of meaning into a highly economical communicative vehicle without reducing the meaning at one level to the meaning at another, inasmuch as the symbol remains multivalent or "polysemic."[38] The ambiguous metalinguistic character of the symbol may be depicted as follows:[39]



The *connotative* property of the symbol refers to its capability to represent and convey emotion. This is significant in the light of our assumption that the quintessence of political culture concerns how people *feel* about politics. The amount of information a voter may assimilate is relevant perhaps to an assessment of his intelligence, or to a study of the effectiveness of the mass media and other agencies of civic education, but utterly irrelevant to political culture precisely defined. For example, from the fact that a person is ill-informed one cannot necessarily infer that he is "apathetic" (many assassins are ill-informed in an objective sense); nor can one infer that a person will be a "good citizen" from the fact that he is well-informed (many political scientists neglect to vote).

As poets have known intuitively for centuries, it is through symbolism, through the imagery and metaphor that T. S. Eliot called "objective correlatives" that man has best been able to express his feelings. Feelings cannot really be expressed convincingly in formal propositions, and to proceed under the illusion that they can is to invite the dilemma of "other minds" that has plagued certain recent British philosophers. As soon as the human mind ceases to be disinterested and becomes aware of its own feelings, it begins to gaze at the world with "interest," and the desire is engendered to create metaphor rather than to describe

[38] Paul Ricoeur uses this term to refer to the symbol's propensity to evoke numerous associations. See his "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor," in Erwin Straus, ed., *Language and Language Disturbances* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1974), 49-72.

[39] With certain terminological modifications, this figure was adapted from Roland Barthes, "Myth Today," in *Mythologies*, trans. by Annette Lavers (New York: Hill & Wang 1972), 109-59.

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objectively.[40] Once created, a symbol may succeed in bringing into focus the emotions implicit in the shared experiences of many others, as a result of which it will become the depository of their emotions as well.[41]

To the degree that a symbol succeeds in becoming a depository of widespread interest and feeling, it can incite prolonged public controversy, mobilize demonstrations of support or protest, and otherwise influence social behavior. For example, in the late 1960's the ABM became a controversial public symbol. The object language referred to a highly sophisticated weapons system and involved various arcane issues of American deterrence and defense strategy that rarely sustain such interest. But the symbol also had certain emotional connotations, touching upon feelings of anxiety about possible unemployment in the defense industry, and perhaps raising at a deeper level the question of the appropriate response to the inherently uncertain prospect of sudden death in a nuclear holocaust. As a symbol among the mass public, the ABM tended to become detached from the technical details of its possible disposition and performance (which could not readily be assimilated by a mass audience), and to be discussed primarily in terms of its connotations. Among the better-educated sectors of the public, the very vividness and urgency of its connotations sustained interest in the technical details of the weapons system and its place in overall deterrence strategy. Thus an argument may be publicly elaborated, at various levels of sophistication (depending on the intelligence of the participants), for as long as the emotional connotations of the generating symbol continue to sustain it. Once a public argument becomes detached from its emotional animus, it is likely to become empty rhetoric, a mere "conceit."[42] Unless it has meanwhile become attached to extrasymbolic supports, the argument then dies of irrelevance. The Chinese contend that Marxism-Leninism has become little more than a conceit in the Soviet Union—an allegation that Soviet officialdom naturally disputes. The possibility illustrates the point, however, that even empty rhetoric may continue to hold sway for an indefinite period on the strength of its public prestige, the interest that

[40] Peter Munz, *When the Golden Bough Breaks: Structuralism or Typology?* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1973), 60. See also Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in Geertz, ed., *Myth, Symbol and Culture* (New York: Norton 1971), 1-39.

[41] Abner Cohen, "Political Anthropology: The Analysis of the Symbolism of Power Relations," *Man*, IV (June 1969), 215-36.

[42] Michael Walzer, "On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 82 (June 1967), 191-205.

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the various organizations it has sired have vested in perpetuating it, and the absence of a compelling challenge.

Although we have argued that it forms the heart of political culture, the connotative content of language has rarely been analyzed by political scientists—(or by linguists or attitude psychologists, for that matter). The usual assumption is that it is "subjective," and therefore too dependent upon the individual speaker and context to allow for generalization. However, the emotional connotations of symbols are surely not entirely subjective, or they could not be perceived by their readers or hearers; naturally, one cannot predict the listener's reaction on the basis of the connotative implications of a symbol, but neither can one predict his reaction to its informational content. Let us concede that there are some connotations that are limited to specific contexts and speakers; on the other hand, there are also some connotations that are as objective and context-free as the symbol's conceptual content. These are socially binding connotations, on which a skilled speaker can rely to evoke the same feelings in the listener that he himself has (or is assumed to have) when he invokes the symbol. It is on the basis of this emotional mutuality, based on common apprehension of a symbol, that the *steering* capabilities of political symbolism are realized.[43]

THE SYSTEM

We have suggested that the basic unit of analysis in studies of political culture is the symbol. Symbols are metalinguistically ambiguous units in that they are parts of the object language that function at the level of metalanguage, providing for typological elaboration of many realms of human experience on the basis of specific criteria of association. It is through symbolism that people express, convey, and clarify their feelings and values. Having thus distinguished political symbolism from other political language on the basis of its linguistic properties, let us introduce the communicative components of the political culture system, and then go on to specify the conceivable relationships among linguistic and communicative variables in the system.

The communicators in the political culture system may be divided into two categories—masses and elites. They are defined solely in terms of their communicative functions: elites manipulate symbols, while masses interpret symbols and respond more or less accordingly, depending on the skills of the elites and on whether their interests coincide. It is not necessarily assumed that elites control other values, such as

[43] Walther Dieckmann, *Sprache in der Politik: Einfuehrung in die Pragmatik und Semantik der politischen Sprache* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1969), 75 ff.

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wealth or even power. Special interest groups are irrelevant to the political *culture* system unless they participate in the manipulation of symbols (in which case they become elites); they normally operate *within* (or at the margins of) the political culture and by grace of its tolerance. Elites and masses relate to one another through symbols, as illustrated in this figure:



This system of political culture may be analyzed on the basis of three semiological relationships obtaining among its variables: pragmatics, semantics, and syntactics.[44] *Pragmatics* refers to the relationship between masses and elites, as mediated through symbols. From the pragmatic perspective, the symbol has meaning *for someone*: attention is focused on the speaker's intention to express or communicate meaning and on the reactions of the hearer. The *semantic* relationship abstracts from specific communication events and seeks to characterize the relationship between the symbol and the political reality to which it refers; it is thus basically concerned with the relationship between symbol and sign, and the typological elaboration of signs. *Syntactics* consists of the formal relationship among signs, as abstracted from the communication event, the speaker, the listener, and the referent; it is of particular importance in projecting the connotations of the symbol. In our analysis of the political culture system, we shall proceed from the pragmatic to the semantic to the syntactic, in progressive abstraction from the "real" communication event.

Pragmatics

We have noted that pragmatics focuses on the speaker's intentions to express or communicate something to someone, and on the reactions

[44] Charles W. Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall 1950); and Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," in Otto Neurath and others, eds., *Foundations of the Unity of Science*, I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1971), 77-139.

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of the listener. Perhaps the chief difference between political symbolism and religious or literary symbolism is that the former is more obviously "pragmatic"—that is, closely tied to immediate human needs and desires. Linguists usually ignore pragmatics because it brings psychological questions into play, as already noted; such questions are unavoidable in political science, which is after all primarily concerned with the function of language in influencing behavior.

In the present model, the actors whose intentions are relevant are the elites and the masses. To simplify, for the purpose of analyzing the most basic political contingencies, let us assume for the moment that the masses' possible intentions may be adequately characterized as "opposition" or "support," and that the elites' intentions may be characterized as "symbolic enhancement" of opposition or support. Several possible motives for these diverging intentions have been discussed in the literature: the most important and politically relevant ones appear to be *relative deprivation*, for the masses (relative either to an earlier time or to another social reference group), and *status incongruence*, for elites. The chief difference between the two is the more inclusive scope of the former: masses may feel some status incongruence (particularly in cases of racial or ethnic discrimination), but are more apt to feel materially deprived, as status is higher on the normal hierarchy of values. Elites—having in most cases achieved relative material satisfaction—desire status, which is associated with political power and (in institutionalized systems) official position. Thus the basic political cleavage among the masses is between the deprived and the satisfied; among the elites it is between the candidates for office and the incumbents. The conceivable intentions of masses and elites combine to form four basic contingencies:

		ELITE INTENTIONS	
		Enhance Opposition	Enhance Support
MASS INTENTIONS	Oppose	1	2
	Support	3	4

1. When there is a mood of opposition among the masses that coincides with a desire among candidate elites to enhance opposition, the conditions exist for a sharp vertical cleavage (between a coalition of opposing elites and masses, and a coalition of supportive elites and masses), and possibly for civil war or a revolution; the outcome is

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dependent upon the relative strength and skill of the opposing coalition vis-à-vis the incumbents. This potentially explosive situation is most easily (and most commonly) defused by co-opting opposing elites into positions of incumbency, thereby transforming the situation into contingency 2.

2. When there is a mood of opposition among the masses that coincides with a consensual desire by the elite to subdue opposition and enhance support, the conditions exist for a sharp horizontal cleavage between the elite and the masses. This situation may occasionally result in an anarchist uprising or a Jacquerie. More frequently, elites manage to use appropriate techniques of symbol manipulation (such as scapegoating, or turning the blame for the aggrieving situation against the protesters and mobilizing an anti-protest, pro-"normalcy" movement) to dissipate mass protest.

3. Where there is a mood of mass satisfaction that coincides with an elite's desire to enhance opposition, there may be one of two outcomes. Either the incumbents will mute the opposition candidates, or the latter will succeed in using appropriate techniques of symbol manipulation to activate latent cleavages among the masses, thereby transforming the situation into contingency 1.

4. When there is a mood of mass satisfaction that coincides with a consensual desire to enhance support (rare, indeed, except in contingency tables), conditions exist for a sense of elite unity and mass quiescence, which may be further consolidated through the use of appropriate techniques of symbol manipulation.

The basic objective of symbol manipulation is the same for incumbent and candidate elites: both have an interest in fostering a sense of *identification* between themselves and the collectivity they mean to represent. The process of political identification involves generalization from objective perception to subjective wish-fulfilment:[45] from the perception of visible similarities between the identifier and his object of identification, the identifier allows himself to infer the existence of various invisible but desired similarities. A candidate member of the elite must try to appeal to both aspects of identification. He must manifest those aspects of the self that are *perceptibly similar* to a maximum number of people. (To do this, he[46] will wear Polish T-shirts, eat blintzes,

[45] Ezra Stotland and Max L. Hillmer, "Identification, Authoritarian Defensiveness, and Self-Esteem," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 64 (1962), 334-42.

[46] Although "he" will be used throughout these abstract formulations for the sake of simplicity and succinctness, I do not wish to imply that all political actors are male.

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attend churches, don construction helmets, and generally try to appear all things to all men. For the sake of simplicity, we shall call this activity "mass" identification.) Simultaneously, he must display those characteristics that a maximum number of people will *desire to appropriate*—wealth, happiness, intelligence, beauty, courage, charm, power —all of the qualities that distinguish him as a member of the elite. We shall call this activity "elitist" identification. While seeking to meet the conflicting requirements for fostering identification, he must also try to disqualify or render implausible his rival's attempts to do the same.

Because of their differing structural positions, the incumbent and the candidate dispose of different symbolic resources and liabilities, and are therefore apt to employ different manipulative techniques. An incumbent finds it easier to foster elitist identification, simply because he is already a member of the elite. To capitalize on this advantage, he may attempt to enhance the status of the collectivity he represents, and emphasize the indissoluble linkage between the office he holds and the high status and great power of that collectivity, alluding frequently to his own competence as an incumbent and deriding his opponent's inexperience.[47] The potential liability of the incumbent's position is that an overemphasis on his elite characteristics and an underemphasis on the common characteristics that facilitate mass identification may provoke envy and resentment. The strengths and weaknesses of the candidate are the exact obverse: he usually has greater difficulty establishing his leadership qualities and fostering elitist identification, but finds it much easier to identify with the masses. The candidate may capitalize on this by temporarily recanting his elite status and adopting numerous popular but mutually incompatible or otherwise impractical positions, taking advantage of the incumbent's relative inability to identify with the masses by promulgating a symbolism of *distinction*: incumbents are estranged from the masses by an insurmountable distinction, and their elite qualities are but the fruit of the exploitation of the masses. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution of 1966–1968, for instance, the traditional symbolic polarities of ghosts versus men, appearance versus reality, dark versus light, and filth versus purity were evoked to dramatize the distinction between elites and masses;

[47] Occasionally, of course, a candidate will retain his commitment to the symbols of opposition even after he wins incumbency. This seems a politically irrational (and therefore perhaps heroic) strategy, however, since he thereby jeopardizes his relations with other members of the elite and his privileged access to the symbols of legitimacy. In the same sense, it is irrational for a candidate to defend the status quo.

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the metaphors of "frames," "shackles," and "fortress" suggested the rigidity and invidious character of this barrier.[48] By symbolically enhancing this sense of elite estrangement, a candidate may proceed to impugn an incumbent's record without risking insult to the constituency whose support he hopes to win; by mitigating this distinction and promoting his identification with the symbols of community ("draping himself in the flag"), an incumbent may succeed in equating criticism of himself with criticism of the group he represents.

"Symbolic enhancement" refers to the loss of distance between actor and symbol, with the result that symbols acquire a greatly enhanced capability to influence behavior. Elites seek to enhance their symbolism by "framing" it—that is, by altering its outer and inner setting. Outer framing consists of using ritual ceremonies and consecrated forums to isolate language from its immediate practical-life interests and transform it into something entirely different in nature—more impressive, strong, and grandiose. Inner framing consists of the use of a specialized or prestigious vocabulary, rhythmic cadence, or emphatic physical gestures to endow linguistic symbols with added power and dignity.[49]

Because it heightens the pragmatic efficacy of symbols, it is in the interest of incumbent elites to institutionalize "framing" within a context they can control, and thereby consolidate their authority. When the ceremonies used to frame language become institutionalized within an ongoing organizational vehicle, "ritualization" occurs. Ritualization involves insulating the symbol system as much as possible from unpredictable external events that might falsify it, and encapsulating it within a community of believers. Within this bounded context, shared belief in the symbols facilitates control and makes possible a predictable social order—thereby consensually validating that shared belief and providing a pretext to punish any violators of the consensus. Differential knowledge of the symbols may comprise a basis for stratification within the community, with a permanent staff of specialists being set up to develop and perpetuate the symbol system. By strictly subordinating individual to community, and emotional impulse to ceremonial decorum, ritualization defines the nature of the internal opposition it generates. Such opposition then takes the form of broad social movements that celebrate the expression of emotional spontaneity, seek to

[48] Dittmer, "Thought Reform and Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71 (March 1977).

[49] Toshihiko Izutsu, *Language and Magic: Studies in the Magical Functions of Speech* (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Philological Studies, 1956) 37, 117.

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level symbolic distinctions, publicize all esoteric communication, and inaugurate a utopian *communitas*.[50] The student movement of the late 1960's in the democratic West manifested these tendencies.[51]

Semantics

The semantic relationship between symbol and referent is often loose, but never altogether arbitrary (as it is in symbolic logic or algebra, wherein x may equal any number, depending on the value of the other terms in the equation).[52] Forming the core of the symbol's metalinguistic or conceptual meaning is the empirical meaning of the original sign; the symbol may embrace an indefinite series of other signs only insofar as they are in some way associated with that core meaning. For example, "New Frontier" refers *as a sign* to a wilderness area on the outskirts of civilization; as a *symbol* it refers to a range of policies and policy makers ("New Frontiersmen") allegedly characterized by their fresh, innovative approach to problems. The fact that the original referent supplies the symbol's core meaning accounts for the fact that certain symbols seem to have similar meanings in many different contexts and even in different cultures, such as the use of the wind or breath to symbolize the spirit, or the use of the sky to symbolize transcendence, power, and immutability. The symbolism of height and depth is frequently used to represent hierarchy in all its many manifestations (bowing, kneeling, ascending a throne, social climbing); and the sun has long been a symbol of authority, because it reveals itself at the same time it reveals other things, eternally sending forth emanations of its substance that reach vast distances and nourish the recipients without perceptibly diminishing its own splendor.[53] Although the

[50] Douglas (fn. 35), 8, 14, 19, 73, and throughout; Victor W. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine 1969), 94-95. For a discussion of the progressive aspects of ritual, see James L. Peacock, *Rites of Modernization: Symbolic and Social Aspects of Indonesian Proletarian Drama* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968).

[51] Barbara G. Myerhoff, "The Revolution as Trip: Symbol and Paradox," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, No. 395 (May 1971), 105-17; Aristide R. Zolberg, "Moments of Madness," *Politics and Society*, II (Winter 1972), 183-209.

[52] David Schneider, in *American Kinship: A Cultural Account* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1968), argues that "A symbol is something that stands for something else where there is no necessary or intrinsic relationship between the symbol and that which it symbolizes." But it seems to me that his own book can be used to demonstrate a "necessary" and involuntary aspect of American kinship and a clear metaphorical association between this aspect and the "voluntary" aspects of kinship.

[53] Edwyn Bevan, *Symbolism and Belief* (Fort Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press 1938), 134 and throughout; Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. by Rosemary Sheet (New York: Sheed and Ward 1958).

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symbolism of political corruption and guilt remains to be systematically investigated, Ricoeur has traced the Judeo-Christian concept of evil to the symbolism of contagion, of a stain or blemish, of missing the mark, of wandering astray, of being uprooted.[54]

Informed by the meaning of the original sign, a symbol may then be extended to an indefinite series of new signs on the basis of their association with that core meaning. Modern research in structural linguistics suggests that there may be only two basic principles of association in the formation of symbols: metonymy and metaphor.[55] *Metonymy* is a relationship based on the substitution of *contiguous* elements, as in synecdochy, or *pars pro toto*: the launching of the first Sputnik symbolically dramatized Soviet technological advancement; the dog, Checkers, became a symbol of the legitimate private appropriation of campaign funds; the Watergate tapes a symbol of widespread corruption in government. *Metaphor* is a relationship based on the substitution of *similar* elements, as in the concept of a "deal" in "Square Deal," "New Deal," and "Fair Deal"; or the Bolshevik (and Black Panther) clenched-fist salute as a symbol of aggressive determination. In political symbolism, both processes are continually operative; careful observation may reveal that preference is given to one or the other, depending on cultural patterns, personality, or style.[56]

Symbols are accorded central status in a political culture according to their ability to order and illuminate experience: it is in the metaphoric cross-referencing of domains that culture is integrated, providing us with the sensation of wholeness.[57] Those symbols capable of elaborating relationships among a wide range of diverse cultural experiences are referred to as "key symbols." According to Ortner, key symbols may have elaborating power in two modes: they may have conceptual elaborating power, in which case they are valued for their capacity to conceptualize the order of the world; or they may have action-elaborating power, in which case they are valued for their ability to imply clear-cut modes of action appropriate to a particular political culture. Ortner calls symbols with conceptual elaborating power "root metaphors"; elaborating symbols that imply culturally appropriate actions

[54] Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. by Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper and Row 1967).

[55] A seminal article was Roman Jakobson, "The Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances," in Jakobson, *Fundamentals of Language* (The Hague: Mouton 1956), 55-82.

[56] Cf. Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*, trans. by Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1968).

[57] James W. Fernandez, "Persuasions and Performances: Of the Best in Every Body . . . and the Metaphors of Everyman," in Geertz (fn. 40), 39-61.

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for various contingencies are "key scenarios."[58] (It should be noted that both are analytical distinctions that are empirically intertwined.) The human body functions as a root metaphor for many cultures,[59] and of course the body's sexual modalities have acquired great conceptual elaborating power in the West since Freud. In politics, the scale (balance of power), and now the computer (input-output, feedback, etc.) have become root metaphors. A key scenario in American political culture would be the myth of the log cabin, which formulates popular conceptions of political success and suggests means for achieving it in the face of seemingly insuperable obstacles. In contemporary China, the key scenario of peasant revolution is articulated in the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung"; the Chairman introduced the notion that this scenario should be re-enacted periodically (as in the Cultural Revolution) in order to enhance its current relevance through ritual.

When a symbol is applied to new signs, it must be dissociated from its original context and become assimilated to the particular contexts of its users.[60] As a result, the core meaning of a widely used symbol tends to atrophy and become reduced to a cliché. The mass media have accelerated this process of inflationary devaluation, steadily reducing the typical symbol's life span. Actors and politicians and other performers who seek to symbolize and influence mass moods can prolong their symbolic relevance beyond that of nonhuman symbols by self-consciously readjusting their public images, sometimes at the price of some disruption of their private lives and sense of identity.

Syntactics

Syntactics consists of the formal analysis of the internal organization of symbols in a symbol system. Analysis of the syntactic arrangement of symbols is particularly valuable for the light it casts upon the (perhaps unconscious) feeling-state of the communicator:[61] whereas the denotative content of symbolism is expressed semantically, its connotative content tends to be conveyed by its syntax. Two aspects of syntactic arrangement are worth particular attention: narrative arrangements of plots, and logical relationships among themes.

Symbols with a clear plot structure, serving a practical argument and

[58] Sherry B. Ortner, "On Key Symbols," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 75 (October 1973), 1338-47.

[59] Douglas (fn. 35).

[60] Robert J. Pranger, *Action, Symbolism and Order* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press 1968), 157.

[61] Edward Stankiewiez, "Problems of Emotive Language," in Thomas A. Sebeok and others, eds., *Approaches to Semiotics* (The Hague: Mouton 1964), 239-65.

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appealing to a perennial or historically recurring constituency are termed "political myths." Each type of political myth has its own epic hero and typical episodes; for example, the leitmotifs of epic heroism include the birth and death of the hero, tested heroism, descent into the underworld, and encounters with various antiheroes: the trickster, the punished wanderer, the unpromising hero.[62] There are foundation myths and eschatological myths, racist myths, and national revolutionary myths; common to all is a demand for a morally coherent world.[63] Surprisingly enough, the plots of recorded myth seem to be more finite than the plots of empirical history, although history is limited by human experience and myth only by human imagination. The reason probably has to do with the fact that myth is not free fantasy but a socially useful formula: the forms of myth are limited by their applicability in a structured political context, and in the course of history the variety of political structures that have emerged is small and recurrent.[64]

The efficacy of a political myth in practical argument depends upon its being accepted as true; it is accepted as true if it explains the experiences of those to whom it is addressed and justifies the purposes they are pursuing. If a myth achieves widespread credibility, it can serve many positive functions in a political system: it can link the hero to a community, legitimize power, establish moral consensus, and limit meaningful alternatives for action, thus establishing a range of predictability for society. Due to their relative immunity from public challenge, myths can preserve customs and rituals, initiate youth into the community through various rites of passage, and confer culturally valid criteria for social stratification and leadership recruitment. But a political myth has certain distinct drawbacks as well: for example, it tends to be extremely antipragmatic, reducing adaptability to crises by foreclosing many alternatives as immoral.[65] And just as the power of some is symbolically enhanced, others will be placed at a severe rhetorical disadvantage. The dynamics of public debate in any community are structured by the fabric of the prevailing myth system,[66] and the number

[62] Gilbert Morris Cuthbertson, *Political Myth and Epic* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 1975), 101-02.

[63] Henry Tudor, *Political Myth* (New York: Praeger 1972), 91.

[64] Cuthbertson (fn. 62), 102. For a good example of the analysis of mythical plot, see Terence S. Turner, "Oedipus: Time and Structure in Narrative Form," in Robert F. Spencer, ed., *Forms of Symbolic Action: American Ethnological Society Proceedings* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1970).

[65] Cuthbertson (fn. 62), 156-211.

[66] Martin E. Spencer, "Politics and Rhetorics," *Social Research*, XXXVII (Winter 1970), 597-624.

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of pluralistic systems in which public challenge of sanctioned myths is permitted is small.

Levi-Strauss has been among the first to suggest that there is an internal logic (structure) underlying the surface plots of a series of myths, endowing them with a common but not immediately obvious meaning. To identify this latent structure of meaning, he breaks the plot into the shortest possible sentences (themes). He then notes similarities among the various thematic elements and sorts them into separate bundles on that basis. These bundles always come in pairs of opposites, reflecting (according to Levi-Strauss) the innate tendency of the human mind to think in binary oppositions, like a digital computer. The pairs of opposites can then be collected into several conceptual schemes according to their subject matter (that is, cosmological, economic, and so forth). Conceptual schemes and their interrelationships can be expressed in a diagram or a series of diagrams that will represent the global structure of the myth, which will in turn make its meaning clear. For example, Levi-Strauss's structural interpretation of the Oedipus myth is that it is an attempt to reconcile the belief that man sprang from the earth with the knowledge that men are born of their parents. The myth mediates between these incompatible views by suggesting that they are related in a way comparable to the relationship between overestimating and underestimating the importance of blood ties. The myth thus provides a logical model capable of overcoming an unwelcome contradiction, progressing from an awareness of this contradiction to its eventual resolution.[67] Edelman has sought to employ structuralist techniques in the analysis of current political controversies, suggesting that we find a pair of opposing myths for the conflicting beliefs that define our attitudes toward social problems.[68] For example, he cites two conflicting myths concerning American welfare policies: one blames the indigent for their own plight, while the other holds the authorities accountable.[69]

Turner's analysis of the internal structure of the myth or symbol seems to be a logical development of Levi-Strauss's: like the latter, he holds that key symbols in a culture have an inherent bipolar structure.

[67] Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, *Totemism* (Boston: Beacon Press 1963); Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books 1963); and Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1966). For a clear exposition, see Howard Gardner, *The Quest for Mind: Piaget, Levi-Strauss, and the Structuralist Movement* (New York: Knopf 1973).

[68] Note, however, that Edelman shifts his focus from the myth, which is not an immediately obvious source of contradictions, to the public polemic, which is.

[69] Murray Edelman, *Language and Social Problems* (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers, University of Wisconsin, June 1974), 4, 5.

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Yet he takes the analysis further by attempting to determine the emotional and evaluative connotations of the two poles: he finds that each key symbol has an "ideological pole" and a "sensory pole."[70] The former makes an appeal to the principles of moral and social order, the latter to human desire and feeling, even of a "gross, frank and physiological order." Turner's underlying assumption is that human emotion toward the political order is inherently ambivalent, and that effective symbolism excites this ambivalence. Just as, for Levi-Strauss, the myth provides a logical model to overcome unwelcome contradictions, for Turner the ritual provides a resolution of the ambivalent bipolarity between higher aspirations and baser appetites: "Powerful drives and emotions associated with human physiology, especially with the physiology of reproduction, are divested in the ritual process of their antisocial quality and attached to components of the normative order, energizing the latter with a borrowed vitality, and thus making the Durkheimian 'obligatory' desirable."[71] Although Turner suggests that ritual resolution of symbolic bipolarity permits cathartic expression to participants while mitigating the more overt elements of hostility, my own research indicates that the contradictions inherent in such opposing symbols will become manifest in the process of mobilization unless extrasymbolic constraints are imposed.[72]

Conclusion

I have presented critical appraisals of several attempts by political scientists to deal with the cultural superstructure of society, and proposed an outline of an alternative theory of political culture based on a semiological conception of communication. At this point it seems appropriate to review the central criticisms of previous approaches in order to determine whether my system constitutes an improvement.

Many of the criticisms were focused on problems of conceptualization. I have attempted to show that the prevailing definition of political culture has tended to blur its conceptual boundaries with political structure on the one side and with political psychology on the other. The reason is that the field of political culture was conceived in terms of the subjective perception of an objective political reality, omitting

[70] Turner (fn. 50), 52; Turner, *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1974), 37 ff.; Turner, *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1967), 19-47. Turner erroneously refers to a *semantic* bipolarity, apparently assuming that the "ideological" and "sensory" properties inhere in the objects themselves rather than in the emotional predispositions of the subjects involved.

[71] Turner (fn. 50), 52.

[72] Dittmer (fn. 48).

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any intervening variable. As a result, there has been a tendency to assume an approximate equivalence between structure and psychology (except for abrupt structural transitions or abnormal psychology), thereby unduly discounting the potential for intrasystem conflict or systemic change. The missing intervening variable was provided by students of political symbolism, who used their discovery of the distinction between symbol and substance to illuminate the conflicts of interest underlying a euphemistic symbolic facade. But lacking any systematic conception of the symbolic process, they allowed certain oversimplifications to creep into their conceptualizations; for instance, the assumptions that whatever did not involve redistribution of goods and services was "symbolic," and that symbolism was "empty," having no other function than to masquerade as goods and services. By blurring the distinction between symbols and political reality, these analysts could then arrive at the deeply cynical position that much of politics was in fact shadow rather than substance, and that anyone who sought reform might be better advised to seek a psychiatrist. The opposite conceptual error was committed by those who introduced communication theory to political science: while the political symbolists tended to confuse symbol and reality, the political communication theorists tended to conflate symbols with words. This usually led to some form of quantitative content analysis, which frequently tended to discount the qualitative content of the symbols.

My conceptualization adopts the symbol as the central variable in the political culture system. I ascribe to symbols the requisite autonomy to sustain an independent subdiscipline dedicated to their analysis. The distinction between symbol and reality is an empirical variable rather than an assumed constant; it will probably vary in approximate correlation with the extrasemantic functions served by the symbol. The distinction between symbol and language is made with the help of the concept of metalanguage: symbols serve as metalinguistic categories while still appearing to be part of the object language. The assumption that elites use language more rationally than the masses has been abandoned; not so the assumption that elites exercise a dominant influence on political communication. I have introduced to the analysis the connotative and pragmatic aspects of symbolism most frequently neglected by students of political symbolism. All of the foregoing was attempted within a conceptual framework that relates relevant communicative and linguistic variables to one another within a comprehensive semiological system. Yet this system is not assumed to incline toward any particular equilibrium or steady state: indeed, conflict

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among incongruent symbolic formulations is assumed, providing the internal dynamic of the system.

I am aware that the alleged theoretical superiority of a semiological systems approach remains moot until its utility is tested in empirical applications. How may such an approach be applied? Survey research should still play an integral role in any country that permits this form of investigation, for direct questionnaires probably remain the most effective means of determining the nature of the pragmatic relationship between masses and elites.[73] But the heart of any analysis should obviously focus on the symbols themselves, beginning with the key symbols. Social anthropologists have developed useful techniques for identifying key symbols in a political culture. One method involves analyzing the political system for its underlying value orientations, hierarchical patterns, attitudes toward authority, and so forth, and then searching for some figure or image that seems to define, in relatively pure form, the underlying sentiments.[74] A more recent and probably superior approach begins by identifying those objects in a particular political culture that seem to attract special interest, and then proceeds to analyze these objects for their meanings: Why do the participants consider them so important? In which different contexts, which different action situations, which different guises, do they appear? How are they elaborated to relate various phenomena in the political culture? What cultural restrictions, rules, or sanctions surround them? Which groups use them, for what purposes, and how do other groups react?[75] Once the key symbols of a political culture have been identified, they can be placed within the semiological framework outlined above for systematic analysis of their linguistic and communicative relationships. And once the qualitative structure of a given symbol system has been established, quantitative measurement of the relationships among its variables should become feasible as well as theoretically interesting.

[73] That would include such obvious questions as mass reaction to changes in political symbol structure. See, for instance, G. Cleveland Wilhoit, "Political Symbol Shifts in Crisis News," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XIII (May 1969), 313-19.

[74] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1946).

[75] Ortner (fn. 58).

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THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND THE THIRD WORLD: Coalition or Cleavage?

By DOUGLAS C. SMYTH

ECONOMIC issues in the international community have been among the major sources of the cleavages developing between North and South in the United Nations, or between the Third World and most of the developed countries. This apparent fault line between states has been referred to at least since 1958, when the U.N. General Assembly launched a study of the concept of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources"; it has become increasingly important since the Third World initiated the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The "Group of 77," the economic negotiating caucus of the developing countries, which at last count numbered 116, was formed at the first UNCTAD. The importance of this bloc of states had become apparent only gradually, however, until the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent price increases by OPEC. In the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, the Third World was called upon by the initiating state—Algeria—to support OPEC-sponsored or -inspired initiatives to restructure the international economic system. That session has been described as a confrontation between developed and developing states. Despite the initial hopes of the United States that the poorest countries would perceive their "true interests" and side with the West against the sudden increase in the price of oil, the session clearly registered a major shift in power and initiative away from the developed nations to what Israel has derisively called "the automatic majority."

The Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, convened to consider the problem of development, had been prepared far more carefully than the Sixth. Secretary Kissinger launched a new "dialogue" with the Third-World countries, and it was clear that the negotiating positions of the United States and of the "77" had moved closer together, but that the latter still held an automatic majority. Although there were commentaries noting "strain" in the solidarity of developing nations, most of the general principles agreed to in the Sixth Special Session, and embodying the forward program of the Third World,

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were reiterated and refined in the Seventh. A "constructive dialogue" had been initiated.

There are questions, however, concerning the degree of consensus and cohesion among the "77." Does the voting majority represent common economic interests, political pressures, leverage for aid, or political consensus? Or is the voting majority more apparent than real—a fragile coalition of newly powerful oil-producing countries and their less advantaged fellows, still maintaining a voting unity based on past ties rather than present commonalities of interest? It is the purpose of this paper to address these questions, and to attempt to describe the nature of the international economic coalition that appears to dominate world forums.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Many roll-call studies have been made of the United Nations proceedings, including attempts to map various voting blocs. Nearly all of these, however, have been concerned with political issues which divide countries on the basis of ideological advantage (i.e., the East-West issues of the cold war), or on the basis of decolonization and self-determination (i.e., North-South issues); or they were undertaken before the bloc of nonaligned nations had become a formidable caucus for economic issues.[1] If one examines recent roll calls on economic issues, either in the General Assembly or in the Second Committee (which is responsible for processing the majority of economic issues brought before the Assembly), one is struck by the large number of issues resolved by "consensus" in which even the United States and the Western European countries reluctantly participate. Furthermore, in the few cases in which a true economic issue is brought to a recorded roll-call vote, the dimensions of division appear negligible. For example, a roll-call vote adopted the Mexican-sponsored Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States by 114 to 3 (United States, West Germany and United Kingdom) with 11 abstentions (all of them developed, Western nations). That particular charter represents one of

[1] Hayward R. Alker and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1965); Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60 (June 1966), 327-39; Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58 (September 1964), 642-58; Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57 (December 1963), 902-17; Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (June 1971), 471-95.

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the most forward, militant economic positions taken by Third-World states. Still, it seems naive to expect that Australia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, Iraq, and the U.S.S.R. are all in agreement on the basic economic issues represented in that document. In the only other roll call on an economic issue, in which the Arab-Israeli issue had not been injected, and in which national self-determination had not been more of an issue than the economic principles, the vote had been even more one-sided. It took place in the Second Committee, and concerned the draft resolution for the midterm review of the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the second U.N. development decade. The vote was 101 to 1 (United States), with 14 abstentions distributed equally between East European and Western states. If one is to conclude from these votes that economic consensus includes all but a small smattering of developed countries, would one also interpret the "consensus documents" agreed to without votes in the two special sessions as in fact representing an undifferentiated world opinion on international economic issues? Many commentators have stated that these problems would be among the most contentious of the last quarter of the century.[2]

If research is to be done on some of the most important and rapidly developing issues of our time—namely, the economic relationships within a global international system—studies of roll calls in the General Assembly are not going to be very fruitful. In fact, they may be misleading, since most recorded divisions that do appear are more closely related to external issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict than to economic disagreements. On the other hand, a large number of U.N. members make statements in debates on the floor of the General Assembly which represent their positions on a variety of economic issues. In the two special sessions previously mentioned, statements in general debate were confined to economic issues by the restricted agenda. Furthermore, comparison was facilitated by the fact that broad issue areas had been defined in the call to each session. Consequently,

[2] Edward Marcus and Mildred R. Marcus, *Economic Progress and the Developing World* (Glennview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman 1971); Lester R. Brown, *World Without Borders* (New York: Random House 1972); Georg Borgstrom, *The Hungry Planet* (New York: Macmillan 1972); Pierre Jalee, *The Third World in World Economy* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1969); Yuan-li Wu, *Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World* (New York: Crane, Russak 1973); Teresa Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books 1971); Yuri Zhukov and others, *The Third World: Problems and Prospects* (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1970); Robert N. Cooper, ed., *A Reordered World: Emerging International Economic Problems* (Washington: Potomac Associates 1973); C. R. Hensman, *Rich Against Poor: The Reality of Aid* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co. 1971).

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nine issue areas were amenable of comparative treatment, and the statements of each delegation could be coded on a ranked scale for each of the nine issues on which a position had been taken. The issues included eight substantive economic concerns and one which was largely symbolic. They were: (1) laudatory symbols, such as the "Group of 77," the New International Economic Order, and free enterprise; (2) resource management and allocation; (3) the regulation of multinational corporations; (4) reform of the monetary system; (5) aid programs and strategies; (6) trade restructuring; (7) energy allocations and management; (8) food supply and agricultural development; and (9) industrial development and technological transfers. A tenth issue was also mentioned—revision of the U.N. policy structure; but as it is outside the scope of this paper, it has not been included here.

The ranking of positions on each issue was initially devised to distinguish supporters of the status quo from moderate reformists, the latter from radical reformists, and these in turn from partisans who rejected the contemporary economic system as hopelessly incapable of reform, advocating its wholesale replacement with something other than nonstate or market relationships. Most delegations mentioned several different courses of action which they would prefer to see implemented in a particular issue area. However, none consistently mentioned all issues, or even all of those between the two extremes on a given issue; in accordance with the logic of the scaling decided upon, this should not have been expected. In other words, the nature of the rankings is subtractive rather than additive, in the sense that an extreme position necessarily excludes a position favoring the status quo and probably most reforms as well. Since the aim of this research has been to delineate differences rather than the consensus positions arrived at when resolutions were agreed upon, it seemed logical to rank delegations according to the most extreme statements they had made on each issue they had covered in the debate, rather than according to their most moderate or some mean between the two. Since most delegations only mentioned two or three of a possible eight ranked positions, computer processing would have become extremely complicated if each position out of a possible of 72 for each session had been coded.

The aim was to provide issue rankings for each participating delegation in order to compare relative militance or moderation and to delineate, if possible, any consistent blocs or cleavages. Since it was expected that both cleavage and cohesion could be caused or described by national attributes[3] or relationships between states, a set of economic

[3] See Vincent (fn. 1).

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indicators, regional identifiers, and an index of aid received (Western sources − Eastern sources ÷ net national product) were used for purposes of analysis.[4] No direct measures of economic or political development have been used, since for a large number of states none are readily available for later than 1965. Many of the countries in this study had barely gained independence at that time, and figures for them would have been unavailable in any case. To construct realistic figures on an empirical basis would have required resources beyond the scope of this research. The only other measure available, level of energy consumption, seriously skews the data on the Middle East oil countries in ways that are probably not reflective of their level of development.

Countries were also classified into categories used by the United Nations: Western developed = developed market economies; Eastern = nonmarket or Socialist economies; and developing or Third World = developing market economies. Cuba and Cambodia are included in the last category, but despite that anomaly, the classification has an intuitive appeal. It is relevant to the forum in which the behavior was observed, and it is relatively impartial, having been constructed by the U.N. Secretariat for nonpolitical purposes.

HYPOTHESES

The aim of this study is to delineate the bases of the Third World's apparent coalition on economic issues, which presumably forms the bedrock of the nonaligned bloc. Is there a monolithic unity as indicated by the roll-call votes? Or are there differences of interest? Are such differences potential cleavages, or are they merely matters of emphasis and order of priorities? And are these differences derived from economic, regional, or East-West factors?

The first possible hypothesis is that the only meaningful differences will be found between the Third World and other countries. This possibility is suggested not only by the roll-call votes and by the tendency of commentators to refer to the Third-World "bloc," but also by the neo-Marxist and neo-colonialist analyses of identical economic problems said to be facing all of the Third World.[5] According to this view, the global economic structure has caused, or maintains, the economic

[4] *U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1973* (New York: United Nations 1974), indicators compiled from national accounts tables, and from bilateral aid received by country from developed market economies and from nonmarket economies. All figures are for 1970, the most complete listing to date.

[5] Raul Prebisch, *Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task* (New York: Praeger 1971); Celso Furtado, *Obstacles to Latin American Development* (New York: Doubleday 1970).

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dependency on the part of developing countries, which is a major reason for their underdevelopment. The OPEC countries have pressed the argument that dependency is real, but that it can cut both ways. It therefore seems plausible, at least, that most developing countries may respond in similar ways to issues that are directly related to their apparent economic dependency.

The second hypothesis can be divided into two distinct parts. First, according to the State Department, the poorest countries (now occasionally referred to as the Fourth World by C. Fred Bergsten and others), should recognize that their interests are distinct from those of the OPEC nations, who, by raising the price of oil, have damaged their economies most severely. However, although the State Department hopefully projected that these countries would side with the United States, economic-gap theory would predict that the poor would become more militant as the wealth of the world is increasingly accumulated elsewhere, whether it be among the newly rich OPEC or the developed countries.[6] Second, various theories of political development posit social ills, conflict, political instability, and concomitantly the search for scapegoats—internal and external—when social and economic change is rapid.[7] Gurr's theory of relative deprivation may also be relevant here, although we are discussing proclivity for external militant positions rather than tendencies toward domestic political violence.[8] Relative deprivation—the perception that one has fewer material or psychic satisfactions than one feels entitled to or expects—is a psychological concept, of course, which may be applied only with great circumspection to the motives of U.N. delegates speaking on behalf of and under the instructions of member governments. Nevertheless, it is attractive to hypothesize that the leaders of governments may feel relative deprivation because their expectations for their countries and for their personal acquisition of power may have been greater than they have yet been

[6] U.S. State Department, *Bulletin*, Vol. 70 (March 4, 1974), 201-02, 219; James Crockcroft, André Frank, and Dale Johnson, *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1972), xii-xv; Irving L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development* (New York: Oxford 1966); A. Maizels, *Industrial Growth and World Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1963); Raul Prebisch, *Towards a New Trade Policy for Development* (New York: United Nations Publications 1964); Barbara Ward and others, *The Widening Gap* (New York: Columbia University Press 1971).

[7] Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1964), 117-21; Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

[8] Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970); James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (1962), 15-18.

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able to achieve. In fact, if one reads the political statements of the early leaders for independence of the Third World, such as Nehru, Sukarno, and Nkrumah, this assumption seems not at all unrealistic.[9] Thus it is hypothesized that either the degree of wealth or the rate of growth might cause differences of priorities or militance among Third-World countries.

According to a third hypothesis or set of hypotheses, divisions within the Third World would best be explained not by economic differences, but by the traditional divergences on political issues that researchers on the United Nations have found in past roll-call studies[10] along the lines of geographic caucusing groups, religious coalitions, and East-West ideologies. If any of these sets of hypotheses were borne out, it would be found, for example, that Third-World countries dependent for aid on Eastern sources would tend to be more radical or take positions more closely aligned with the positions taken by Socialist states than the more Western-dependent or nondependent states. If a relationship were based on region, for example, African countries would be found to cluster around some particular positions on an issue area, while Asian countries would tend to cluster around different positions.

In more formal terms:

H_1: Rankings on the nine issues would reveal consistent contrasts between Western countries and the Third World. Socialist states may or may not be sharply differentiated from Third-World countries, but no consistent or significant divisions within the Third World should appear.

H_2: Rankings on the nine issues would reveal not only contrasts between Western and Eastern developed countries and the Third World, but cleavages—i.e., significant differences on economic indicators within the Third World.

H_{2a}: The cleavages indicated above would be found on measures of static wealth, such as national income and per capita income; i.e., Third-World countries with low economic indicators would be significantly more likely to take radical positions than those with higher average per capita income, and vice versa.

[9] Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1970); Dorothy Norman, ed., *Nehru: The First Sixty Years* (New York: John Day 1965); John D. Legge, *Sukarno* (New York: Praeger 1972).

[10] Alker and Russett; Russett; Lijphart; Vincent (all fn. 1).

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H_{2b}: The cleavages indicated above would be found on measures of growth rate, such as the average growth rate of per capita income; i.e., Third-World countries with very high or very low growth rates would be significantly more likely to take radical positions than those experiencing more moderate growth rates.

H_3: Rankings on the nine issues would reveal cleavages within the Third World on the basis of region, predominant religion, or the balance of aid receipts (i.e., dependency on Eastern or Western aid).

DATA DEFINED

Seventy-six states took an active part in the general debate of the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly in April 1974 (referred to as Session I in the Tables), or made official statements in connection with the session. These constituted the first universe. In the Seventh Special Session, September 1-15, 1975 (referred to as Session II in the Tables), 110 countries participated actively in the debate, constituting the second universe. Of these, 68 had been participants in the earlier session; there was therefore a total of 118 cases. However, the total of each issue area amounts to less than 110, because many delegations took positions on only some, and very few took positions on all categories in either session.

The statements of each delegation for each session were coded for each of the nine issue areas mentioned earlier. The scale of ratings range from a minimum of 1 (representing the most conservative stance, favorable to existing arrangements, especially toward private enterprise and the free market system of trade), through more reformist positions from 2 to 4, to radical reforms from 5 to 7. Statements essentially rejecting the existing system out of hand were ranked 8. For example, positions on natural resources were ranked as follows: 1—Proposals to exploit new sources of raw materials, primarily advanced by importing developed nations, and for a special fund to be established for this purpose; i.e., to make capital available for private enterprise to intensify exploration for resources. 2—Proposals to organize markets and regulate stocks to insure consumers' access to the raw materials needed by their economies. 3—Promotion of consumer-producer cooperation through mutual consortia and negotiation to protect the interests of both. 4—Promotion of processing of raw materials by the producer countries in order to reap a greater proportion of the benefits of their

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national resources. 5—Acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty over the disposition of a country's resources, and consequently the right of a national government to regulate, control, or nationalize foreign exploitation of its state's raw materials. This position often included the idea that a state ought to treat, and be permitted to treat, these raw materials as a diminishing resource—i.e., capital which should earn not only present income but future wealth. 6—The interests of resource producers should be guarded against the competing interests of consumer states to exploit them by paying the cheapest prices possible for raw materials. 7—Producer associations (cartels) should be formed for raw materials in addition to oil and copper, and these should cooperate to safeguard their interests against consumer states. 8—Consumer states that have exploited producer states in the past should be made to pay compensation for past exploitation. (An outline for additional coding will be found in Appendix A.)

THE QUESTION OF THIRD-WORLD SOLIDARITY

Analysis and comparison of Tables I and II reveals that Third-World countries, while far from unanimous, were distributed in distinctly different patterns than were either group of developed states. A larger proportion of Third-World than of Western countries fairly consistently took radical positions, even when the bulk of Socialist states did not take such positions. However, developing countries were not consistently more radical than Socialist countries. A higher proportion of Third-World than of Socialist countries took radical positions on six of nine issues in the Sixth Special Session and on four of nine issues in the Seventh. The issues for the earlier session were symbolism, resource allocation, aid, trade, energy, and industrialization and development; for the second session they were symbolism, resources, monetary reform, and energy. In the Sixth Special Session on the resource issue, a two-thirds majority of Third-World countries advocated the promotion of producers' organizations (cartels) or compensation for past exploitation of their resources. Socialist countries, however, were split: 55 percent advocated the permanent national sovereignty of resources and talked in terms of producer-consumer confrontation, while 44 percent advocated producer organizations and compensation for past exploitation. A majority of Western countries, on the other hand, advocated resource development funds, better organization of resource markets, and producer-consumer cooperation. It appears that Third-World countries were much more willing to promote cartels than either group of developed nations; this seemed to be a consistent pattern in both sessions. What is surprising, of course, is the relative conservatism

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of the Socialist states. One might speculate that the Eastern Europeans, being resource importers, were somewhat reluctant to endorse producer cartels; none did so in the Seventh Special Session. In fact, indications have developed in other research that the more radical positions taken by Socialist states in the earlier session were a reflection of the OPEC lead rather than of Soviet dominance.

In the Seventh Special Session, the positions on the resource issue reflected the more moderate atmosphere: majorities of each bloc advocated at least the recognition that individual states held permanent sovereignty over their resources and that these should be treated as diminishing assets. However, more than a third of the Third-World countries went further, continuing to advocate the promotion of producer associations. Why were Socialist states consistently more moderate than the Third World on symbolism, resources, and energy, and why were their positions on aid and trade so moderate in the earlier session? An impression from reading the statements made in the Sixth Special Session was that the trade issue was not very salient to them (hence the liberal positions), and that the issue of aid, like those of resources and energy, tended to put these countries in a difficult position. They probably wanted to side with the Third-World bloc, since the latter was directing most of its attacks at the Western countries; but they are clearly aid donors and—with the possible exception of the U.S.S.R.—resource and energy importers, giving them common interests with the West. There were apparent shifts in pluralities from the Sixth to the Seventh Special Session, but analysis elsewhere has shown that, with one possible exception, these were not due to the influx of 42 new participants in the latter session.[11] Thus the two sessions can be treated as comparable samples, which expands our universe for examining the components of the Third-World "bloc."

The degree of consensus within the blocs has varied over time, but at no time was the Third World so monolithic that there could be no potential disagreement or cleavage. In the Sixth Special Session, the degree of consensus within the Third World (compared by size of majorities or pluralities) was, despite its larger constituency, greater than among the other two blocs on five out of the nine issues. The Third World was also more unified than the Socialist states on a sixth issue, trade.[12] However, most majority positions still amounted to less

[11] Smyth, "A Comparison of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions: A Shift Towards the Center," mimeo (Florida Technological University, June 1976).

[12] It ought to be noted that the developed Western states, despite our negative comments about "bloc" behavior, were more unified than the Socialist states on many issues, and were the most unified in the later session.

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than 70 percent, which indicates disagreement by nearly a third of Third-World participants on almost every issue. To add to this dilution of the "automatic voting bloc," in the Seventh Special Session the Third-World countries were less unified than the other two blocs except on symbolic referents. On all substantive issues except resources, the Western nations were more unified than the Third World. Socialist states were at least as unified as the Third World on all but three substantive issues: multinational corporations, monetary reform, and agriculture. Although this shift in the later session indicates in part a weakening of the Third-World consensus, it also reflects more careful coordination and a conscious seeking of acceptable middle ground by the developed Western nations. On only four issues was there a Third-World majority of less than 60 percent. Although that is lower than in the previous session, it does not represent a complete loss of agreement, especially since the Third World is by far the largest bloc of nations. Nevertheless, the dilution of consensus makes it possible to determine if any consistent cleavages exist within the Third World.

It is of interest to note here that shifts on a number of issues clearly demonstrated that the developing countries and the Socialist bloc did not see eye to eye on a variety of issues. For example, in the Sixth Special Session, the few Socialist states that bothered to comment on the issue of monetary reform took rejectionist or extreme reform positions, such as advocating that Special Drawing Rights (S.D.R.'s) be used to finance development, and that this be a right earned by poor countries by virtue of past exploitation. Only a third of developing countries took radical positions, and most were for a one nation-one vote formula for reorganizing the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). In the Seventh Special Session, a substantial two-thirds majority of developing countries took a variety of radical positions falling into both of the above categories on this issue. That represented a radicalizing shift that was unique in the more moderate later session, in which two-thirds of the participating Socialist states articulated more moderate positions than previously; that is, they moved in the opposite direction, calling for moderate reforms of the International Monetary Fund, such as compensatory financing facilities and a special I.M.F. development fund not explicitly linked to S.D.R.'s. Had the conservative Marxists governing these countries become sufficiently concerned about the stability of the international financial system to publicly eschew all but moderate reform proposals? No other explanation would seem to be available, since it was clearly the Third World that took more moderate positions on other issues in the later session, not the Socialist states; and because it

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was clearly the Third World that was more interested in achieving solutions to these issues than was the largely autarchic Socialist bloc.

EXPLORING THIRD-WORLD CLEAVAGE

An analysis of the more militant positions taken by Third-World countries in the Sixth Special Session in relation to the economic and other attributes of each revealed no single clear line of cleavage that divided them on all the issues. However, two of the nine issue areas were directly related to the degree of dependence on Eastern or Western aid, and four were related to the rate of economic growth experienced in the last decade.

THE EAST-WEST CLEAVAGE

Although, as shown above, Socialist states did not appear to coordinate positions with Third-World countries, there were indications that heavy dependence on aid from the Socialist states or a relative balance of sources of Socialist and Western aid enabled developing nations to take relatively more radical positions rhetorically on foreign aid than their more Western-dependent counterparts (Aid: Table III_1, partial correlation $= -0.3597$, $N = 23$, significance $= .039$, controlled by per capita income; Symbols: Table III_2, Kendall's correlation $= -0.3057$, $N = 26$, significance $= .024$). The nature of substantive proposals favored by neutral and Socialist-dependent states clearly did not follow a Communist line, however; 60 percent of the Socialist states favored nothing more radical than fewer strings attached to bilateral aid, or multilateral aid through established institutions. The kinds of proposals made by the two-thirds of the Third-World countries taking radical positions called for a departure from established aid-giving institutions in favor of newly created ones, in which a Third-World majority would be assured, and for an international development strategy that would be automatic and obligatory. Only two Socialist states took radical positions on aid, but they merely denounced current arrangements as exploitative. The one heavily Western-dependent nation taking a position on the issue simply called for the continuation and expansion of bilateral programs. A similar situation was evident for symbolic referents. In neither case did radical Third-World positions coincide with Socialist positions; relatively balanced aid or dependence on aid from the Socialist bloc did appear to facilitate taking radical positions, while Western aid appeared to pose a constraint. The constraint was weak, however, since 64 percent of the countries receiving some Western aid took radical positions, while

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none of the countries heavily dependent on aid from the Socialist bloc took any but radical positions.

THIRD-WORLD ECONOMIC CLEAVAGES IN THE SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION

The more significant cleavage among Third-World countries appeared to be due to the rate of economic growth experienced by them. However, the effects of a negative or slow rate of growth were contradictory. For resources and symbolism, it tended to be associated with radical positions (Resources: Table III_3, Kendall's correlation = −0.4156, N = 24, significance = 0.006; Symbolism: Table III_4, partial correlation = −.03297, N = 29, significance = 0.035). For the issue of industrial development, slow growth was associated with a variety of nonradical positions (Industrialization and development: Table III_5, Fisher's exact test = .03733). Nevertheless, for these three issue areas there did appear to be a relationship between rate of growth and positions taken in the Sixth Special Session.

To elaborate, 85 percent of Third-World countries with low or negative rates of growth called for radical solutions to resource problems, such as the promotion of producers' cartels and indemnification by the foreign-owned extraction industries for past exploitation. On the other hand, 75 percent of developing nations with moderate to high growth rates made nonradical proposals ranging from producer-consumer agreements and cooperation, through insistence upon treating resources as a diminishing asset over which there was permanent national sovereignty, to an unspecified expectation that producers and consumers had conflicting interests and that confrontation would achieve their resolution (Table III_3).[13]

The relation between growth rates and the issue of industrial development was precisely the opposite. The countries experiencing per capita rates of growth of national income above 3.7 percent per year took relatively more radical positions, such as requiring the multilateral exchange of technical information, the establishment of an international industrialization institute (controlled by the Third World), technological transfers through the Third-World-controlled United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), or the exhortation to others to follow the Chinese example and industrialize by one's own efforts alone. Countries experiencing slow rates of per capita growth were divided (54.5 to 45.5 percent) between more moderate proposals

[13] Symbolic positions varied similarly, when size of country (income) was held constant.

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on the one hand (calling for a redeployment of uncompetitive industries to developing countries, recommending that private investment be made in conformity with a state's development plans, and the promotion of special most seriously affected [M.S.A.] aid programs), and on the other hand, the relatively more radical proposals described above (Table III_4, Fisher's exact test = .03733).

To sum up, in the Sixth Special Session dependence on aid appeared to act as a weak influence upon the positions taken by Third-World delegations on foreign aid programs and on the symbolism they used. While the former issue was probably affected because it was potentially a more direct attack on donors of major aid than on other issues, the weakness of the effect was surprising, since almost 65 percent of the nations receiving a net balance of Western aid took radical positions on foreign aid anyway. The clear ascendance of Third-World militants in this session, and the emergent economic power of OPEC, may contribute to an explanation.

The effect of growth rates was apparently more complex, probably because what was being measured consisted of more substantive concerns than the flexing of muscles represented by aid and symbolism. The radicalism of the more slowly developing countries on the issue of resources may have reflected both the influence of OPEC members as potential donors of aid, and frustration with the low levels of the prices of primary products. On the other hand, the issue of industrialization and development, on which all fast-growing nations agreed on the need for some form of multilateral, Third-World-controlled transfer of technology, may have represented a perception of blockage in the development process by states that were relatively successful in achieving economic growth, but faced difficulties in achieving structural change.

What is significant is that in the Sixth Special Session so few systematic signs of cleavage appeared. For five of the nine issues—multinational corporations, monetary reform, trade, energy, and agriculture—whatever differences appeared were not accounted for by any of the attributes or categories used. Despite the publicized prominence of the OPEC countries, the positions they took publicly did not differ significantly from those of the rest of the Third World on any of the issues. In the Sixth Special Session, the Third World was clearly held together by the force of events and the dramatic changes in world power, which seemed to transcend potentially different interests among them.

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THIRD-WORLD CLEAVAGES IN THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION

The Seventh Special Session was marked by a long period of preparation, a cooling of rhetoric, and a notable attempt by Western leaders and moderate leaders within the Third World to begin a dialogue that would eventually resolve outstanding differences. Some elements within the Third World had come to realize that declarations alone, such as the one proclaiming the New International Economic Order—the result of the Sixth Special Session—would not solve their external problems. What was missing was the necessary agreement of the developed countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that Third-World majorities were smaller; nor, as a consequence, that cleavages within the Third World were more visible. What is surprising, however, is that there were no overriding cleavages cutting across each issue; instead, there was a variety of considerations specific to only a few issues. In fact, on four issues individual delegations appeared to be pulled by at least two different cross-cutting influences. Nevertheless, there were enough cleavages to reveal more about the constituent parts of the Third-World coalition, and perhaps to gain some insights into the motivations underlying most of the positions taken by its members. Rather than detail all of them, however, a few representative issues will be analyzed here. (For a list of all statistically significant relationships, see Appendix B.)

On the issue of resources, delegations of states that had experienced slow rates of growth took relatively radical positions, but these positions were also in part a function of the degree and source of their dependence on aid. Specifically, while only a third of those with more rapid growth rates took relatively radical positions (coded 5 through 8), 72 percent with relatively slow growth rates (minus to 5.9 percent) took such positions (Table IV_1, Fisher's exact test = 0.0435). Statistical control by average rate of growth experienced, however, reveals that countries were probably influenced by East-West considerations as well, since positions taken on resource issues were negatively associated at a significant level with the aid index (partial correlation = .3353, significance = .041). In other words, among countries with equivalent rates of growth, those receiving much Western aid were least likely to take radical positions, while those dependent on high levels of aid from the Socialist states were most likely to take such positions. Since Socialist states were not particularly radical themselves on this issue (see Table II_2), this would seem to mean that dependence on Western aid operated as a constraint upon what a developing country's leaders felt

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they could advocate in this area. Without the influence of Western aid, enthusiasm for producer associations and indemnities for past exploitation of resources would probably have been even greater. However, the influence of the growth rate appears to be the more important relationship.

Similar crosscutting influences are apparent for the issue of industrialization and development. There seems to be a division by region, and also by the degree and direction of dependence on aid. Thus, a preponderance of African and Latin American delegations (78.9 and 71.4 percent respectively) took relatively radical positions, advocating various measures designed to transfer technology multilaterally and automatically, while majorities of Middle Eastern and Asian nations took relatively nonradical positions that stressed either private investment, or special aid for most seriously affected nations (Table IV_3, $x^2 = 9.453$, $df = 3$, significance = at least .025). Operating at the same time, however, were East-West influences. A greater degree of dependence upon Western sources of aid was associated with relatively nonradical positions; conversely, dependence upon Socialist sources was associated with more radical positions (Kendall's correlation = −.2931, significance = .025). In this instance it would seem that dependence upon Western aid encouraged national delegations to take positions similar to their donors (favorable to private industrial development), while dependence on Socialist aid promoted more radical positions—particularly the advocacy of automatic and unilateral transfers of technology more favored by the Socialist states than by developing countries.

A demonstration of the weakness of Western influence and the correspondingly greater influence of Socialist aid was provided by the issue of monetary reform on which, like on industrialization and development, positions were primarily divided by region (Table IV_2, $x^2 = 9.662$, $df = 3$, significant to at least .025). Here, however, the more radical positions were associated with states dependent on Western aid, while the more moderate positions were apparently held by nations dependent upon Socialist aid (Kendall's correlation = 0.2783, significance = .035). The issue of monetary reform had the largest Third-World majority for radical proposals of any of the substantive issues in the Seventh Special Session, and was one of only three in which more Third-World delegations than Socialist states advocated radical proposals (Table II_4). Since over three-quarters of the Western states concurred with two-thirds of the Socialist states in relatively moderate proposals (such as the stabilization of commodity prices through a

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special I.M.F. fund, or a moderate revision of voting formulas in the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.), it would appear that dependence on Western aid had less influence upon positions taken than dependence on Socialist aid. This disparity becomes especially clear when the configurations on monetary reform and on industrialization and development are compared. A smaller proportion of developing countries advocated radical proposals on the latter issue, while a majority of Socialist states did so, and a radical position among Third-World delegations was associated with greater neutrality or dependence on Socialist aid—just the opposite of the monetary reform issue.

The complexity of influences operating upon delegations is illustrated by the contradictory effect of growth rates, depending upon the issue. As in the Sixth Special Session, countries experiencing slow rates of growth tended to take more radical positions on the issues of resources and symbolism, while nations experiencing relatively rapid rates of growth tended to take more radical positions on other issues: monetary reform, and industrialization and development in the earlier session, and regulating multinational corporations (M.N.C.'s) in the later session (Kendall's correlation = 0.4367, df = 18, significance = 0.027). In the later session, a minority of developing states that was only slightly larger than the 25 percent of developed Western states agreed that there should be something more than simple regulation of M.N.C.'s, such as nationalization or, short of that, a transfer of processing operations from developed to developing countries. This minority tended to consist of the more economically dynamic states, which might be explained as a confirmation of the hypothesis that rapid growth tends to radicalize—except that the hypothesis did not hold for any other issue. It is plausible that the most rapidly growing states are also those in which M.N.C.'s have found attractive opportunities for investment or in which their extraction investments have caused rapid and disruptive growth. In either case, greater contact with M.N.C.'s seems to have occasioned more strongly negative reactions, which is borne out by the Latin American experience.

Despite the expectation that a separation between Third and "Fourth" Worlds might emerge, the only significant association between per capita income (the usual division being based on this measure) and substantive positions taken was on the issue of trade. Radical positions were significantly associated with relatively high per capita income (Kendall's correlation = 0.2216, df = 46, significance = .019), but with low levels of national income (Kendall's correlation = −0.2336,

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$df = 46$, significance = .019). National income is unrelated to per capita income, and is more a measure of the size of a national economy than its relative wealth; what appears to be a paradox is thus easily resolved, since smaller states tend to be more dependent upon trade. Therefore, countries were more likely to make radical proposals on trade—such as indexing export to import prices—if they were relatively small and relatively prosperous. Both conditions tend to indicate some dependence upon foreign trade. Larger and less prosperous countries may have been more concerned with commodity agreements and an increase in the volume of trade rather than in price indexing, which would tend to raise the costs of all raw materials in the same fashion as that of oil. Both the Third World and the Socialist states were divided on this issue (see Table II_6); that may be one reason why the United States in the ensuing negotiations agreed only to an "investigation" of the principle of indexing prices.

On all but three issues—aid, energy, and agriculture—significant differentials were found among countries in the Third World. These differentials, although they may be useful in telling us why Third-World countries take certain positions, do not reveal any significant cleavages which consistently divide this large and rather disparate group of states on economic issues. We learn from the varied impact of dependence on aid, of economic growth, and of relative levels of wealth that, while the economic issue areas may not be totally independent of each other, the countries of the Third World have a variety of different interests, or have reacted in different ways to a particular issue. Their reactions depended on the sources of their foreign aid, the degree of success they have experienced in stimulating economic growth, the level of their relative wealth, and the regional context. Not all of these variables are relevant to each issue, and individual variables do not have the same impact on different issues.

It should be stressed again that the positions analyzed above were stated prior to the negotiating process of the Seventh Special Session, but they did appear to represent the relative priorities of the participating delegations. The cleavages noted were the only ones revealed by the data. Despite the impressions of some observers, the OPEC countries did not appear to present any positions that were significantly different from those of the Third World as a whole.[14]

[14] John Ruggie and Branislav Gusovic, "The Seventh Special Session," *International Organization*, xxx (Spring 1976).

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CONCLUSIONS

A variety of factors seem relevant to the positions taken by Third-World delegations in the U.N. Differences between the Third World and developed countries appear to be determined by the basic global economic division. Differentiation within the Third World, however, is much more complex. Clearly, these countries are distinct from both Western and Eastern developed countries, but at the same time they are not homogeneous. Furthermore, while four factors—degree of East-West dependence, growth rate, wealth, and region—seem to differentiate among them on a variety of issues, the impact of these factors is not consistent. For example, it is not possible from the above findings to talk realistically of a "Fourth World" that is clearly different from those states that are relatively better off than the developing countries as a whole. Static wealth does not even appear as a significant variable except in the Seventh Special Session, and rates of growth seem to have inconsistent effects across issues. Furthermore, one cannot say that either the slow-growing or the rapidly growing states are radical on all or most issues. Neither can one say that countries that tend to be dependent on Eastern states for aid are consistently more radical than those that are more dependent on Western aid. Again, it varies by issue; while Eastern-dependent states tended to be more radical on aid and symbolism in the earlier session, and on resources and technological transfer in the later one, they were no more radical than Western-dependent ones on five issues in the later and on seven issues in the earlier session, and were significantly less radical on two issues in the later session.

One thing is clear: none of the hypotheses presented at the beginning of this paper have been decisively confirmed. While there are consistent contrasts between the positions of Third-World countries and Western developed countries, there are also statistically significant cleavages within the Third World on various issues in both sessions; therefore, although the first part of H_1 is confirmed, the second part is not. On the other hand, no consistent cleavages have been revealed for either session, although East-West aid dependency and different rates of growth did recur on a number of issues in both sessions, and cleavage on relative wealth and poverty did recur on several issues in the later session, as did regional differences. Thus, while H_2, H_{2a}, H_{2b}, and H_3 have not been disconfirmed, they have not been confirmed either. No one pattern seems to predominate for all issues or for either session.

Perhaps the most fruitful way to look at the Third World, therefore, is as an overlapping coalition of interests, in which the Latin American

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states, for example, go along with a demand for price indexing to which they are not opposed in principle, in return for support for a radical restructuring of the monetary system, on which they apparently feel more strongly than do other areas of the Third World. Countries that experience political tensions because of poor economic performance may feel more strongly about controlling the exploitation of resources than they do about trade; countries that are highly dependent on external trade in commodities and other agricultural products may not feel very concerned about resource exploitation (they may have no resources), but may be convinced that the terms of trade are consistently stacked against them. Since neither group of countries would necessarily be exclusive of the other or would feel adamantly opposed to the more radical proposals of the other, each has something to offer to the other —i.e., the necessary support to give each group's positions the credibility it would otherwise lack. In other words, the OPEC countries—by some accounts the power behind Third-World solidarity—gained support for the actions taken on oil; in return, especially in the later session, they gave support on issues such as monetary reform and the automatic transfer of technology. Judging by their statements in the later session, they were not strongly in favor of the more forward proposals in these areas; yet they helped to sponsor them in the draft presented by the "Group of 77," and some versions appeared in the final consensus document at the end of the Seventh Special Session. There is speculation, of course, that the OPEC countries had aid to give or to withhold, but it may be that on economic issues it was their example rather than their threats or promises that proved most important. The overlapping nature of the Third World's economic interests may not have produced unanimity, but it facilitated the building of coalitions; conversely, it may make the dismemberment of these coalitions rather difficult.

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TABLE I

ISSUES BY BLOC, SESSION I

	Developed Countries		*Socialist States*		*Third World*		*Total*
I1: SYMBOLS							
Moderate	6	46.2%	4	50%	3	8.5%	13
Radical	7	53.8%	4	50%	32	91.5%	43
Total	13		8		35		56
I2: RESOURCES							
Conservative-Moderate	7	58.3%	0		2	7.1%	9
Liberal	4	33.3%	5	55.6%	7	25%	16
Radical	1	8.3%	4	44.4%	19	67.9%	24
Total	12		9		28		49
I3: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS							
Moderate	5	71.4%	0		9	45%	14
Radical	2	28.6%	8	100%	11	55%	21
Total	7		8		20		37
I4: MONETARY REFORM							
Conservative-Moderate	3	42.9%	0		5	23.8%	8
Liberal	3	42.9%	0		9	42.8%	12
Radical	1	14.3%	3	100%	7	33.4%	11
Total	7		3		21		31
I5: AID							
Moderate	3	23.1%	0		3	9.6%	6
Liberal	8	61.5%	3	60%	7	22.6%	18
Radical	2	15.4%	2	40%	21	67.8%	25
Total	13		5		31		49
I6: TRADE							
Moderate	11	84.6%	4	57.1%	9	37.5%	24
Radical	2	15.4%	3	42.9%	15	62.5%	20
Total	13		7		24		44
I7: ENERGY							
Moderate	7	70%	1	50%	3	21.4%	11
Radical	3	30%	1	50%	11	78.6%	15
Total	10		2		14		26
I8: AGRICULTURE							
Moderate	5	83.3%	1	33.3%	5	100%	11
Radical	1	16.7%	2	66.7%	0		3
Total	6		3		5		14
I9: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT							
Moderate	6	85.7%	1	25%	6	35.3%	13
Radical	1	14.3%	3	75%	11	64.7%	15
Total	7		4		17		28

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TABLE II

ISSUES BY BLOC, SESSION II

	Developed Countries		*Socialist States*		*Third World*		*Total*
II_1: SYMBOLS							
Moderate	4	30.8%	6	66.7%	4	10.8%	14
Radical	9	69.2%	3	33.3%	33	89.2%	45
Total	13		9		37		59
II_2: RESOURCES							
Moderate	2	22.2%	0		3	8.8%	5
Liberal	5	55.6%	6	100%	19	55.9%	30
Radical	2	22.2%	0		12	35.3%	14
Total	9		6		34		49
II_3: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS							
Moderate	3	75%	2	33.3%	17	74%	22
Radical	1	25%	4	66.7%	6	26%	11
Total	4		6		23		33
II_4: MONETARY REFORM							
Moderate	13	76.5%	4	66.7%	16	32.7%	33
Radical	4	23.5%	2	33.3%	33	67.3%	39
Total	17		6		49		72
II_5: AID							
Moderate	8	53.3%	1	11.1%	17	42.5%	26
Liberal	7	46.7%	2	22.2%	11	27.5%	20
Radical	0		6	66.7%	12	30%	18
Total	15		9		40		64
II_6: TRADE							
Moderate	15	71.4%	4	40%	20	41.7%	39
Liberal	5	23.8%	2	20%	9	18.8%	16
Radical	1	4.8%	4	40%	19	39.6%	24
Total	21		10		48		79
II_7: ENERGY							
Moderate	2	100%	1	100%	2	33.3%	5
Radical	0		0		4	66.7%	4
Total	2		1		6		9
II_8: AGRICULTURE							
Moderate	10	71.4%	1	50%	14	63.6%	25
Radical	4	28.6%	1	50%	8	36.4%	13
Total	14		2		22		38
II_9: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT							
Moderate	6	50%	0		21	42.9%	27
Liberal	6	50%	3	42.9%	15	30.6%	24
Radical	0		4	57.1%	13	26.5%	17
Total	12		7		49		68

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TABLE III

THIRD WORLD: ISSUES BY ATTRIBUTE, SESSION I

III$_1$: AID BY AID INDEX

	East		*Neutral*		*West*		*Total*
Moderate	0		2	7.4%	1	100%	3
Radical	3	100%	25	92.6%	0		28
Total	3		27		1		31

III$_2$: SYMBOLS BY AID INDEX

	East		*Neutral*		*West*		*Total*
Moderate	0		1	3.2%	1	100%	2
Radical	3	100%	30	96.8%	0		33
Total	3		31		1		35

III$_3$: RESOURCES BY GROWTH RATE

	Slow		*Fast*		*Total*
Nonradical	3	15%	6	75%	9
Radical	17	85%	2	25%	19
Total	20		8		28

III$_4$: SYMBOLS BY GROWTH RATE

	Slow		*Fast*		*Total*
Nonradical	0		4	40%	4
Radical	26	100%	6	60%	32
Total	26		10		36

III$_5$: INDUSTRIALIZATION BY GROWTH RATE

	Slow		*Fast*		*Total*
Nonradical	6	54.5%	0		6
Radical	5	45.5%	6	100%	11
Total	11		6		17

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TABLE IV

THIRD WORLD: ISSUES BY ATTRIBUTE, SESSION II

IV_1: RESOURCES BY GROWTH RATE

	Slow		*Fast*		*Total*
Conservative-Moderate	7	28%	6	66.7%	13
Liberal-Radical	18	72%	3	33.3%	21
Total	25		9		34

IV_2: MONETARY REFORM BY REGION

	Africa		*Mideast*		*Latin America*		*Asia*		*Total*
Conservative-Moderate	5	25%	5	50%	0		6	60%	16
Liberal-Radical	15	75%	5	50%	9	100%	4	40%	33
Total	20		10		9		10		49

IV_3: INDUSTRIALIZATION BY REGION

	Africa		*Mideast*		*Latin America*		*Asia*		*Total*
Conservative-Moderate	4	21.1%	7	58.3%	2	28.6%	8	72.7%	21
Liberal-Radical	15	78.9%	5	41.7%	5	71.4%	3	27.3%	28
Total	19		12		7		11		49

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Appendix A: Issue Areas

RESOURCES
1. Exploit new sources; fund resource development
2. Organize markets; regulate stocks
3. Producer-consumer cooperation
4. Processing by producers
5. National sovereignty over diminishing resources
6. Producer-consumer confrontation
7. Cartels (producers' organizations)
8. Compensation for past exploitation

MULTINATIONAL (TRANSNATIONAL) CORPORATIONS
1. Positive evaluation
2. Cooperative national regulation
3. Code of conduct
4. International regulation
5. Compensatory strategy to strengthen national firms (public/private)
6. Transfer processing/manufacturing to LDC's
7. Nationalization
8. Nationalization without compensation

SYMBOLS (LAUDATORY CONTEXT)
1. Free enterprise
2. Détente, world peace, cooperation
3. GATT system
4. World Bank, IMF
5. UN System-ECOSOC
6. UNCTAD
7. New International Economic Order; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
8. Group of 77; nonaligned nations

MONETARY REFORM
1. Reorganize IMF for liquidity and balance-of-payments control
2. Special fund for UNCTAD or IMF to stabilize prices of raw materials
3. Voting reorganization: recognize oil nations and power
4. Special IMF buffer stock financing—compensatory
5. Special IMF fund for development
6. SDR's to be linked to development
7. Voting on equitable bases (1 nation–1 vote IMF reorganization)
8. SDR's for development as compensation for past exploitation

AID
1. Private investment and more bilateral
2. More of existing bilateral
3. Grants instead of loans
4. More to MSA's
5. More untied bilateral
6. More multilateral through established institutions/international development strategy
7. Multilateral new funds, controlled by LDC's
8. Denunciation of aid, or aid for past exploitation

TRADE
1. Free trade, eliminate barriers
2. Nondiscrimination on basis of kind of economic-political system
3. Commodity agreements—producer and consumer
4. Negotiate nondiscrimination against LDC manufacturers/processing
5. Nonreciprocal tariff slashes for LDC's
6. Promote trade between developing countries
7. Indexing of LDC prices of exports with DC prices of exports
8. Denunciation of market as exploitative

ENERGY
1. Assure supply, access
2. Develop new sources, kinds (International Energy Fund)

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3. Producer-consumer dialogue
4. Permanent national sovereignty over resources
5. Equitable pricing compared to alternative sources
6. Diminishing resources—priced, produced accordingly
7. Prices to compensate for past exploitation
8. Nationalization

AGRICULTURE

1. Food information—early warning
2. Bilateral food aid; technical aid
3. Food aid target—10 million tons per year
4. IFAD/other new multilateral technical and aid institutes
5. International system of national grain reserves to aid MSA's
6. Multilateral grants for food aid
7. Prevent aid from becoming surplus dumping
8. Food price controls—within means of LDC's

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Private investment and transfer of technology
2. Redeploy uncompetitive DC industries to LDC's
3. Private industries to LDC's in conformity with development plans
4. Special MSA/landlocked country programs
5. International Industrialization Institute—exchange technical information—multilateral
6. UNIDO to promote industrial cooperation, technical transfers
7. UNIDO to become a specialized agency
8. Self reliance—go it alone

Appendix B: Issue-Attribute Relations

SESSION I

Aid by aid index, controlled by per capita income
partial = 0.3597, $N = 25$, significance = .039
Symbols by Aid Index
Kendall's = −0.3057, $N = 26$, significance = .024
Resources by per capita growth rate
Kendall's = −0.4156, $N = 24$, significance = 0.006
Symbols by per capita growth rate, controlled by national income
partial = −0.3297, $N = 29$, significance = 0.035
Industrialization by per capita growth
Fisher's exact test = .03733, positive, rapid more radical

SESSION II

Resources by aid index, controlled by average growth rate
partial = −0.3353, $N = 26$, significance = .036
Monetary reform by aid index
Kendall's = −0.2783, $N = 41$, significance = .036
Industrialization by aid index
Kendall's = −0.3329, $N = 33$, significance = .025
Symbols by per capita income
Kendall's = −0.3329, $N = 33$, significance = .025
Trade by national income
Kendall's = −0.2884, $N = 44$, significance = .026
Trade by per capita income
Kendall's = 0.2923, $N = 44$, significance = .024
MNC's by average growth rate
Kendall's = 0.4367, $N = 18$, significance = .027
Symbols by average growth rate
Fisher's exact text = .0031, slow more radical (negative)
Monetary reform by region
$x^2 = 9.662$, $df = 3$, at least .025
Industrialization by region
$x^2 = 9.453$, $df = 3$, at least .025

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Research Note

POLITICAL GAMING AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING CRISES

By ROBERT MANDEL*

RECENTLY a barrage of criticism concerning foreign policy making during crises has appeared. This criticism focuses on the distorting processes of maneuver and persuasion that characterize the formulation and execution of foreign policy decisions and on the foreign policy makers' distorted perceptions of other states during crises. In this article, I shall evaluate one means—political gaming—which has been used by American foreign policy makers to analyze and reduce these distortions.

I. Problems in Foreign Policy Making during Crises

A widespread consensus concerning the nature of the distortions in decision making during crises prevails in the literature on bureaucratic politics. Allison,[1] Halperin,[2] and Downs[3] agree that bureaucrats and organizations distort information and interpretation of directives to suit their own interests. Steinbruner[4] argues that bureaucrats focus on a single approach in dealing with issues and continue to use it, whether or not it proves effective or appropriate. Holsti[5] as well as Moffitt and

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[1] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971). See also Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 40-70.

[2] Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press 1974).

[3] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown 1967), 266, 272-73.

[4] John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 123.

[5] Ole R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (June 1965), 365. See also Holsti, *Crisis Escalation War* (London: McGill-Queens University

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Stagner[6] explain how these tendencies toward closure and rigidity become more acute during crises on the individual level; Janis[7] and Hermann[8] describe the quick emergence of unanimity among decision-making groups. Pruitt[9] and Lentner[10] identify the reluctance of decision-making groups to seek outside opinions during crises.

Far less agreement on the nature of perceptions during crises is evident in the literature about international images. Boulding,[11] Jervis,[12] and White[13] assert that foreign policy makers exaggerate the hostility of other states and underestimate the hostility of their own nation. But LeVine and Campbell[14] find considerable consensus in the literature about ethnocentrism concerning the notion that perceptions of hostility are reciprocated, that hostile or friendly attitudes between two nations tend to correspond. They also suggest that more warlike nations perceive others as weak ("contrast projection"), and generally concur with the contention of Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen[15] that nations feel more powerful than their enemies, with Jervis's[16] assertion that states overestimate their importance and influence, and with White's[17] belief that nations in conflict exhibit military overconfidence. But LeVine and

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Press 1972), 13. In this study, crises are defined as situations which threaten important national goals, allow a short time for decision, and occur as surprises to policy makers. See Charles F. Hermann, "Time, Threat, and Surprise: A Simulation of International Crisis," in Hermann, ed., *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York: Free Press 1972), 187. The terms "policy makers" and "decision makers" are used loosely to include middle-level government officials.

[6] J. Weldon Moffitt and Ross Stagner, "Perceptual Rigidity and Closure as a Function of Anxiety," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 52 (May 1956), 354-57.

[7] Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972), 198.

[8] Charles F. Hermann, *Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1969), 155.

[9] Dean G. Pruitt, "Problem Solving in the Department of State" (Northwestern University 1961), 60, as quoted in Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VIII (June 1963), 69.

[10] Howard H. Lentner, "The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United States Department of State," in Hermann (fn. 5), 130.

[11] Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), 124-25.

[12] Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 454-79; and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976).

[13] Ralph K. White, *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1970).

[14] Robert A. LeVine and Donald L. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior* (New York: Wiley 1972), 212-23.

[15] David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1967), 8.

[16] Jervis (fn. 12), "Hypotheses on Misperception," and *Perception and Misperception*, chap. ix.

[17] White (fn. 13), 16.

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Campbell admit that writers disagree about whether states view potential enemies as strong ("xenophobic threat") or weak ("ethnocentric superiority").[18] A general consensus does exist that, to themselves, nations exaggerate the clarity of their expressed intentions.[19] Such writers as Rosenblatt[20] and Postman and Bruner[21] agree that perceptual distortions, whatever their specific nature, become more severe under crisis conditions.

II. Professional Use of Political Gaming

To analyze and reduce these distortions, American foreign policy makers introduced political gaming in the late 1950's. Political games are exercises in which teams representing national governments meet and discuss crisis situations presented in scenarios.[22] Since the technique's inception, most of the actual and potential crises in American foreign policy have been the topics of games in which foreign policy makers from high and middle levels of government have participated. Such exercises have taken place at the RAND Corporation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The modern political game was devised by Herbert Goldhamer of the RAND Corporation in 1955–1956 as a means for RAND and Defense Department personnel to learn about political situations and foreign policy decision making.[23] In 1958, Lincoln Bloomfield of M.I.T. modified the RAND exercises and began conducting games involving middle-level foreign policy officials. His purpose was not only to loosen the policy assumptions of the players, but also to develop and test hypotheses about American foreign policy preferences.[24] In 1961, political gaming was initiated by the Cold War Division (now the Politico-Military Division) of the Joint War Games Agency (now the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency) of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs

[18] LeVine and Campbell (fn. 14).

[19] Jervis (fn. 12), "Hypotheses on Misperception," and *Perception and Misperception*, 354-55.

[20] Paul C. Rosenblatt, "Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism and Nationalism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (June 1964), 131-46.

[21] Leo Postman and Jerome S. Bruner, "Perception Under Stress," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 55 (November 1948), 314-23.

[22] Political games are to be distinguished from international relations simulations like the Inter-Nation Simulation, which involves imaginary nations, more structure, and quantification.

[23] Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming" *World Politics*, XII (October 1959), 71-83.

[24] Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Cornelius J. Gearin, "Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age," *Orbis*, XVI (Winter 1973), 1012-13.

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of Staff in the Pentagon. The initial purpose of the Pentagon games, which involve senior officials like the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense, was to improve interagency communication between the new defense intellectuals ("Whiz Kids") in Washington and the older professional military staffs.[25] In 1974, I initiated a series of political games by the Analytical Techniques Group of the Office of Political Research at the Central Intelligence Agency. These games involve personnel primarily from the middle levels of the C.I.A. Their main purpose is to promote greater discussion and communication within the agency.[26]

The political games played at the professional level have a fairly uniform format. Before the game, a "Control" group writes a scenario about a crisis. The game consists of three to six periods of one-to-four-hour sessions. There are generally between two and seven teams; each team consists of three to ten players and usually represents a single country. The Pentagon and RAND games almost always include a team representing the United States and one representing the Soviet Union (called "Blue" and "Red" respectively). During each period, each team decides on its country's move—its actions and contingencies based on its interests and objectives—in response to the situation depicted in the scenario. Between periods, Control writes a new scenario depicting the projected outcome of events in light of the preceding moves, which is presented to the teams at the beginning of the next period. A critique of the issues raised in the game concludes each exercise.

III. Testing the Value of Political Gaming

This article provides the first systematic examination of the accomplishments of professional-level political games in analyzing and reducing distortions in foreign policy making during crises. Four sources of information are used: (1) the four series of political games conducted by Lincoln Bloomfield from 1960 to 1969 with C.I.A. and

[25] Letter from William M. Jones, RAND Corporation, February 26, 1975. A 1964 series of Pentagon games on a projected American bombing of North Vietnam, involving Curtis LeMay, Earle Wheeler, John McNaughton, and McGeorge Bundy, had the startling (at the time) resolution that the bombing would not have much effect. These Vietnam games are described in David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House 1972), 460-62.

[26] While I was a summer intern at the C.I.A., I conducted a game on the Kurd-Iraq-Iran dispute in 1974 and one on a China-Vietnam dispute in 1975. Other C.I.A. games were on the Chile-Peru border dispute and on internal factions in Brazil. These games had a political rather than military emphasis and involved only the roles of foreign actors in foreign crises.

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Defense and State Department personnel;[27] (2) three series of political games conducted by William Jones of RAND from 1974 to 1975 with RAND and Defense Department personnel;[28] (3) a series of tightly controlled experimental political games conducted by the author with students at Yale University in October 1975;[29] and (4) experience and insights from two political games conducted by the author in July 1974 and 1975 with C.I.A. personnel.

The distortions identified in foreign policy making during crises clearly pose an urgent problem. Although beneficial results have been noted both by participants in and observers of professional-level games, there has been no comprehensive, systematic review of these games.[30] Existing psychological theory strongly indicates that the dynamics involved in political gaming can help to reduce and analyze any prevalent distortions. Specifically, numerous experiments in role playing and group dynamics have shown that gaming could draw participants away from their rigid roles, biases, and constraints, and cause them to become more sympathetic to new ideas and outside opinions.[31] Moreover, there are few alternatives to political gaming involving government foreign policy makers which make it possible to analyze current perceptions of these policy makers during crises.[32]

[27] The POLEX, POLEX-DAIS, DETEX, and CONEX series are reviewed here. (POLEX I—which had no government personnel—is excluded.) The games covered many potential crises, including civil strife in Angola, a pro-Castro regime in Venezuela, Chinese infiltration of Burma, and insurgency in India.

[28] Reviewed are the SUPER CRISIS, INTERMEDIATE, and LOW LEVEL series on (respectively) a Soviet invasion of China, Soviet attacks in the Middle East, and tensions between India and Pakistan. Although there are many other RAND political games, the group examined here consists of the unclassified ones RAND deems most worthy of postgame analysis. Most of the games not included are informal "dry runs" with little planning or documentation and with no Defense Department personnel involved.

[29] The Yale games were designed to replicate the C.I.A. game of July 1975 on island disputes between China and Vietnam; a C.I.A. game participant gave a talk on the crisis. The Yale games were conducted to see whether, and how, student games with rigid experimental controls would be similar to professional-level games.

[30] One evaluation of benefits from the early M.I.T. political games is Richard E. Barringer and Barton Whaley, "The MIT Political-Military Gaming Experience" *Orbis*, IX (Summer 1965), 437-58. A recent review of five Pentagon games is Lt. Colonel Joel Snyder, "Measuring the Benefits of Politico-Military Simulations" (unpub., 1974). But these studies and the few attempts to use political gaming to test hypotheses are often flawed by misuse of participants' reactions and demand characteristics, misunderstanding of gaming effects, and ambiguity of indicators.

[31] Examples of role-playing studies are in Alan C. Elms, ed., *Role Playing, Reward, and Attitude Change* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold 1969). Examples of group dynamics studies are in Norman R. F. Maier, *Problem Solving and Creativity in Individuals and Groups* (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. 1970).

[32] For limitations on analyzing perceptions, see Stuart Cook and Claire Selltiz, "A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Attitude Measurement" *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 62

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Two sets of hypotheses can be advanced—that political gaming can reduce certain distortions involved in decision making during crises, and that certain distortions in international perceptions during crises are reflected in political gaming.[33]

The first set of hypotheses reflect the most severe areas of distortion during crises, as well as the areas of effectiveness attributed to political gaming by psychological theories. These hypotheses concern the increased imagination, flexibility, and attentiveness of the participants generated by political gaming as compared to standard operating procedures.

Decision makers involved in a foreign policy crisis

(1) are more likely to exhibit increased imagination by exploring a larger number of policy alternatives;
(2) are more likely to exhibit increased flexibility by simultaneously undertaking a greater variety of distinctly different general approaches to the resolution of policy problems;
(3) are more likely to exhibit increased attentiveness to outside viewpoints by considering a larger number of projected reactions of other actors.

These hypotheses were operationalized in the RAND, M.I.T., and Yale games through a comparison, among the game periods, of the number of policy alternatives, differing general approaches to the resolution of policy problems, and projected reactions of other actors mentioned by the teams. The data were gathered through a content analysis of the appropriate sections of the written team moves.[34] The underlying assumption is that in the first period of a game, performance corresponds closely to that produced by each participant's standard

(July 1964), 36-55; and Ole R. Holsti and others, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: Free Press 1968), 129. Standard methods of attitude measurement (personal interviews, questionnaires, or direct observation), other types of simulation (INS, TEMPER, or PRINCE), and other forms of psychological intervention (such as devil's advocates or T-Groups), have rarely been effective here.

[33] The underlying assumption in advancing these two different sets of hypotheses is that distortions in internal decision making can be reduced through political gaming because they are primarily the result of the particular structural environment in which foreign policy makers normally operate during crises; but distortions in international images can merely be reflected through political gaming because they are the result of deep-seated belief structures that are relatively independent of the decision-making process and the organizational context.

[34] A reliability test was used to check the clarity of the rules for counting the decision-making factors. To assess the significance of the change in these factors across game periods, the F-test was used because both the period and the quantity of each factor are interval variables.

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operating procedures; as the game progresses, his performance increasingly reflects the impact of political gaming.

The second set of hypotheses reflects the theoretical and empirical importance of the perceptions identified in foreign policy crises, as well as the comprehensiveness and lack of ambiguity of these perceptions. During crises, the greatest amount of international misperception occurs in these areas. The hypotheses specifically concern the players' images of states' clarity of communication, hostility, and power during crises. The hypotheses on hostility and power include a distinction between "status quo" and "non-status quo" sides in a conflict: between states seeking to preserve the balance of power and those seeking to upset it.[35] This distinction is useful because the literature on images frequently links various perceptions to the warlike actions of a state. The hypotheses are as follows:

(1) Decision makers involved in a foreign policy crisis are likely to perceive the level of clarity of their own state's expressed intentions toward other states involved in the crisis as being higher than it is perceived to be by decision makers from these other states.

(2) Decision makers from status quo states involved in a foreign policy crisis are likely to perceive their own state's level of hostility and of power toward other states involved in the crisis as being lower than it is perceived to be by decision makers from these other states. Conversely, decision makers from non-status quo states are likely to perceive their own state's level of hostility and of power toward other states involved in the crisis as being higher than it is perceived to be by decision makers from these other states.

To test these hypotheses, each team's perceptions of itself (representing foreign policy makers' images of their own state) were compared to other teams' perceptions of that team (representing foreign policy makers' images of other nations).[36] The differences between these levels are considered separately for status quo and non-status quo states when gauging hostility and power, but not when gauging clarity of expressed intentions. In the RAND and M.I.T. games, the data for these hypoth-

[35] Lincoln P. Bloomfield and others, *User's Manual for CASCON II: Computer-Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflicts* (Cambridge: M.I.T. C.I.S. monograph #C/72-14, September 1972), 12.

[36] These two perspectives are referred to as the "actor" and "observer" perspectives. See Edward E. Jones and Richard E. Nisbett, "The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior," in Edward E. Jones and others, *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press 1972), 93-94.

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eses were gathered through a content analysis of the appropriate sections of the written team moves. In the Yale games, the data were gathered through responses by team members to postperiod questionnaires.[37] The underlying assumption is that each nation distorts its images relative to the perspectives of other nations, regardless of what the "objective" levels are.

In addition to the two sets of general hypotheses, each group of professional-level games tests a special hypothesis.[38] The M.I.T. games examine the impact of the participants' political and military orientations on international perceptions during crises; the RAND games explore the impact of varying levels of crises on these perceptions. The special hypotheses are as follows:

(1–M.I.T.) In a crisis, American foreign policy decision makers with military orientations are likely to perceive the level of United States hostility toward the Soviet Union as being lower than that level is perceived to be by those with political orientations. Conversely, decision makers with military orientations are likely to perceive the level of Soviet hostility toward the United States as being higher than that level is perceived to be by those with political orientations.[39]

(2–RAND) Foreign policy decision makers are more likely to perceive their own state's levels of hostility and power as being greater if their state is directly involved in a major crisis than if it is indirectly involved in a minor crisis. Similarly, they are more likely to perceive other states' levels of hostility and power as being greater if these other states are directly involved in a major crisis than if they are indirectly involved in a minor crisis.[40]

IV. Results of the Evaluation of Political Gaming

Although the findings for the two sets of general hypotheses from the 24 M.I.T., RAND, and Yale games involve a wide variety of topics, contexts, and types of participants, the similarities are sufficient to per-

[37] Three reliability tests were used to check the clarity of the rules for rating the perceptions. To assess the significance of the difference between the perspectives of actors and observers, the Mann-Whitney U-test (standardized by the Z-score) was used because one variable (the team) is nominal and the other (the rating) is ordinal.

[38] A special hypothesis tested in the Yale games showed that results were similar among expert and non-expert student players.

[39] Postperiod questionnaires were administered to DETEX II participants by Lincoln Bloomfield. The roles played by these participants corresponded to their agency backgrounds and were separable into political (State-type) and military (Defense-type) groups.

[40] Perceptions were compared by studying the results of two series of games; the SUPER CRISIS series was compared to the LOW LEVEL series.

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mit some general conclusions. The first set of hypotheses was clearly supported by the evidence, which showed that the imagination, flexibility, and attentiveness of the participants in the games increased significantly as the games progressed—as indicated by the number of considered policy alternatives, differing general approaches to the resolution of policy problems, and projected reactions of other actors. The second set of hypotheses was also clearly supported by the evidence which showed that status quo teams view themselves as being significantly less hostile and powerful than they appear to other teams; that non-status quo teams view themselves as being significantly more hostile and powerful than they appear to other teams; and that all the teams viewed their own expressed intentions as being significantly clearer than they appear to the other teams.

The "United States" team in one of the M.I.T. games provided an example of the increased imagination generated by political gaming. This team progressed in its search for multilateral aid in settling a dispute between Algeria and Morocco from its first-period desire for a general arms embargo to a wide range of diverse actions in later periods: raising the crisis issue at U.N. and NATO meetings; asking the U.S.S.R. and France to support O.A.U. mediation; suggesting the introduction of international observer forces in a demilitarized zone between Algerian and Moroccan troops; and supporting a Canadian proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the area and a Soviet proposal for a cease-fire (as well as pressing for U.N. and Moroccan acceptance of these proposals).

The "United States" and "Soviet Union" teams in one of the RAND games provided an example of the distortions in images of hostility and power reflected through political gaming. Despite a relentless Soviet attack on Iran and Saudi Arabia, the "United States" team (the status quo side) consistently underestimated—relative to the Soviet-team's self-perceptions—the uncooperativeness, belligerence, and determination in the Middle East of the "Soviet Union" (the non-status quo side). This misperception was most graphically highlighted in the game by naive American support for a Soviet proposal which might have temporarily stopped the fighting in the area, but which would have given the U.S.S.R. control of oil in the region. The "Soviet" team, on the other hand, exaggerated—relative to the "American" team's self-perceptions—American antagonism and the possibility of large-scale American retaliation against the Soviets, thereby substantiating the hypothesis on status quo/non-status quo perceptions. This misperception was displayed by the "Soviet" team's plea to European states in

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the first game period to restrain the United States, while the "United States" team was in fact about to suggest a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. regional agreement in the second game period.

The evidence from the M.I.T. and RAND games also supported the two special additional hypotheses. The data on political-military orientations showed that the military members on each team viewed the United States as being significantly more cooperative and trustworthy (the two dimensions of hostility considered here), and the Soviet Union as significantly less cooperative and trustworthy than did the political members on each team. In addition, the evidence on varying levels of crisis showed that teams representing states directly involved in a major crisis viewed their own state and other states as being significantly more hostile and powerful than did teams representing states indirectly involved in a minor crisis.

V. Applicability of Political Gaming to Research and Policy

Political gaming can be useful as a vehicle both for academic researchers—to test theories in international relations, and for government policy makers—to improve the foreign policy decision-making process.

The evaluation of the second set of general hypotheses on international perceptions during crises, supplemented by the special studies comparing differences between political and military participants and between high-and low-level crises, shows that several theories in international relations can be readily tested and refined through evidence from political games. Participation of actual foreign policy makers in these games makes the perceptions reflected of special interest to scholars.[41] The findings on hostility and power appear especially important because they modify widely accepted contentions.

The present inquiry qualifies Boulding's and Jervis's assertion that most countries tend to understate their own hostility and to overstate that of others. Although this contention may be valid for a status quo state viewing another status quo state, the findings here indicate that a non-status quo state sees itself as more hostile than others see it. While these results may seem somewhat counterintuitive, it appears quite reasonable for decision makers engaged in aggressive actions in a crisis to justify their own state's actions by (internally) emphasizing

[41] The similarity of expert and non-expert results in the Yale games and the similarity of the results of the Yale games to those of the M.I.T. and RAND games indicate that players at the professional level may not always be needed to draw valid conclusions from the games.

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and exaggerating its animosity toward its enemies. This evidence does not refute the notion from the theory of ethnocentrism that hostile attitudes are reciprocated; but the data do reveal that, even if hostile attitudes are reciprocated, the levels of reciprocation can be quite different. For example, the flow of hostility may often be greater from a non-status quo state to a status quo state than vice versa.

The study similarly refines prevailing theories about perceptions of power. The notion from the theory of ethnocentrism that more warlike states perceive others as weak is corroborated only in part. The data show that a non-status quo state would indeed exaggerate its own power and thus may often see other states as weaker than itself, but they also demonstrate that any state would perceive status quo states as stronger than these states see themselves. Although this finding may also seem counterintuitive, a status quo country may well consistently understate its own power relative to the perceptions of other countries. The identification of two distinct patterns of perception of power helps to resolve the theoretical disagreement noted by LeVine and Campbell over whether states view potential enemies as weak or strong. The broad generalization by White, Jervis, and Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen—that actors exaggerate their own power and influence—is shown by the present data to apply only to non-status quo states.

Perhaps the most notable theoretical implication of these perceptual findings is in the area of deterrence theory. It is widely accepted that deterrence depends entirely on perceptions of capabilities rather than on the capabilities themselves;[42] George and Smoke have concluded that both the theory and the practice of deterrence at the crisis level need much further development.[43] The present findings—through identification of the prevalent perceptual distortions relating to hostility, power, clarity of expressed intentions, political-military orientations, and levels of crisis—help to refine the understanding of the signalling process used in crisis deterrence. For example, if a foreign policy maker knows more precisely under what conditions adversaries would tend to overstate or understate his country's power, it can help him decide when a show of force can be used to maintain deterrence.

The material on international images also helps to refine theories relating to the other major focus of this study—the process of decision making during crises. This process appears to be directly influenced by

[42] See John Raser, "Theories of Deterrence," *Peace Research Reviews*, III (February 1969), 14.

[43] Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press 1974), 44-45.

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international perceptions. For example, this study's findings on clarity of expressed intentions suggest a severe inability by the United States to understand the expressed intentions of another state. Such a tendency can lead to increased internal distortion by foreign policy making offices or agencies because unclear communications permit a wider latitude for varying interpretations of the other state's policy among bureaucratic factions involved in the process. The material on hostility suggests severe exaggeration by the United States of the hostility of other status quo states, and underestimation of its own hostility (since, in the games reviewed, the United States was always a status quo state). These tendencies can cause American decision makers to distort their reporting of information, and can influence their choice of offices or agencies that are to participate in a given crisis decision. For example, if a crisis involves the Soviet Union in a status quo role, the tendency of American decision makers to exaggerate Soviet hostility may cause them to emphasize information supporting this perception, and may affect their desire to have military offices and agencies participate in the decision-making process. The tendency of the United States to exaggerate the power of other status quo states and to underestimate its own may cause similar distortions in a crisis.

The foregoing are but a few examples of potential theoretical refinements that could be discovered and tested through political gaming, which in turn could lead to further interesting research using gaming and other techniques.[44] Apparently, the principal restriction on the types of hypotheses that can be tested through political gaming is that they be hypotheses about general processes or perceptions rather than specific context-dependent, policy-predicting, or event-forecasting hypotheses.

It has been argued that the findings from games are not closely related to "real-world" findings due to the artificialities of the game structure. But this contention appears to be highly unlikely. In political gaming involving government officials, the foreign policy decision makers themselves are the team members; as little structure as possible is imposed in order to reduce the differences from the participants' normal working environment. In a government crisis, the same narrowing of attention on the issue takes place; the information available may be scanty and may therefore prevent a realistic depiction of the situation by the participants; and sessions may be similar in length to game moves. When professionals are involved, a serious crisis atmos-

[44] Several government analysts mentioned that more research on international perceptions would be useful in their own work.

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phere is likely to be maintained because the participating bureaucrats know that reports of the games may be read by their superiors.

The evaluation of the first set of hypotheses on changes in the decision-making process induced by political gaming shows that the process of analysis among government officials can be improved by this technique. The changes in imagination, flexibility, and attentiveness appear to be important improvements not only because of their intrinsic desirability, but also because they often lead to improvements in the quality of the crisis analyses written at the conclusion of the games.[45] These benefits may accrue not only to team members themselves but also—to a limited extent—to observers and the members of Control, who learn from watching the disagreements among team members, the misperceptions among the teams, and the surfacing of new policy alternatives.

Would these results or even more fruitful ones occur in the course of routine decision-making procedures? One might argue that if the same group of analysts who participated in a political game were simply gathered together in a room for a discussion of the issues, similar results would emerge, but this contention appears to be highly unlikely. During a crisis, analysts from the various offices in a government agency often do get together in informal settings or task forces to discuss the issues. Such discussions, however, do not yield improvements in decision making of the sort generated by political games because of a number of inhibitions: Although analysts often sense basic differences in perspective among themselves or limitations in others' views of the range of policy contingencies, they do not argue them out because they feel (1) that others simply cannot be convinced to change their viewpoint; (2) that others (or they themselves) might feel personally hurt or threatened; (3) that it might prove overly difficult, and therefore not worth the effort, to try to refute the arguments of others; or (4) that the necessary good working relationship with others might be destroyed. The analysts' normal discussions largely consist of a kind of easy rhetoric and safe generalization not conducive to fruitful analysis. Psychological experiments have shown that such patterns are pervasive in the absence of an intervention technique like political gaming. Moreover, because of the lack of productivity of ordinary group discussions and the analysts' belief that they alone are the real experts on the issue, they prefer in many cases simply to write their analyses with little if

[45] A number of government analysts who participated in the C.I.A. games commented spontaneously on this improvement.

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any consultation with others. The results of this tendency appear to be even less fruitful than group discussions.[46]

In many of the games involving government officials, the lack of routine confrontation of differing perspectives and the narrowness of policy alternatives considered under routine conditions were vividly displayed in two ways. Many participants expressed shock about some of the views held and the policy options suggested in the games. Frequently, the first moves taken in the first period of the games represented the culmination of months or even years of analysis of a general area of tension by the game participants using their standard operating procedures. By the time the exercises ended, these participants invariably found these first moves to be grossly incomplete and occasionally totally inappropriate. Thus, routine processes of decision making have clearly not produced the kinds of improvements induced by political gaming in decision making during crises.

Under what conditions is political gaming most appropriate? My experience and discussions with professional-level gaming directors and participants suggest two criteria: (1) Within any participating agency, a high level of up-to-date, comprehensive, and accurate data on ongoing crises is necessary for the development of political games that are realistic and plausible. (2) A high level of compartmentalization among participating offices within an agency, or poor communication among a group of participating agencies, both of which tend to amplify distortions in decision making, would indicate a need for the structured cross-office or cross-agency contact provided in political gaming.

Some may fear that gaming would decrease the differences in viewpoints among offices or agencies, and thereby negate a basic goal involved in creating separate offices or agencies. However, the tendency of political gaming is not to cause a participating official to abandon his office's or agency's viewpoint completely and to assume another's. Rather, these exercises cause each participant to develop new perspectives and to explore new alternatives that are not necessarily similar to any other viewpoint expressed in a game, and that are highly individualistic.

Political gaming appears to be most useful for considering ongoing or

[46] The insights in this section are drawn from the author's discussions with middle-level government analysts and from his observation of their interaction and modes of behavior during their routine working conditions.

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imminent foreign policy crises. Psychological experiments have indicated that improvements in decision making that are generated by political gaming may be only temporary. However, in ongoing or imminent crises, these improvements need to last only long enough to influence the content of the analyses and recommendations written by government officials. Problems of time lapse and memory failure are thus eliminated. Even if the changes generated by a game were to last only one week, for example, that time would still be sufficient to affect current analyses written on the crisis. These changed analyses, in turn, might well alter in some slight way the immediate decisions made by the director of the agency, or by the President. Admittedly, for some crises the decision time would be too short to allow for the application of political gaming; but other issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, are continuing sources of tension. In these cases, sufficient time is available to consider ways of coping with possible future escalations by means of political gaming.

The choice of the level of government participants for political games seems to depend on the goal of a particular exercise. If the objective is to improve the analyses that individual area specialists send to the director of their agency and to reduce the influence of intra-organizational distortions on their work, the games should be played by middle- and lower-level experts such as those who participated in the C.I.A., RAND, and M.I.T. exercises. If, on the other hand, the objective is to improve the output of the agencies as a group and to reduce susceptibility to inter-organizational distortions (to which the output from the lower level is still subject after an agency's director reviews it and passes it upward), the participants should be top-level officials like those in the Pentagon games.

In general, the participation of very senior government personnel can be detrimental because of their lack of detailed expertise on any given crisis issue and because of the tendency of lower-ranking participants to be reluctant, even in a game, to oppose or contradict a much more senior participant. However, William Jones of RAND, who has extensive experience conducting government games on both levels, has found no significant difference between senior-level and middle-level games played on any given foreign policy crisis.[47] An informal comparison between the Pentagon and the C.I.A. games has led me to the same conclusion.[48]

[47] Interview, January 8, 1976.

[48] The highly classified transcripts of the Pentagon games were examined by the author while he was an intern at the C.I.A.

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To determine the applicability of political gaming to either research or policy, some significant costs should also be considered. Some of the more elaborate Pentagon games may cost up to $5000 each (mostly to pay for the participants' time); a game may last up to two weeks, with move periods taking several hours; the background preparation for a game may require six months or several hundred hours; and up to fifty participants (including team members and Control) may be involved.[49] At the other end of the scale, some of the C.I.A. games lasted only six and one-half hours, required only about fifty hours of background preparation, involved only nine participants, and entailed little "real" cost, since the participants, who were members of the agency, considered the game part of their normal work schedule. The costs are clearly variable depending on the type of political game and the participants.

Perhaps the greatest single cost is one of talent rather than money—the writing of appropriate scenarios for the games. A scenario which is both realistic and provocative calls for delicate compromises. The timing of the use of scenario "goads" to induce participating teams to take certain actions or to consider certain issues has to be carefully regulated by the Control group; otherwise, team members may perceive Control, rather than an opponent in the crisis, as the real "enemy." A scenario writer also has to make a number of complex decisions about the amount of time covered. Projecting a scenario too far into the future (for example, more than five years) may diminish the value of involving participants who are experts on the current state of a crisis.[50] The major cost involved in designing a scenario is thus the difficulty of obtaining experts in the field.

Political gaming merits greater use in both academic research and government policy making. Further study and refinement are necessary to delimit more precisely the specific conditions under which the technique is most appropriate. Moreover, the modifications that I have suggested for existing theories of international crises will also require more exploration to define the limits to which they may be generalized.

[49] Bloomfield and Gearin (fn. 23), 1026.

[50] For a discussion of the state of art, see Peter DeLeon, *Scenario Designs: An Overview* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Paper Series, #R-1218-ARPA, June 1973), v.

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Review Article

BRAUDEL'S MEDITERRANEAN: *Un Défi Latin*

By JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Trans. by Siân Reynolds. New York, Harper & Row, Vol. I, 1972, 648 pp.; Vol. II, 1973, 727 pp.; each vol. $17.50 cloth, $4.95 paper.

I

BY 1966, when the revised French edition appeared, historians concerned with early modern Europe had come to recognize Fernand Braudel's opus as a classic. In the four years since the English translation has become available, a much broader circle of historians has acclaimed the work as the herald of a new historiography. The translation—a triumph of fluency and fidelity—has appeared at a time when historiography in the English-speaking countries is ready for new concepts and techniques. To a large extent these (particularly the concern for quantification) have infiltrated from the analytic social sciences. That origin has, it seems, made many historians suspicious. Because Braudel is a historian *par excellence*, the manifold novelties of his work may be received more readily. The book's impact will, over the years, be stronger because it is the most prestigious exemplar of a systematic effort to develop a new historiography, the *Annales* approach. What is not so readily apparent is that the *Annales* school—with Braudel's work at once its culmination and its best introduction—has much to offer to social scientists outside the historical profession. As long ago as 1928, Marc Bloch, who was to be a founder of the *Annales* in the following year, discussed one element of the new approach, the comparative method, in terms still highly pertinent to comparative politics as well as to comparative history. "More capable of rigorously classifying and criticizing common features, it can hope to attain conclusions both much less hypothetical and more precise" by (1) revealing factors evident in one society but difficult to distinguish in an otherwise similar society because they are effective at a deeper level; (2) tracing interaction of groups in one society in a manner permitting inference to

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similar interaction in a neighboring society; and (3) identifying influences due entirely to diffusion.[1]

From one point of view, Fernand Braudel's life work has been an application of Bloch's prescription. Spatially, *The Mediterranean* is a vast canvas on which developments in individual societies are elucidated by detailed comparison with their neighbors—some of them well beyond the conventional boundaries of the Mediterranean area—and diffusion of cultural traits is carefully examined. Nevertheless, like Bloch and other core members of the *Annales* school, Braudel remains within the historical framework by imposing some chronological as well as spatial limits on his subject. Nominally *The Mediterranean*, as the title indicates, treats only a portion of the sixteenth century. Hence one cannot expect Braudel's work to contain the nomothetic emphasis that analytic social scientists might desire. Essentially he is concerned with examining individual phenomena in depth through the illumination provided by the *methods* of the social sciences rather than with presenting a *theory* of history or international relations.

But what a conception of "depth" Braudel has! "I hope too that I shall not be reproached for . . . my desire and need to see on a grand scale. . . . 'It is fear of great history which has killed great history,' wrote Edmond Faral in 1942. May it live again!" (I, 22). Thus, in his search for understanding, Braudel extends his "sixteenth century" back to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and forward to the Thirty Years' War, thereby encompassing virtually two centuries. For his "environmental" examination, far longer periods are explored: at times his comparisons range as far afield as the seizure of Marrakesh in 1912 (the last feat of nomadism), the French wars of religion, the Chinese civil war of the 1920's, and the parallel between the financial expertise of "developed" sixteenth-century societies and the industrial expertise of nineteenth-century Western societies (I, 179, 370, 511).

II

Braudel's comparisons over time and space afford much instruction—as well as considerable concrete data—for contemporary efforts to provide a developmental dimension for social theory. His concern (not always successful) for attaining conceptual clarity at the outset of his analysis is notable. Thus he cogently comments that "the question of boundaries is the first to be encountered; from it all others flow. To

[1] Bloch, "Pour une Histoire Comparée des Sociétés Européennes," reprinted in Bloch, *Mélanges Historiques*, I (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N. 1963), 18 ff.

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draw a boundary around anything is to define, analyze, and reconstruct it, in this case select, indeed adopt, a philosophy of history" (I, 18). For Braudel, boundaries in time (periodization) are, as suggested above, at least as important as boundaries in space—both subjects that analytic social scientists are still only beginning to confront.[2] Braudel sees historical time as interrelated scales of geographical, social, and individual time—"*total history*, written in three different registers, on three different levels, perhaps best described as three different conceptions of time" (II, 1238).[3]

In treating his first "register," the environmental, Braudel follows the great tradition (so strong in France in contrast to the United States) of relating geography to both history and the analytic social sciences. Political scientists are, of course, aware of the extent to which French political and social investigators have used cartographical presentations as a kind of correlation analysis, although they have increasingly turned to more complex mathematical techniques of correlation. Analyses of international relations have, in the United States as well as in Europe, commonly embraced the specifics of geography. The French tradition, however—derived from the nineteenth-century geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache and his great contemporary, the historian N. D. Fustel de Coulanges—implies a more profound concern for geographical influences which North American scholars, given the erratic distribution of professional geographic skills in the great universities, have often missed. Geography, with its focus on the particular as well as the nomothetic, clearly constitutes a bridge between traditional historiography and the analytic social sciences.[4] This linkage is apparent throughout the work of the *Annales* scholars, but nowhere more sharply than in the Braudel opus, which devotes the first 355 pages to physical and social geography. At times the author does seem to be carried away by this aspect of his subject; although consistently fascinating, not all of this vast preliminary exposition is really essential to his thesis. Occasionally, too, his reading of secondary sources traps Braudel

[2] See especially the anthropological approach in Frederik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget 1969).

[3] The tripartite time perspective pre-dates publication of Lawrence Durrell's *The Alexandria Quartet*, which also takes the Mediterranean as its subject. Braudel (II, 1239) recognizes his kinship to Durrell.

[4] This is particularly evident in combining maps and chronology to trace diffusion. As David Collier and Richard E. Messick have recently demonstrated (using similar techniques), the diffusion variable is significant in explaining the distribution of institutional phenomena, despite "the very unequal attention [accorded this factor] in political research." See "Prerequisites versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption," *American Political Science Review*, LXIX (December 1975), 1299.

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in misleading simplification. Thus he ascribes Arab failure in conquering Anatolia, as contrasted to Turkish success, to the dromedary's unadaptability to the cold climate (I, 96). The geographer Xavier de Planhol, Braudel's principal authority, qualifies this generalization, however, by pointing out that the Turks adapted the dromedary to Anatolia by pursuing earlier experiments in crossbreeding it with the Bactrian camel.[5] In other words, climate (as Braudel readily concedes elsewhere) was a significant but not a determining factor.

Much more important than such lapses are Braudel's innovations in relating environmental to social elements. He is especially strong in techniques of demographic analysis; for instance, in using tax collection statistics as an indicator of population distribution in Castile. Most impressive are his techniques for converting conventional geographic space into spatial categories that are meaningful for the societies he treats. For example, by intricate analysis of the time it took news to travel in expanding circles centered on Venice (I, 366), or the time required for movement of armies from Spain to the Low Countries (II, 838), he portrays a sixteenth-century space with configurations vastly different from those one sees on a modern map.[6] Braudel is able to utilize such techniques because of his complete mastery of the data base, derived from his familiarity with secondary sources (including many unpublished materials prepared by his associates or assistants), as well as his own extensive archival research. Social scientists endeavoring to extend the longitudinal dimensions of their analyses will, ordinarily, have to rely on secondary sources more than he does. But Braudel, too, cannot directly utilize certain major documentary collections, notably the Ottoman archives. His frankness and common sense in recognizing the historian's need to resort to secondary sources for major aspects of a vast subject are refreshing. Just as welcome are his astringent remarks on the practical limitations in replicating expensive investigations of the same phenomenon (such as the speed of communications just noted) for different but essentially similar chronological periods.

III

If geography constitutes the major disciplinary framework for the first quarter of Braudel's work, economics provides the basic analytic tools for the central portion. Chapter I of this second part is entitled "Economies: The Measure of the Century." By that point, however,

[5] *Le Monde Islamique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires 1957), 63 ff.

[6] These maps are only 2 of the 68 graphs, charts, and maps supplementing the text.

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Braudel has already introduced a wealth of theoretical typologies related to economics. Some typologies, like the extended discussion of nomadic, transhumant, and sedentary populations, plainsmen and mountaineers, link geography and economics. The interesting discussion of functional types of cities also touches a major concern of contemporary economic geography (I, 323). So does the elaborate discussion of urban-rural relations (I, 185, 210, 337), in which Braudel comes close to the view that Mediterranean peoples have had a distinctive affinity (as contrasted to Northern Europeans) for city life.[7] More specifically drawn from economics are such hypotheses as Paul Mantoux's that industry is created and fostered by commerce (I, 319). Above all, Braudel's hope (he realizes it cannot at present be attained) for a quantitative model of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean economy, comparable to the national accounting models essayed by contemporary economists, shows how strongly he is attracted to the concepts and methods of economics (I, 419). Where he finds them feasible, he devotes much effort to constructing partial quantitative models relevant to his investigation, such as the analysis (I, 424-27) of the shares of Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean grain in commercial circulation.

The fundamental purpose behind Braudel's concern with economics is to understand what "the economic apparatus of the sixteenth century was, what limits it imposed upon man's achievement, before studying what man actually constructed—or tried to construct" (I, 355). Here, as in his reliance on geographic analysis ("It is worth repeating that history is not made by geographical features, but by the men who control or discover them" [I, 225]), he hastens to reject determinism. Consequently, the sweeping criticism that, "Seduced by the actions of mountains, plains, and bodies of water, Braudel confers the functions of actors in human history on natural elements and population statistics," appears to be unjustified.[8] The problem of economic determinism is, however, rather different for a historian of a limited chronological period (particularly one in which technological change was slow) and a social scientist seeking to correlate factors in contemporary processes. Braudel regards economic factors as *limits* imposed by circumstances upon conscious human action. In the short term, since economic resources were fixed (or, what usually amounted to the same

[7] This position is advanced by Edith Ennen, *Frühgeschichte der europäischen Stadt* (Bonn: Röhrscheid 1953), 111 ff., 225 ff. (not cited by Braudel).

[8] Américo Castro, *The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History*, trans. by Willard F. King and Selma Margaretten (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 7. Castro also sharply differs with Braudel on the substantive question of expulsion of the Moriscos and Jews.

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thing, were *perceived by contemporaries* as fixed), they can be taken as givens outside the realm of conscious political action. Over intermediate chronological ranges, to be sure, these limits were somewhat extended by technological innovation. Thus, land transportation increased in relative importance toward the end of the sixteenth century, although its revolutionary impact was still distant (I, 284). In some areas (notably Castile) better transportation *permitted* the development of strong, centralized government—hence the role of Philip II as a distinctly Spanish monarch, in contrast to his perambulatory father, Charles V (I, 55; II, 674 ff.).[9] However, since such technological change as occurred was almost entirely the work of anonymous, "unconscious" individuals or groups, the role of the political actor remains, for Braudel, subordinate: "these statesmen were, despite their illusions, more acted upon than actors" (I, 19).

The acting forces were undoubtedly social rather than geographic or environmental, but what kind of social forces does Braudel see as decisive? Here the clarity of his analysis falters. Most conspicuously absent is an emphasis on ideas or even literary and art forms. Yet it is by no means certain that Braudel intends to exclude such factors except as a matter of scholarly division of labor. He dedicates his work to Lucien Febvre (the founder, with Bloch, of the *Annales*), and explicitly models part of his own methodology on Febvre's intellectual history (I, 355). Superficially, Braudel's dominant social forces can be identified as economic groups. In his crucial effort to establish the chronological limit of Mediterranean predominance, Braudel writes that "the most indicative dates are perhaps 1620–1630, when the Portuguese *marranos* were installed at the heart of Spain's finance . . . often the straw men of northern capitalism" (I, 229). This finding would seem to accord with his concern for the dominance of financial over political or administrative skills. The generalization also fits in with his preoccupation with class relations—particularly the fragility of the Mediterranean bourgeoisie because of its tendency to assimilate to the nobility (I, 511; II, 726). He even advances the fairly long-range theory that a succession of political structures arose from alterations in the limits of economic resources—"what an economist would call the political enterprise of optimum dimensions" (II, 702). In the fifteenth century, "were these narrow units and medieval economies adequate for the pressures of the new age?" (I, 332, 339). Thus city states de-

[9] But Philip II's sedentary rule was also made possible by *political* circumstances in France, which allowed him, in contrast to Charles, access to direct routes to his possessions in the Netherlands and Italy (I, 372).

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clined; at first they were replaced by territorial states of moderate size.[10] By the sixteenth century, however, the latter were threatened by the "monster states"—first, abortively, France, then the Hapsburg and the Ottoman Empires (II, 657). As economic depression succeeded expansion at the close of the century, these empires in turn declined before a new age of territorial states.

In spite of these conclusions, which come close to constituting a general theory of political evolution, Braudel explicitly questions the validity of the underlying economic interpretation: "Neo-materialism is an inviting path. How valid is it as an approach? . . . For there is no single conjuncture; we must visualize a series of overlapping histories, developing simultaneously. It would be too simple, too perfect, if this complex truth could be reduced to the rhythms of one dominant pattern" (II, 892). At this point, Braudel is moving from economic analysis to a concern with culture or civilization which he apparently considers causal at a more fundamental level. Behind both economic and political change, he writes, "the single decisive factor was the restless energy of the West" (II, 679). This is not the kind of explanation that a social scientist can feasibly define, much less test. Other formulations ("All civilization can be defined as a struggle, a creative battle against the odds" [II, 1239]), will frustrate the social scientist in the same way that Arnold Toynbee's metaphoric language did a generation ago. Even Braudel's basic criterion, "permanence," is hard to define objectively: "Neither by brute force, whether conscious or unconscious, nor by casual force, allowing itself to be directed by the accidents of history, nor even by propaganda, however widely disseminated and eagerly received, can one civilization make appreciable inroads on the territory of another. A pattern is there too firmly from the start" (II, 757).

IV

In spite of these reservations, one must follow Braudel into the thickets of cultural definition, for his work is incomprehensible without an understanding of his concept of distinctive civilizations. The deeper one plunges into this massive treatise, the clearer it becomes that the author is motivated not only by the desire, common to *Annales* scholars, "to write a new kind of history," but by an ardent wish to revise our understanding of the critical epoch of modern history which he treats. At a very explicit level this revisionism consists of an effort to re-

[10] Braudel's hypothesis that the territorial state could advance where cities were not too numerous or rich resembles that of Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), 576 ff.

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establish the Mediterranean countries as the formative component of modern civilization. It is this intention that explains, from the substantive as contrasted to the purely methodological standpoint discussed above, Braudel's concern for periodization, for locating the precise moment when "the greatness of the Mediterranean" passed to Northern Europe. Again, though, there is a certain ambiguity. Braudel emphasizes "the unity and coherence of the Mediterranean region," the interpenetrability of the great conflicting Hapsburg and Ottoman polities; a certain continuity in traditions and way of life persisted from Roman times or earlier. Yet Christian and Moslem lands surely constituted, in his concept of civilizations, distinct realms. Nor is this all: "It is essential then to accept that there are civilizations of the diaspora type"—made up of Jews, Armenians, Moriscos, etc.—widely distributed throughout the Mediterranean region, yet retaining their distinctive habits, traditions, emotional ties, in addition to (and sometimes after the disappearance of) their peculiar religions and languages (II, 804 ff.). Sensitivity to this kind of civilization is obviously intimately related to the continuing salience of familial ties in commerce (I, 445). If, then, one reconsiders his emphasis on financial expertise and the changing balance between the Mediterranean and the North, it is possible (Braudel never fully clarifies the matter) that the ostensibly economic mechanisms that he identifies as circumscribing political action are themselves the product of more profound cultural trends.

In the final analysis, too, the Islamic world (Arab or Turk) is not, if I read him correctly, fully "Mediterranean" for Braudel because it represents, at least in part, the alien element in "the conflict between the Mediterranean and the neighboring desert . . . the clash between two economies, civilizations, societies, and arts of living" (I, 180). Here Braudel again accords with Lawrence Durrell who (with the novelist's disdain for a facade of objectivity) distinguishes between the "right" and "wrong" sides of the Mediterranean.[11] I have little doubt that Braudel (although in the preface to the first edition [I, 17], he calls himself a "northerner" who has loved the Mediterranean all the more for that accident of origin) identifies with the Latin civilization of the Western Mediterranean.[12]

[11] Durrell, *The Alexandria Quartet* (New York: Dutton 1962), *Justine*, 31.

[12] Perhaps deliberately, Braudel never fully confronts the ambiguous position of France between the North and the Mediterranean. For example, he notes that Catholics of the *Franche Comté* are repelled by the excesses of "southern piety" (II, 765). The ambiguity is particularly important because northern Frenchmen have led the astonishing French economic, political, and intellectual recovery after World War II, whereas the Mediterraneans were more often cast in the role of opposition. (It has been noted that the anti-DeGaulle votes in 1965 almost coincided with the thirteenth-century areas of Albigensian domination.)

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> In the sixteenth century there was a Latin civilization (I have reservations about calling it Christian) the sturdiest of all the civilizations to struggle for command of the sea: expanding, it advanced through the Mediterranean region and beyond, into the depths of Europe, towards the Atlantic and the Iberian *Ultramar*. The spread of Latin culture, dating back over several centuries, was felt as much in shipbuilding—which the Italians, masters of the craft, taught the men of Portugal and even the Baltic—as it was in silk manufacture, of which the Italians were first the pupils and then the demonstrators; or in accounting techniques, which the Venetians, Genoese and Florentines, merchants from the old days, had perfected well before the northerners. And of course Latin culture was spread by the mighty reverberations of the Renaissance, the child of Italy and the Mediterranean whose path can be followed across Europe (II, 763-64).

At one level, therefore, Braudel sees the Hapsburgs as leaders of a titanic—and historically "necessary"—defense of Latin European civilization against the Ottomans. In this perspective, many episodes look different from the Whig version, whether as presented by Anglo-Americans or by nineteenth-century French liberals.[13] The expulsion of the Moriscos is no longer a piece of bigotry, but an efficacious though drastic measure of self-defense: "In the Spanish situation I am therefore naturally on the side of the Jews, the *conversos*, the Protestants, *alumbrados*, and Moriscos. But such feelings, which I cannot avoid, are irrelevant to the basic problem. To call sixteenth-century Spain a 'totalitarian' or 'racist' country strikes me as unreasonable. It has some harrowing scenes, but then so do France, Germany, England or Venice . . ." (II, 823). Similarly, the revolt of the northern Netherlands is a multifaceted tragedy for both sides. The Armada represents a reasonable but unlucky effort to suppress insidious harassment; its defeat, for all contemporaries could tell, might have been as ephemeral as the Turkish victory at Prevesa half a century earlier. Ivan the Terrible emerges as Philip's unwitting but providential ally, drawing off the Turkish assault. Even the Hapsburg struggle against France is a stern necessity to prevent Turkish manipulation of Christendom's division. The novel perspective (for English-speaking readers) is most noticeable in Braudel's general defense of Latin civilization against the North:

> A living civilization must be able not only to give but to receive and to borrow. . . . But a great civilization can also be recognized by its refusal

[13] "Whig version" seems to be the most nearly neutral term; Hispanic writers often refer to *la leyenda negra*—the black legend—of Spanish atrocities, current for centuries in the English-speaking world. See the recent analysis and documentary collection, Charles Gibson, ed., *The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New* (New York: Knopf 1971).

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> to borrow. . . . Refusals to borrow: of these the sixteenth century provides one of the most striking examples. . . . There had of course always been a gulf between the North and the Mediterranean, two worlds bound together but quite distinct, each with its own horizons, its own heart and, religiously speaking, its own soul. . . . After a few moments of hesitation and enthusiasm which make its final refusal even more noteworthy, Latin civilization said no to the Reformation "from over the mountains." . . . To mention only one difference, Protestantism in the Mediterranean hardly touched the masses at all. It was a movement confined to an elite. . . . The refusal then was deliberate and categorical. It has been said of the Reformation that "it burst upon the Platonic and Aristotelian theology of the Middle Ages as the barbarian Germans burst upon Greco-Roman civilization." All one can say is that what remained of the Roman Empire on the shores of the Latin sea put up more resistance in the sixteenth century that it had in the fifth (II, 764-68).

V

In his explicit historical justification of Romance civilization, Braudel is by no means representative of the *Annales* school. All the same, I have the impression (it is hardly more than an impression) that he reflects a deep, underlying sentiment widespread in contemporary Spain, Italy, and especially France. The sentiment is diversely manifested in a preference for vacations in other Latin countries; in the renewed self-confidence of graduates of the *Grandes Ecoles* vis-à-vis products of Anglo-Saxon or Germanic institutions; and in the vogue for Paul Claudel's *Le Soulier de Satin*, a dramatic riposte to books like Charles Kingsley's *Westward Ho!* which glorified the Elizabethan at the expense of the conquistador. Taken together, these fragments of evidence impress one as a reaffirmation of Latin civilization which is bound to influence Latin America as well as Latin Europe.

What makes this reaffirmation most interesting to the scholar its its combination, in Braudel and in other products of the *Annales* school, with an approach to social analysis distinct from the American approaches that have dominated post-World War II scholarship. Systems theory has rapidly penetrated the French intellectual world. Since Emile Durkheim was the most prominent forerunner of structuralism, and Claude Levi-Strauss himself has been an *Annales* collaborator, it is hardly surprising that structuralism has been especially influential. Braudel acknowledges that he is "by temperament a 'structuralist'" (II, 1244). But a decade ago, structural functionalist analysis was often associated with celebration of Anglo-American political culture. Moreover, the more abstract Parsonian categories have turned out to be poorly adapted to the concrete longitudinal investigations preferred by

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Annales scholars, who seem to require more eclectic theoretical frameworks.

I have suggested that Braudel's work is eclectic in its concepts as well as in its methodological tools. He, like the *Annales* group as a whole, has failed to develop a coherent theoretical position. Although it would be grossly unfair to fault him (or it) for not doing what he never promised, it is evident that scholars seeking to develop tighter, more consistent theories are going to have to find more precise conceptual starting points than Braudel can offer. Nevertheless, a considerable element of eclecticism is, I think, inescapable in the kind of longitudinal studies that North American social scientists are now recognizing as essential to provide a developmental dimension for their theoretical constructs. This is especially true of political scientists and other comparativists trying to specify boundaries between political cultures and the starting and terminal dates of political systems. Braudel has considerable substantive material relating to the formative age of modern polities to offer such investigators. His methodological positions are even more helpful. In addition, his techniques for reordering geographic space in accordance with the potentials of communications technology should be particularly useful to the specialist in international relations. Perhaps the most valuable lesson Braudel and the *Annales* group present to both kinds of political scientists is the necessity of methodological pluralism. Along with this lesson goes its twin, the need for a pluralism of cultural perspectives. Braudel has not worked out an integrated theory of the relative value of civilizations any more than he has presented a coherent theory of causation in history. If he had advanced such a theory of civilizations, I suspect that many would find it objectionable. What Braudel does provide—and this is critically important at a time when North American intellectuals are finally coming to terms with the pluralistic cultural background of our own society as well as of the world in which we act—is a rich alternative perspective on the early modern origins of the Western world. This perspective, a challenge that Braudel might term *un défi latin*, is too significant to neglect.

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